Toward a multidimensional definition of sportsmanship

Abstract

One major problem with research conducted on sportsmanship is the absence of an accepted definition. The purpose of this study was to attempt to derive a definition of sportsmanship by applying premises from social psychological theories and research. A major assumption of this perspective is that sportsmanship meanings and labels attached to given behaviors are learned through interpersonal interactions with various sport participants and that eventually a consensual agreement develops regarding the nature of sportsmanship. It thus follows that a meaningful definition of sportsmanship should be obtained through the athletes themselves. In this study, 1056 male and female athletes completed a questionnaire which contained various items pertaining to sportsmanship. Results from a factor analysis revealed the presence of 5 factors corresponding to the respect and concern for: a) one's full commitment toward sport participation, b) the rules and officials. c) social conventions, d) the opponent, as well as e) a negative approach toward sport participation. Implications of this multidimensional definition for future sportsmanship research are drawn.     

Patterns of Daily Time Use of Young Adults With or Without First-Episode Psychosis

This study compared patterns of daily activities and satisfaction with time use of young adults with first-episode psychosis and healthy volunteers. Fifty young adults participated in retrospective structured interviews on time use. Young adults with first-episode psychosis spend more time in sleep, passive leisure, and personal care activities, and less in total productive activities and education. No difference appeared for leisure, paid work, and household work, or satisfaction with daily time use. Reasons underlying dissatisfaction with daily time use differed between the groups. Clinical and research implications are discussed.     

Mathematical forms and forms of mathematics: leaving the shores of extensional mathematics

In this paper, I introduce the idea that some important parts of contemporary pure mathematics are moving away from what I call the extensional point of view. More specifically, these fields are based on criteria of identity that are not extensional. After presenting a few cases, I concentrate on homotopy theory where the situation is particularly clear. Moreover, homotopy types are arguably fundamental entities of geometry, thus of a large portion of mathematics, and potentially to all mathematics, at least according to some speculative research programs.     

Moral Arguments in the Debate over Nanotechnologies: Are We Talking Past Each Other?

How are we to understand the fact that the philosophical debate over nanotechnologies has been reduced to a clash of seemingly preprogrammed arguments and counterarguments that paralyzes all rational discussion of the ultimate ethical question of social acceptability in matters of nanotechnological development? With this issue as its starting point, the study reported on here, intended to further comprehension of the issues rather than provide a cause-and-effect explanation, seeks to achieve a rational grasp of what is being said through the appeals made to this or that principle in the range of arguments put forward in publications on the subject. We present the results of the study’s analyses in two parts. In the first, we lay out the seven categories of argument that emerged from an analysis of the literature: the arguments based on nature, dignity, the good life, utility, equity, autonomy, and rights. In the second part, we present the background moral stances that support each category of argument. Identifying the different categories of argument and the moral stance that underlies each category will enable a better grasp of the reasons for the multiplicity of the arguments that figure in discussions of the acceptability of nanotechnologies and will ultimately contribute to overcoming the tendency towards talking past each other that all too often disfigures the exchange. Clarifying the implications of the moral arguments deployed in the debate over nanotechnologies may make it possible to reduce the confusion observable in these exchanges and contribute to a better grasp of the reasons for their current unproductiveness.     

The Social and Ethical Acceptability of NBICs for Purposes of Human Enhancement: Why Does the Debate Remain Mired in Impasse?

The emergence and development of convergent technologies for the purpose of improving human performance, including nanotechnology, biotechnology, information sciences, and cognitive science (NBICs), open up new horizons in the debates and moral arguments that must be engaged by philosophers who hope to take seriously the question of the ethical and social acceptability of these technologies. This article advances an analysis of the factors that contribute to confusion and discord on the topic, in order to help in understanding why arguments that form a part of the debate between transhumanism and humanism result in a philosophical and ethical impasse: 1. The lack of clarity that emerges from the fact that any given argument deployed (arguments based on nature and human nature, dignity, the good life) can serve as the basis for both the positive and the negative evaluation of NBICs. 2. The impossibility of providing these arguments with foundations that will enable others to deem them acceptable. 3. The difficulty of applying these same arguments to a specific situation. 4. The ineffectiveness of moral argument in a democratic society. The present effort at communication about the difficulties of the argumentation process is intended as a necessary first step towards developing an interdisciplinary response to those difficulties.     

