Aboriginal Practitioners Offer Culturally Safe and Responsive CBT: Response to Commentaries

We appreciate the valuable commentaries that have been provided for our paper “Can CBT be effective for Aboriginal Australians? Perspectives of Aboriginal practitioners trained in CBT.” The international authors identify how CBT, with adaptations by culturally responsive practitioners can be of value for non‐Western and Indigenous peoples. The commentary by Australian psychologists Dudgeon and Kelly questions the value of CBT for Indigenous Australians, terming it a “Western therapy” that is “culturally unresponsive” and “culturally blind.” They also critique the methodology of the study. We argue that CBT can be adapted by culturally competent practitioners to be culturally safe in Australia, as elsewhere. Cultural safety is mostly a function of the therapist, not the therapy. In the Bennett‐Levy et al. (2014) study, CBT was delivered in a culturally responsive way by Aboriginal counsellors within their own communities. CBT is a particularly adaptable and versatile therapy, and embodies principles of empowerment and self‐determination that are central to Indigenous social and emotional well‐being. We are concerned that CBT, which has strong empirical support and has been adapted elsewhere for a range of cultures, including Indigenous cultures, may be being denied to Indigenous Australian clients. There is considerable opportunity to evaluate the effectiveness and versatility of CBT, and variations of its mode of delivery, for all Australians.     

Effects of memory instruction on attention and information processing: Further investigation of inhibition of return in item-method directed forgetting

In the item-method directed-forgetting paradigm, the magnitude of inhibition of return (IOR) is larger after an instruction to forget (F) than after an instruction to remember (R). In the present experiments, we further investigated this increased magnitude of IOR after F as compared to R memory instructions (dubbed the F > R IOR difference), in order to understand both the consequences for information processing and the purpose of the differential withdrawal of attention that results in this difference. Words were presented in one of four peripheral locations, followed by either an F or an R memory instruction. Then, a target appeared in either the same location as the previous word or one of the other locations. The results showed that the F > R IOR difference cannot be explained by attentional momentum (Exp. 1), that the spatial compatibility of the response options with target locations is not necessary for the F > R IOR difference to emerge (Exp. 2), and that the F > R IOR difference is location-specific rather than response-specific (Exp. 3). These results are consistent with the view that F > R IOR represents a bias against responding to information emanating from an unreliable source (Taylor & Fawcett, 2011).     

Walking Before and During a Sea Voyage

Stationary and moving surfaces impose different constraints on walking. In this study we investigated within-participants differences between walking on a ship before (at the dock) and during (at sea) a sea voyage. Four individuals participated in the study. While on the ship they wore a tri-axial accelerometer (ActiGraph GT3X+; ActiGraph LLC, Pensacola, FL) on their waists. Activity data were sampled at 30 Hz. Data were collected on the day before the voyage began and on several days at sea. The number of steps per day was greater at the dock than at sea. The net resultant force per day also was greater at the dock than at sea. However, resultant force per step was greater at sea (79.97 ± 8.50 vector magnitude counts/step) than on land (62.94 ± 10.03 vector magnitude counts/step). In addition, we observed variations in resultant force per step across days at sea. Ship motion decreased overall activity but increased the force per step.     

Avoid violence,rioting, and outrage; approach celebration,delight, and strength: Using large text corpora to compute valence,arousal, and the basic emotions

Ever since Aristotle discussed the issue in Book II of his Rhetoric, humans have attempted to identify a set of “basic emotion labels”. In this paper we propose an algorithmic method for evaluating sets of basic emotion labels that relies upon computed co-occurrence distances between words in a 12.7-billion-word corpus of unselected text from USENET discussion groups. Our method uses the relationship between human arousal and valence ratings collected for a large list of words, and the co-occurrence similarity between each word and emotion labels. We assess how well the words in each of 12 emotion label sets—proposed by various researchers over the past 118 years—predict the arousal and valence ratings on a test and validation dataset, each consisting of over 5970 items. We also assess how well these emotion labels predict lexical decision residuals (LDRTs), after co-varying out the effects attributable to basic lexical predictors. We then demonstrate a generalization of our method to determine the most predictive “basic” emotion labels from among all of the putative models of basic emotion that we considered. As well as contributing empirical data towards the development of a more rigorous definition of basic emotions, our method makes it possible to derive principled computational estimates of emotionality—specifically, of arousal and valence—for all words in the language.     

