II—Jason Stanley

ABSTRACT The central claim is that Hornsby's argument that semantic knowledge is practical knowledge is based upon a false premise. I argue, contra Hornsby, that speakers do not voice their thoughts directly. Rather, our actions of voicing our thoughts are justified by decisions we make (albeit rapidly) about what words to use. Along the way, I raise doubts about other aspects of the thesis that semantic knowledge is practical knowledge.     

The epistemological objection to modal primitivism

Modal primitivists hold that some modal truths are primitively true. They thus seem to face a special epistemological problem: how can primitive modal truths be known? The epistemological objection has not been adequately developed in the literature. I undertake to develop the objection, and then to argue that the best formulation of the epistemological objection targets all realists about modality, rather than the primitivist alone. Furthermore, the moves available to reductionists in response to the objection are also available to primitivists. I conclude by suggesting that extant theories of the epistemology of modality are not sensitive to the question of primitivism versus reductionism.

     

The Dynamic Nature of Goals and Message Production as Revealed in a Sequential Analysis of Conflict Interactions

Although message‐production theories often assume that goals behave dynamically to direct communication behavior, few studies consider the interconnectedness of goals and behavior throughout interactions. Here, the interrelationship of communication goals and tactics was examined through a sequential analysis of 47 conflict interactions between close friends or dating partners. It was posited that for both the initiators and resistors in a conflict, the importance of relational or other‐identity goals would be associated with the use of integrative tactics and the importance of instrumental or self‐identity goals would be related to the use of distributive tactics. We examined these predictions within and across partners. Analyses indicated that for both conflict initiators and resistors, the importance of a combination self/instrumental goal predicted the use of distributive tactics and the importance of an other‐identity goal lead to partner‐oriented tactics. For resistors, the importance of an instrumental goal was associated with the use of distributive tactics and the importance of a combination identity/relational goal was aligned with issue‐oriented tactics as well. Across partners, several significant patterns between one partner’s use of distributive or integrative tactics and the other partner’s goals were observed. Implications of the results for understanding conflict and message production are discussed.     

Somatic response to stress, physical symptoms and health service use: The role of current stress

The study examined physical symptoms and health service utilization of subjects high or low on a measure of the tendency to experience stress somatically and high or low on a measure of current stress. High somatic responders reported greater numbers of symptoms than low somatic responders regardless of stress level. However, high somatic responders who were experiencing high levels of current stress reported significantly more symptoms than high somatic responders who were experiencing low levels of stress. These findings indicate that somatic response to stress reflects both a general tendency to focus on physical symptoms, and a specific tendency to focus more on physical symptoms when under stress. Analysis of health service records indicated that high somatic responders had more visits prompted by symptoms than low somatic responders, but did not differ in frequency of health service visits designed to maintain health. The findings further clarify the relationship between somatic response to stress, physical symptoms and health service use.     

Conceptions of states and traits: dimensional attributes with ideals as prototypes

Traits and states are concepts that people use to both describe and understand themselves and others. We show that people view these concepts as prototype-based categories that have a graded internal structure and fuzzy boundaries and identify a set of attributes that define the prototypical cores of two categories: traits and states. Prototypical traits are stable, long-lasting, and internally caused. Prototypical states are temporary, brief, and caused by external circumstances. These prototypes are not defined by averages, as the family-resemblance principle would suggest, but by ideal (or extreme) attribute values. Like other ideal-based categories, traits and states serve particular goals. Trait concepts permit people to predict the present from the past; state concepts identify those behaviors that can be controlled by manipulating the situation. These two complementary schemas are part of the extensive theory of psychological causality that is implicit in language. Abstract social concepts differ from object categories in their category standards, the nature of their attributes, and the interrelations among those attributes.