Cognitive load and semantic analogies: Searching semantic space

The aim of the present study is to investigate the performance of children of different ages on an analogymaking task involving semantic analogies in which there are competing semantic matches. We suggest that this can best be studied in terms of developmental changes in executive functioning. We hypothesize that the selection of common relational structure requires the inhibition of other salient features, in particular semantically related matches. Our results show that children's performance in classic A ∶ B ∶∶ C ∶ D analogy-making tasks seems to depend crucially on the nature of the distractors and the association strength between both the A and B terms and the C and D terms. These results agree with an analogy-making account (Richland, Morrison, & Holyoak, 2006) based on different limitations in executive functioning at different ages.     

Pour une poétique des jeux de langage

Malgré le refus que Wittgenstein semble avoir toujours opposé à l'idée d'une esthétique philosophique, son oeuvre et les nombreuses suggestions que contiennent ses divers propos se révélent riches d'enseignements, en particulier pour ce qui concerne les voies dans lesquelles certaines formes de discours sur l'art se sot engagées. La notion wittgensteinienne dejeu de langage est, sous ce rapport, éclairante. Elle permet de mettre au jour, ou du moins d'entrevoir, deux catégories de faits. Tout d'abord, elle offre une perspective critique intéressante sur le programme de ce que l'on s'est plu à nommer une poétique, dans le prolongement d'Aristote, de Jakobson et de Valéry. La poétique structuraliste, en particulier, se révéle solidaire d'une philosophie que ses ambitions théoriques ne suffisent pas à occulter. En second lieu, la notion de jeu de langage, chez Wittgenstein lui-même, est associée à une pratique d'écriture originale qui obscurcit les frontiéres que la philosophie, depuis Platon, s'est toujours souciée de tracer. Pour une poétique des jeux de langage, il existe, entre la poétique et la philosophie une double symétrie. La premiére — celle des structuralistes ou des néo-structuralistes —obéit à un programme plus philosophique qu'on ne croit; la second, en revanche, comme on le voit avec Wittgenstein, intégr une démarche poétique qui nous invite à penser à nouveaux frais ce que nous faisons.     

Category theory and the foundations of mathematics: Philosophical excavations

The aim of this paper is to clarify the role of category theory in the foundations of mathematics. There is a good deal of confusion surrounding this issue. A standard philosophical strategy in the face of a situation of this kind is to draw various distinctions and in this way show that the confusion rests on divergent conceptions of what the foundations of mathematics ought to be. This is the strategy adopted in the present paper. It is divided into 5 sections. We first show that already in the set theoretical framework, there are different dimensions to the expression foundations of. We then explore these dimensions more thoroughly. After a very short discussion of the links between these dimensions, we move to some of the arguments presented for and against category theory in the foundational landscape. We end up on a more speculative note by examining the relationships between category theory and set theory.Various versions of this paper have been read by many people, many of whom have made crucial comments. Needless to say, I am entirely responsible for the claims made in this paper. I would particularly like to thank, in alphabetical order, Mario Bunge, Marta Bunge, Michael Hallett, Andrew Irvine, Saunders Mac Lane, Collin McLarty, Peneloppe Maddy and Mihaly Makkai. Part of the work was done while the author was a visiting fellow at REHSEIS in Paris and at the Center for Philosophy of Science in Pittsburgh. I would like to thank everyone for his or her help and support. I gratefully acknowledge the financial support received from the SSHRC of Canada while this work was done.