IN VIVO VERSUS SIMULATION TRAINING: AN INTERACTIONAL ANALYSIS OF RANGE AND TYPE OF TRAINING EXEMPLARS

We analyzed the role of the range of variation in training exemplars as a contextual variable influencing the effects of in vivo versus simulation training in producing generalized responding. Four mentally retarded adults received single case instruction, followed by general case instruction, on washing machine and dryer use; one task was taught using actual appliances (in vivo) and the other using simulation. In vivo and simulation training were counterbalanced across the two tasks for the 2 subject pairs, using a within-subjects Latin square design. With both paradigms, more errors were made after single case than after general case instruction during probe sessions with untrained washing machines and dryers. These results suggest that generalization errors were affected by the range of training exemplars and not by the use of simulated versus natural training stimuli. Although both general case simulation and general case in vivo training facilitated generalized performance of laundry skills, an analysis of training time and costs indicated that the former approach was more efficient. The study illustrates a methodology for studying complex interactions and guiding decisions on the optimal use of instructional alternatives.     

Inquiry into intentional systems I: Issues in ecological physics

Summary The role of intention in guiding the behavior of goal-directed systems is a problem that continues to challenge behavioral science. While it is generally agreed that intentional systems must be consistent with the laws of physics, there are many obvious differences between inanimate, physical systems and sentient, intentional systems. This suggests that there must be constraints over and above those of physics that govern goal-directed behavior. In this paper it is suggested that generic properties of self-organizing mechanisms may play a central role in the origin and evolution of intentional constraints. The properties of self-organizing systems are first introduced in the context of simple physical systems and then extended to a complex (biological) system. Whereas behavior of an inanimate physical system is lawfully determined by force fields, behavior of an animate biological system is lawfully specified by information fields. Biological systems are distinguished from simple physical systems in terms of their ubiquitous use of information fields as special (biological and psychological, social, etc.) boundary conditions on classical laws. Unlike classical constraints (boundary conditions), informational constraints can vary with time and state of the system. Because of the nonstationarity of the boundary conditions, the dynamic of the system can follow a complex trajectory that is organized by a set of spatially and temporally distributed equilibrium points or regions. It is suggested that this equilibrium set and the laws that govern its transformation define a minimal requirement for an intentional system. One of the benefits of such an approach is that it suggests a realist account for the origin of semantic predicates, thereby providing a basis for the development of a theory of symbolic dynamics. Therefore, the principles of self-organization provide a comprehensive basis for investigating intentional systems by suggesting how it is that intentions arise, and by providing a lawful basis for intentional behavior that reveals how organisms become and remain lawfully informed in the pursuit of their goals.     

Feigned insanity in nineteenth-century America: Tactics,trials, and truth

Feigned insanity in nineteenth-century America is appraised through a review of the medical and legal literature. The authors focus on the explanations for feigning, procedures used in uncovering feigning, and the role of feigning in the courtroom. This discussion of feigned insanity demonstrates the remarkable consistency of approach to this form of malingering over the past 200 years.     

Culture wars: American moral divisions across the adult lifespan

Sociologists have argued that the public moral debate in contemporary America is characterized by a “culture war,” pitting “orthodox” and “progressivist” groups against one another (Hunter, 1991). This study addressed whether the culture war is evident in the moral thinking of ordinary Americans, and whether age-related patterns exist. Sixty fundamentalist Baptists (orthodox) and 60 mainline Baptists (progressivist) evaluated and reasoned about moral issues such as divorce and abortion. Each group was divided evenly into three age groups copsisting of young, midlife, and older adults. Moral reasoning was analyzed in terms of Shweder's (1990) ethics of autonomy, community, and divinity. Within all three age groups, progressivists used the ethic of, autonomy more than orthodox participants. Orthodox participants used the ethic of divinity more than progressivists. Orthodox and progressivist groups did not differ much in their use of the ethic, of community. Very few age group differences were found within the orthodox and progressivist groups. It is concluded that morality is conceived of in markedly different wasy by orthodox and progressivist groups, and that these conceptions are consistent across age groups.     

Is visual attention automatically attracted by one’s own name?

Subjects were presented with briefly exposed visual displays of words that were common first names with a length of four to six letters. In the main experiment, each display consisted of four words: two names shown in red and two shown in white. The subject’s task was to report the red names (targets), but ignore the white ones (distractors). On some trials the subject’s own name appeared as a display item (target or distractor). Presentation of the subject’s name as a distractor caused no more interference with report of targets than did presentation of other names as distractors. Apparently, visual attention was not automatically attracted by the subject’s own name.     

Character-Principlism and the Particularity Objection

This paper is a response to particularist critics of the normative force of moral principles. The particularist critique, as I understand it, is a rejection not only of principle-based accounts of moral deliberation and justification, but also of accounts of character in which principles play a central role. I focus on the latter challenge and counter it with a view I call character-principlism .
I begin by discussing in a general way what motivates the particularity objection to principles and then contrast two views – both of which insist on the importance of attentiveness to particularity – about the relative normative status of principles and particular cases. I present some reasons for believing that we need a more normatively robust conception of the role of moral principles than the particularists provide. In the main portion of the paper, I discuss how character-principlism sees principles functioning in our lives and the lives we lead with others. I contrast this with some other accounts of desirable character that particularists can embrace, and argue that these are seriously flawed because, unlike character-principlism, they cannot satisfactorily explain how a person could possess the constancy of character that moral integrity requires.     

Cerebral Anesthetization for Localization of Speech: The Contribution of W. James Gardner

In 1949, the neurologist Juhn Wada reported the first use of a new procedure for determining the localization of speech and language in neurological patients: examination of the effects on speech and language after injecting a barbiturate, sodium amytal, into the internal carotid artery of each hemisphere in succession. By the 1960s, Wada'sIntracarotid Amobarbital Procedure,orIAP,had become the method of choice for identifying the speech-dominant side in one kind of neurological patient, persons with epilepsy who are candidates for surgical resection, and it remains so today. In 1941, however, an American neurosurgeon, W. James Gardner, reported his use of a different anesthetization procedure for speech localization in neurological patients. Instead of injecting sodium amytal through the blood supply, as in the IAP, Gardner injected procaine hydrochloride directly into cortical tissue. In this paper, we provide a brief biography of Gardner. We then discuss his method of cortical anesthetization, the theoretical and empirical background guiding his use of this method and his choice of patients, and, finally, the fate of Gardner's method within the scientific community.     

Construct validity and test-retest reliability of a date rape decision-latency measure

In two studies, the construct (convergent and discriminant) validity and test-retest reliability of a date rape decision-latency measure was examined. In Study 1, 174 college men completed measures related to sexual aggression and listened to an audiotaped simulation of a date rape, during which cues of nonconsent and force gradually escalated over time. Participants were instructed to respond, by pressing a button which recorded the latency of their decisions in seconds, if and when they believed the man depicted in the scenario should stop his sexual advances. Results demonstrated positive associations between prolonged decision latencies and sexually aggressive behavior, calloused sexual beliefs, acceptance of interpersonal violence, and sexual promiscuity. In Study 2, initial results were cross-validated in a sample of 102 college men, and discriminant validity was established as decision latencies were unassociated with measures of social desirability, alcohol consumption and drug use. Test-retest reliability assessed over a 2-week interval was .87.The authors wish to thank Alan Gross and Brian Marx for providing the audiotaped stimulus materials, Richard Marsh for writing the decision-latency computer program, Jason Hicks for assisting with programming, and the undergraduate research assistants for serving as experimenters.     

Correspondence

The American Journal of Psychoanalysis -