Selection for encoding: No evidence of better endogenous orienting following forget than following remember instructions

In an item-method directed forgetting task, attentional resources are withdrawn from forget item processing (e.g., Taylor & Fawcett in Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics, 73, 1790–1814, 2011). Taylor and Hamm (Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics, 78, 168–186, 2016) demonstrated that there is no corresponding increase in the proclivity for exogenous attention to be captured following a forget instruction. This means either that the attentional resources withdrawn from the forget item are reallocated immediately (and therefore not especially vulnerable to capture) or that it is not exogenous attention that is withdrawn. Given that endogenous attention is distinct from exogenous attention, we therefore extended the Taylor and Hamm study by using endogenous orienting rather than exogenous orienting. Words appeared individually in a peripheral location (Exp. 1) or in a central location (Exp. 2), followed by an instruction to either remember or forget. After a short (50-ms) or long (250-ms) interstimulus interval (ISI), a central cue (80% accurate) directed participants to allocate their attention to the left or right. This was followed by a discrimination target that appeared at a 1,000-ms cue–target stimulus onset asynchrony. A subsequent yes–no recognition test assessed memory for all study items. In both experiments, we observed better recognition of remember words than forget words—a directed forgetting effect. We also found a cueing effect, revealed as faster reaction times to discriminate cued targets than to discriminate uncued targets. There was not, however, an effect of memory instruction (and/or instruction–cue ISI) on the magnitude of this cueing effect. Thus, neither exogenous attention nor endogenous attention remains in an unengaged state following an instruction to forget.     

Genuine belief and genuine doubt in Peirce

Peirce makes it clear that doubt and belief oppose one another. But that slogan admits of a weaker and a stronger reading. The weaker reading permits and the stronger reading forbids one to be in a state of doubt and of belief with respect to the same proposition at the same time. The stronger claim is standardly attributed to Peirce, for textual and philosophical reasons. This paper maintains that this standard construal is excessively strong. It argues that the secondary literature tends to presuppose the strong reading and that it often does so by confusing sufficient conditions for belief with necessary ones. It acknowledges some textual evidence on behalf of the strong reading but maintains that, taken as a whole, the relevant passages are as friendly to the weak as to the strong interpretation of Peirce. The paper then links the doubt–belief theory of “The Fixation of Belief” to the papers on probability that occupy the bulk of the Illustrations of the Logic of Science. It shows that Peirce's discussion of probability, strength of belief, and weight of evidence makes room for confidence, but not belief, to be undermined and thus offers a more flexible version of Peirce's theory of inquiry.     

Personality Trait Differences Between Young and Middle‐Aged Adults: Measurement Artifacts or Actual Trends?

A growing body of research demonstrates that older individuals tend to score differently on personality measures than younger adults. However, recent research using item response theory (IRT) has questioned these findings, suggesting that apparent age differences in personality traits merely reflect artifacts of the response process rather than true differences in the latent constructs. Conversely, other studies have found the opposite—age differences appear to be true differences rather than response artifacts. Given these contradictory findings, the goal of the present study was to examine the measurement equivalence of personality ratings drawn from large groups of young and middle‐aged adults (a) to examine whether age differences in personality traits could be completely explained by measurement nonequivalence and (b) to illustrate the comparability of IRT and confirmatory factor analysis approaches to testing equivalence in this context. Self‐ratings of personality traits were analyzed in two groups of Internet respondents aged 20 and 50 (n = 15,726 in each age group). Measurement nonequivalence across these groups was negligible. The effect sizes of the mean differences due to nonequivalence ranged from –.16 to .15. Results indicate that personality trait differences across age groups reflect actual differences rather than merely response artifacts.     

Just between us: Exclusive communications in online social networks

Social media websites such as Facebook are used for relationship development and maintenance often through self-disclosure and sharing of personal information. However, not all forms of social media communication may be equally suitable for this task. This paper explores users’ norms about the appropriateness of using private vs. public Facebook messages to communicate different kinds of personal information, and the effectiveness of these types of communication in building relationships. Study 1, a survey, revealed that users endorse conflicting expectations about preferences for receiving information publicly or privately. Study 2, a field experiment testing the effects of private versus public Facebook communications on actual relationship development using participants’ own Facebook pages, suggested that private messages lead to greater closeness.     

Anxiety sensitivity as a specific and unique marker of anxious symptoms in youth psychiatric inpatients

We addressed several questions regarding the relation of anxiety sensitivity to anxious symptoms among 47 youth psychiatric inpatients (18 boys, 29 girls), ages 9–17 (M = 14.23, SD = 1.89). Participants completed measures of anxiety sensitivity, anxious and depressive symptoms, trait anxiety, and positive and negative affect; chart diagnoses were available. Consistent with hypotheses, we found that (a) anxiety sensitivity was associated with anxious symptoms, even controlling for trait anxiety and depressive symptoms; and (b) anxiety sensitivity displayed symptom specificity to anxious versus depressive symptoms (i.e., was associated with anxiety controlling for depression but not with depression controlling for anxiety). Furthermore, regarding factors of anxiety sensitivity, we obtained mixed support for our prediction that phrenophobia would be associated with both depression and anxiety, whereas fear of physical arousal would be associated with anxiety but not depression. Implications for the construct validity of anxiety sensitivity were discussed.