Getting the story right: a Reductionist narrative account of personal identity

A popular “Reductionist” account of personal identity unifies person stages into persons in virtue of their psychological continuity with one another. One objection to psychological continuity accounts is that there is more to our personal identity than just mere psychological continuity: there is also an active process of self-interpretation and self-creation. This criticism can be used to motivate a rival account of personal identity that appeals to the notion of a narrative. To the extent that they comment upon the issue, proponents of narrative accounts typically reject Reductionist metaphysics that (ontologically) reduce persons to aggregates of person stages. In contrast to this trend, we seek to develop a narrative account of personal identity from within Reductionist metaphysics: we think person stages are unified into persons in virtue of their narrative continuity with one another. We argue that this Reductionist version of the narrative account avoids some serious problems facing non-Reductionist versions of the narrative account.     

An Ecological Approach to Modeling Vision: Quantifying Form Perception Using the Circle Map Equation

Abstract

Object perception occurs within a dynamic world, where the environment and the observer (both body and eyes) are continually moving, shifting and changing. We seek to characterize and quantify this process from a perspective accounting for the interconnected system of motion in the environment, the perceiver and the eye, unfolding through time. Specifically, we build a mathematical representation for object perception based off the circle map equation. We describe an interaction between the eyes’ movement and the movement in the world, in order to better understand how those work together to result in perception. Across three experiments, we show that the stability of the relationship between object perception and complex eye movements can be perturbed and will have a predictable response to said perturbations. In so doing, we provide a different context – a dynamical systems framework – under which we can begin to consider the ecological validity of visual perception models, while recognizing the degree to which the visuo-spatial world is continuously being perturbed and disrupted. In fact, we postulate that such perturbations are capitalized on by the perceptual system, contributing to accurate object and motion identification.     

Gender differences in spatial navigation: Characterizing wayfinding behaviors

Psychonomic Bulletin & Review - Men show a consistent spatial navigation advantage over women, which is often attributed to their increased use of survey spatial strategies. But what about...     

Living with painful diabetic neuropathy: insights from focus groups into fears and coping strategies

Objective: Painful diabetic neuropathy (PDN) is known to negatively affect quality of life. Being physically active is a crucial part of successful diabetes self-management, but regimen adherence is often low. Coping strategies and fears have shown to be related to less physical activity (PA). The aim of the present study was to obtain more in-depth information on psychological risk factors leading to less PA in persons with PDN.

Design: Three semi-structured focus group interviews were conducted with a representative sample of persons with PDN (N?=?12). Data were transcribed verbatim and analysed using a hybrid method of thematic analyses and a grounded theory approach.

Main Outcome Measures: Fears and coping strategies related to PA in persons with PDN.

Results: Several specific fears were identified; fear of hypoglycaemia, fear of pain increase, fear of total exhaustion, fear of physical injury, fear of falling, fear of loss of identity, and fear of negative evaluation by others. To cope with these fears, avoidance, remaining active, cognitive distraction, and acceptance strategies were described.

Conclusion: In persons with PDN, diabetes-related fears and pain-related fears play a role in less engagement in PA, indicating the need for new methods for improving self-management in persons with PDN.     

Putting psychology before metaphysics in moral responsibility: Reactive attitudes and a “gut feeling” that can trigger and justify them

ABSTRACT

In “Freedom and Resentment,” P.F. Strawson argues that since the reactive attitudes are psychologically unavoidable, they do not stand in need of justification from philosophical theorizing about the metaphysical conditions necessary for free action. After reviewing and criticizing this line of argument, we develop an alternative account of how the reactive attitudes can be justified through a feature of our psychology. This new account focuses upon a collection of cognitive mechanisms identified by cognitive neuroscience, which recognize human beings (and other minded beings) and which also give rise to a gut feeling that certain entities are possible targets for the reactive attitudes. By focusing on the justificatory power of this gut feeling, we arrive at an account of moral responsibility that places psychology before metaphysics in a manner broadly similar to Strawson’s original account, but in a way that avoids some of the shortcomings of that account.