Gender differences in spatial navigation: Characterizing wayfinding behaviors

Psychonomic Bulletin & Review - Men show a consistent spatial navigation advantage over women, which is often attributed to their increased use of survey spatial strategies. But what about...     

Living with painful diabetic neuropathy: insights from focus groups into fears and coping strategies

Objective: Painful diabetic neuropathy (PDN) is known to negatively affect quality of life. Being physically active is a crucial part of successful diabetes self-management, but regimen adherence is often low. Coping strategies and fears have shown to be related to less physical activity (PA). The aim of the present study was to obtain more in-depth information on psychological risk factors leading to less PA in persons with PDN.

Design: Three semi-structured focus group interviews were conducted with a representative sample of persons with PDN (N?=?12). Data were transcribed verbatim and analysed using a hybrid method of thematic analyses and a grounded theory approach.

Main Outcome Measures: Fears and coping strategies related to PA in persons with PDN.

Results: Several specific fears were identified; fear of hypoglycaemia, fear of pain increase, fear of total exhaustion, fear of physical injury, fear of falling, fear of loss of identity, and fear of negative evaluation by others. To cope with these fears, avoidance, remaining active, cognitive distraction, and acceptance strategies were described.

Conclusion: In persons with PDN, diabetes-related fears and pain-related fears play a role in less engagement in PA, indicating the need for new methods for improving self-management in persons with PDN.     

Putting psychology before metaphysics in moral responsibility: Reactive attitudes and a “gut feeling” that can trigger and justify them

ABSTRACT

In “Freedom and Resentment,” P.F. Strawson argues that since the reactive attitudes are psychologically unavoidable, they do not stand in need of justification from philosophical theorizing about the metaphysical conditions necessary for free action. After reviewing and criticizing this line of argument, we develop an alternative account of how the reactive attitudes can be justified through a feature of our psychology. This new account focuses upon a collection of cognitive mechanisms identified by cognitive neuroscience, which recognize human beings (and other minded beings) and which also give rise to a gut feeling that certain entities are possible targets for the reactive attitudes. By focusing on the justificatory power of this gut feeling, we arrive at an account of moral responsibility that places psychology before metaphysics in a manner broadly similar to Strawson’s original account, but in a way that avoids some of the shortcomings of that account.