Aboriginal Practitioners Offer Culturally Safe and Responsive CBT: Response to Commentaries

We appreciate the valuable commentaries that have been provided for our paper “Can CBT be effective for Aboriginal Australians? Perspectives of Aboriginal practitioners trained in CBT.” The international authors identify how CBT, with adaptations by culturally responsive practitioners can be of value for non‐Western and Indigenous peoples. The commentary by Australian psychologists Dudgeon and Kelly questions the value of CBT for Indigenous Australians, terming it a “Western therapy” that is “culturally unresponsive” and “culturally blind.” They also critique the methodology of the study. We argue that CBT can be adapted by culturally competent practitioners to be culturally safe in Australia, as elsewhere. Cultural safety is mostly a function of the therapist, not the therapy. In the Bennett‐Levy et al. (2014) study, CBT was delivered in a culturally responsive way by Aboriginal counsellors within their own communities. CBT is a particularly adaptable and versatile therapy, and embodies principles of empowerment and self‐determination that are central to Indigenous social and emotional well‐being. We are concerned that CBT, which has strong empirical support and has been adapted elsewhere for a range of cultures, including Indigenous cultures, may be being denied to Indigenous Australian clients. There is considerable opportunity to evaluate the effectiveness and versatility of CBT, and variations of its mode of delivery, for all Australians.     

Effects of memory instruction on attention and information processing: Further investigation of inhibition of return in item-method directed forgetting

In the item-method directed-forgetting paradigm, the magnitude of inhibition of return (IOR) is larger after an instruction to forget (F) than after an instruction to remember (R). In the present experiments, we further investigated this increased magnitude of IOR after F as compared to R memory instructions (dubbed the F > R IOR difference), in order to understand both the consequences for information processing and the purpose of the differential withdrawal of attention that results in this difference. Words were presented in one of four peripheral locations, followed by either an F or an R memory instruction. Then, a target appeared in either the same location as the previous word or one of the other locations. The results showed that the F > R IOR difference cannot be explained by attentional momentum (Exp. 1), that the spatial compatibility of the response options with target locations is not necessary for the F > R IOR difference to emerge (Exp. 2), and that the F > R IOR difference is location-specific rather than response-specific (Exp. 3). These results are consistent with the view that F > R IOR represents a bias against responding to information emanating from an unreliable source (Taylor & Fawcett, 2011).     

Walking Before and During a Sea Voyage

Stationary and moving surfaces impose different constraints on walking. In this study we investigated within-participants differences between walking on a ship before (at the dock) and during (at sea) a sea voyage. Four individuals participated in the study. While on the ship they wore a tri-axial accelerometer (ActiGraph GT3X+; ActiGraph LLC, Pensacola, FL) on their waists. Activity data were sampled at 30 Hz. Data were collected on the day before the voyage began and on several days at sea. The number of steps per day was greater at the dock than at sea. The net resultant force per day also was greater at the dock than at sea. However, resultant force per step was greater at sea (79.97 ± 8.50 vector magnitude counts/step) than on land (62.94 ± 10.03 vector magnitude counts/step). In addition, we observed variations in resultant force per step across days at sea. Ship motion decreased overall activity but increased the force per step.     

Avoid violence,rioting, and outrage; approach celebration,delight, and strength: Using large text corpora to compute valence,arousal, and the basic emotions

Ever since Aristotle discussed the issue in Book II of his Rhetoric, humans have attempted to identify a set of “basic emotion labels”. In this paper we propose an algorithmic method for evaluating sets of basic emotion labels that relies upon computed co-occurrence distances between words in a 12.7-billion-word corpus of unselected text from USENET discussion groups. Our method uses the relationship between human arousal and valence ratings collected for a large list of words, and the co-occurrence similarity between each word and emotion labels. We assess how well the words in each of 12 emotion label sets—proposed by various researchers over the past 118 years—predict the arousal and valence ratings on a test and validation dataset, each consisting of over 5970 items. We also assess how well these emotion labels predict lexical decision residuals (LDRTs), after co-varying out the effects attributable to basic lexical predictors. We then demonstrate a generalization of our method to determine the most predictive “basic” emotion labels from among all of the putative models of basic emotion that we considered. As well as contributing empirical data towards the development of a more rigorous definition of basic emotions, our method makes it possible to derive principled computational estimates of emotionality—specifically, of arousal and valence—for all words in the language.     

The Problem of Secondary Effects

This paper argues that two principles held by many metaphysicians and philosophers of mind are inconsistent: (1) there is no systematic overdetermination, and (2) some causal effects are also determined by their metaphysical grounds. Call this “The Problem of Secondary Effects.” After introducing the problem and noting philosophical theories that face it, the paper offers further clarification by considering three potential strategies for solving it. All fail. An approach that sacrifices ‘secondary effects’ is briefly sketched as a solution.