On counterpossibles

The traditional Lewis–Stalnaker semantics treats all counterfactuals with an impossible antecedent as trivially or vacuously true. Many have regarded this as a serious defect of the semantics. For intuitively, it seems, counterfactuals with impossible antecedents—counterpossibles—can be non-trivially true and non-trivially false. Whereas the counterpossible "If Hobbes had squared the circle, then the mathematical community at the time would have been surprised" seems true, "If Hobbes had squared the circle, then sick children in the mountains of Afghanistan at the time would have been thrilled" seems false. Many have proposed to extend the Lewis–Stalnaker semantics with impossible worlds to make room for a non-trivial or non-vacuous treatment of counterpossibles. Roughly, on the extended Lewis–Stalnaker semantics, we evaluate a counterfactual of the form "If A had been true, then C would have been true" by going to closest world—whether possible or impossible—in which A is true and check whether C is also true in that world. If the answer is "yes", the counterfactual is true; otherwise it is false. Since there are impossible worlds in which the mathematically impossible happens, there are impossible worlds in which Hobbes manages to square the circle. And intuitively, in the closest such impossible worlds, sick children in the mountains of Afghanistan are not thrilled—they remain sick and unmoved by the mathematical developments in Europe. If so, the counterpossible "If Hobbes had squared the circle, then sick children in the mountains of Afghanistan at the time would have been thrilled" comes out false, as desired. In this paper, I will critically investigate the extended Lewis–Stalnaker semantics for counterpossibles. I will argue that the standard version of the extended semantics, in which impossible worlds correspond to maximal, logically inconsistent entities, fails to give the correct semantic verdicts for many counterpossibles. In light of the negative arguments, I will then outline a new version of the extended Lewis–Stalnaker semantics that can avoid these problems.     

Actual and Counterfactual Attitudes: Reply to Brueckner and Fischer

In a recent article, I criticized Anthony L. Brueckner and John Martin Fischer’s influential argument—appealing to the rationality of our asymmetric attitudes towards past and future pleasures—against the Lucretian claim that death and prenatal non-existence are relevantly similar. Brueckner and Fischer have replied, however, that my critique involves an unjustified shift in temporal perspectives. In this paper, I respond to this charge and also argue that even if it were correct, it would fail to defend Brueckner and Fischer’s proposal against my critique.     

ALL THE (MANY,MANY) THINGS WE KNOW: EXTENDED KNOWLEDGE*

In this paper we explore the potential bearing of the extended mind thesis—the thesis that the mind extends into the world—on epistemology. We do three things. First, we argue that the combination of the extended mind thesis and reliabilism about knowledge entails that ordinary subjects can easily come to enjoy various forms of restricted omniscience. Second, we discuss the conceptual foundations of the extended mind and knowledge debate. We suggest that the theses of extended mind and extended knowledge lead to a bifurcation with respect to the concepts of belief and knowledge. We suggest that this conceptual bifurcation supports a form of pluralism about these concepts. Third, we discuss whether something similar can be said at the metaphysical level.     

Genetic Counseling Graduate Student Debt: Impact on Program,Career and Life Choices

The cost of education is rising, increasing student financial aid and debt for students pursuing higher education. A few studies have assessed the impact of student debt in medicine, physical therapy and social work, but little is known about the impact of student debt on genetic counseling students and graduates. To address this gap in knowledge, a web-based study of 408 recent alumni of genetic counseling programs in North America was conducted to assess the impact of student debt on program, career and life choices. Over half (63 %; n?=?256/408) of the participants reported that loans were extremely important in their ability to attend their training program, with most using subsidized loans no longer available to current graduate students. While participants were generally satisfied with their genetic counseling education, 83 % (n?=?282/342) of participants with student debt reported feeling burdened by their debt, which had a median of $40,000–$50,000. This debt is relatively close to the median starting salary reported by survey participants ($45,000–$50,000), breaching the “20-10 rule” that states student debt should not exceed 20 % of annual net income. In response to this critical issue, we propose recommendations for the genetic counseling field that may help alleviate student debt impact and burden.     

Buy three but get only two: The smallest effect in a 2 × 2 ANOVA is always uninterpretable

Loftus (Memory & Cognition 6:312–319, 1978) distinguished between interpretable and uninterpretable interactions. Uninterpretable interactions are ambiguous, because they may be due to two additive main effects (no interaction) and a nonlinear relationship between the (latent) outcome variable and its indicator. Interpretable interactions can only be due to the presence of a true interactive effect in the outcome variable, regardless of the relationship that it establishes with its indicator. In the present article, we first show that same problem can arise when an unmeasured mediator has a nonlinear effect on the measured outcome variable. Then we integrate Loftus’s arguments with a seemingly contradictory approach to interactions suggested by Rosnow and Rosenthal (Psychological Bulletin 105:143–146, 1989). We show that entire data patterns, not just interaction effects alone, produce interpretable or noninterpretable interactions. Next, we show that the same problem of interpretability can apply to main effects. Lastly, we give concrete advice on what researchers can do to generate data patterns that provide unambiguous evidence for hypothesized interactions.     

The generalization of shared reality: When communication about one target shapes evaluations of other targets

Communicators often tune their message about a target to the audience's attitude toward that target. This tuning can shape a communicator's own evaluation of the target, which reflects the creation of a shared reality with the audience. So far, evidence for shared‐reality creation has been confined to one specific target. In two experiments, we examined whether and when a shared reality would generalize to other targets. In Experiment 1, shared‐reality creation about an ambiguous sexist target generalized to the evaluation of a new ambiguous sexist target for which no audience attitude was provided. However, this happened only when there was high (vs. low) commonality with the audience regarding previous judgments. In Experiment 2, we investigated conditions for the temporal persistence of generalization. One week after message tuning to a high‐commonality audience, a shared reality generalized to a new ambiguous sexist target when participants recalled the shared‐reality creation about the initial target, but it did not generalize in conditions without such recall. Also, no generalization occurred for non‐ambiguous or non‐sexist targets. Results suggest that shared reality generalization depends on perceived commonality with the audience, recollection of shared reality at time of judgment, and similarity between new and initial targets.     

The Appeal to Expert Opinion: Quantitative Support for a Bayesian Network Approach

The appeal to expert opinion is an argument form that uses the verdict of an expert to support a position or hypothesis. A previous scheme‐based treatment of the argument form is formalized within a Bayesian network that is able to capture the critical aspects of the argument form, including the central considerations of the expert's expertise and trustworthiness. We propose this as an appropriate normative framework for the argument form, enabling the development and testing of quantitative predictions as to how people evaluate this argument, suggesting that such an approach might be beneficial to argumentation research generally. We subsequently present two experiments as an example of the potential for future research in this vein, demonstrating that participants' quantitative ratings of the convincingness of a proposition that has been supported with an appeal to expert opinion were broadly consistent with the predictions of the Bayesian model.     

The hegemony of the practical in embodied cognitive science and the question of bodily vulnerability

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences - When perception is made the subject of philosophy, it is primarily understood as pre-theoretical sensual knowledge, and the question of its truth content...     

Responses to commentaries

This paper is an author response to three commentaries, by Robert Kraut and Itamar Rosenn (2012), Barry Wellman (2012) and Mark van Vugt (2012), on our article entitled ‘Relationships and the social brain: Integrating psychological and evolutionary perspectives’ ( Sutcliffe, Dunbar, Binder, & Arrow, 2012 ).