Collective memory, group minds, and the extended mind thesis

While memory is conceptualized predominantly as an individual capacity in the cognitive and biological sciences, the social sciences have most commonly construed memory as a collective phenomenon. Collective memory has been put to diverse uses, ranging from accounts of nationalism in history and political science to views of ritualization and commemoration in anthropology and sociology. These appeals to collective memory share the idea that memory “goes beyond the individual” but often run together quite different claims in spelling out that idea. This paper reviews a sampling of recent work on collective memory in the light of emerging externalist views within the cognitive sciences, and through some reflection on broader traditions of thought in the biological and social sciences that have appealed to the idea that groups have minds. The paper concludes with some thoughts about the relationship between these kinds of cognitive metaphors in the social sciences and our notion of agency.     

A REPLY TO PHILIP LEVY-IN DEFENSE OF THE G INDEX

Levy's criticism that the use of the G index does not equate person means and variances in Q analysis is answered by pointing out that the matrices used in the illustrations supporting his argument are not based upon items which have been 'double-scored', a necessary requirement for the correct use of G in Q technique. His comments, therefore, are regarded as irrelevant.     

A simple procedure for approximate factor analysis

A variation of the centroid method is described and illustrated. By the application of new rules for reflecting signs, it may be possible to reduce to insignificance the factor loadings of tests showing insignificant correlation (original or residual) with clusters of tests having relatively high intercorrelations. As a result, a factor common to any one of these clusters may be revealed by the centroid method itself with little or no need for rotation of axes or further calculations.     

Acquisition and extinction of a simple motor skill as a function of delay of knowledge of results

The present experiment demonstrates that the effects of delay of knowledge of results (KR) in a line drawing task depend upon the dependent variable which is considered and the original response tendency of the subjects. Delay of KR interfered with the acquisition of the correct response when number of correct responses is the dependent variable. When KR was omitted the immediate-KR group continued to make more correct responses than the delayed-KR group. However, there was a significant reduction in correct responses for both groups. When absolute error was the response measure there were no significant differences between immediate-and delayed-KR groups either during acquisition or extinction. Analysis of the type of response made during extinction suggested that the overshooting effect obtained by previous investigators may be typical of short responders trained under conditions of immediate reinforcement but not of those trained under delayed-KR.

Greenspoon and Foreman (1956) obtained clear cut evidence that the effectiveness of knowledge of results (KR) in a line drawing task varies inversely with the time delay between the response and KR. On the other hand, Bilodeau and Bilodeau (1958) were unable to demonstrate a similar effect in five different experiments. Bilodeau and Ryan (1960) hypothesized that the Greenspoon and Foreman findings could not be replicated and they did in fact obtain null results. However, Dyal (1965) has recently replicated the Greenspoon and Foreman results for the case of a 30 sec. delay interval.

The purpose of the present experiment is twofold: (a) to provide replication of Green-spoon and Foreman's study at the 20 sec. delay interval used by Bilodeau and Ryan, and (b) to determine the effect of elimination of KR on a simple motor response which has been formed on the basis of KR.     

Qualitative and quantitative measures of joint attention development in the first year of life: A scoping review

Joint attention (JA) is the purposeful coordination of an individual's focus of attention with that of another and begins to develop within the first year of life. Delayed, or atypically developing, JA is an early behavioural sign of many developmental disabilities and so assessing JA in infancy can improve our understanding of trajectories of typical and atypical development. This scoping review identified the most common methods for assessing JA in the first year of life. Methods of JA were divided into qualitative and quantitative categories. Out of an identified 13,898 articles, 106 were selected after a robust search of four databases. Frequent methods used were eye-tracking, electroencephalography, behavioural coding, and the Early Social Communication Scale (ECSC). These methods were used to assess JA in typically and atypically developing infants in the first year of life. This study provides a comprehensive review of the past and current state of measurement of JA in the literature, the strengths and limitations of the measures used, and the next steps to consider for researchers interested in investigating JA to strengthen this field going forwards.     

SCADS: A Model of Children's Strategy Choices and Strategy Discoveries

Preschoolers show surprising competence in choosing adaptively among alternative strategies and in discovering new approaches. The SCADS computer simulation illustrates how simple processes can generate this impressive competence. The model's behavior parallels data on children's addition in at least eight ways: It uses diverse strategies over prolonged periods of time, makes adaptive choices among strategies, discovers the same strategies as children, discovers strategies in the same sequence as children, makes discoveries without trial and error, makes discoveries without having experienced failure, narrowly generalizes new approaches, and generalizes more broadly following challenging problems. SCADS thus indicates plausible sources of young children's surprising competence at strategy choice and strategy discovery.     

The Role of Response Effort and Motion Study in Functionally Equivalent Task Designs and Alternatives

We evaluated the effects of functionally equivalent task designs and alternatives, as validated by motion study procedures, on dependent variables (nonadaptive responses, use of alternative, attempts at task, and completed attempts at task) relevant to performing a selected task. First, we evaluated the effects of functionally equivalent task designs on the dependent variables. Second, we evaluated the effects of an efficient functionally equivalent alternative on the variables. Third, we compared the effects of the efficient functionally equivalent alternative with a less efficient functionally equivalent alternative on the same variables. The results showed that the inefficient functionally equivalent task design occasioned higher rates of nonadaptive responses than the efficient functionally equivalent task design. The results also showed that the functionally equivalent task designs and alternatives competed within and across response classes to reduce nonadaptive responses. Mixed results were obtained in comparing the effects of the efficient versus the less efficient functionally equivalent alternatives. We provide evidence for extending the current concept of functional equivalence to include task design responses as well as alternative responses in functional equivalence training.