Terrorism as Collective Communication: The Collective Communication Model of Terrorism (CCMT)

This paper proposes that the psychological and behavioral effects of terrorist threat can be understood as a collective communication process that occurs between terrorists and their potential victims. Based on classic communication theory, terrorists are regarded as the senders of a specific collective message (such as ‘stop oppressing our culture’); a terrorist incident as the collective message itself (through its performance, modality and targets); and the potential victims as its collective receivers (who interpret the intention of the attack as a function of their pre-existing attributes, such as traits or salient social identities). The perception of terrorism as a dynamic and interactive process between collective senders, messages and receivers opens new theoretical perspectives regarding whether (a) terrorism can be successful in reaching its collective aim; (b) if it is interpreted as rational or irrational; and (c) how to counteract the vicious, cyclical relationship between terrorism and counter-terrorism. Previous findings on the psychology of terrorism can be organized within this theoretical framework, and the psychological impact of varying attributes of the perpetrators (senders), incident (message), and the reactions of the potential victims (receivers) systematically investigated. A series of self-conducted studies are also reviewed and found to provide direct support for the collective communication model of terrorism.     

Moral Responsibility and the Metaphysics of Free Will: Reply to van Inwagen

In The Philosophical Quarterly , 47 (1997), pp. 373–81, van Inwagen argues in a critical notice of my book The Metaphysics of Free Will that the impression that Frankfurt-type examples show that moral responsibility need not require alternative possibilities results from insufficient analytical precision. He suggests various precise principles which imply that moral responsibility requires alternative possibilities. In reply, I seek to defend the conclusion I have drawn from Frankfurt-type examples: moral responsibility need not require alternative possibilities. I contend that van Inwagen's principles — the principle of possible prevention and the no-matter-what principle — are invalid, and I suggest that their plausibility comes from thinking about a proper subset of the relevant cases.     

Les comportements d'évaluation dans les systèmes éducatifs: INFLUENCE D'UNE CATÉGORISATION ETHNIQUE SUR LA NOTATION DE PRODUCTIONS SCOLAIRES

Dans le cadre de l'étude expérimentale des comportements d'évaluation mis en ?uvre dans les systèmes éducatifs et à partir de concepts de la psychologie de la perception, les auteurs rapportent une expérience qui met en évidence l'influence d'une catégorisation ethnique des élèves sur l'évaluation de leurs productions scolaires. Un měme devoir est noté différemment selon que le nom patronymique de l'élève qui est censé l'avoir effectué a une ((consonance française)) ou au contraire une ((consonance étrangère)). Mais les effets enregistrés diffèrent selon les évaluateurs concernés, qui ont été distingués selon des dimensions similaires à celles différenciant les élèves dont ils devaient évaluer les productions.     

Does Religious Belief Matter for Grief and Death Anxiety? Experimental Philosophy Meets Psychology of Religion

It is commonly reasoned that religious belief moderates death anxiety and aids in coping with loss. However, a philosophical perspective known as meta‐atheism includes the claim that avowed religious believers grieve deaths and experience death anxiety as intensely as avowed atheists. Thus, we report a study comparing religious believers and nonbelievers on measures of death anxiety and grief. We further investigated the relationships between certain religious beliefs (views of God, afterlife belief, religious orientation) and death anxiety, as well as both painful grief reactions and grief‐related growth. We surveyed 101 participants across the United States, ranging in age (19 to 57), education, and ethnicity. Participants avowing some form of religious belief, in comparison to those not, did not demonstrate lower levels of death anxiety. They did, however, display higher levels of a certain type of death acceptance. Additionally, those professing belief reported less grief and greater growth in response to loss. Greater afterlife belief was not associated with less grief; however, it was associated with both greater grief‐related growth and lower death anxiety.     

Emotional collectives: How groups shape emotions and emotions shape groups

Group settings are epicentres of emotional activity. Yet, the role of emotions in groups is poorly understood. How do group-level phenomena shape group members’ emotional experience and expression? How are emotional expressions recognised, interpreted and shared in group settings? And how do such expressions influence the emotions, cognitions and behaviours of fellow group members and outside observers? To answer these and other questions, we draw on relevant theoretical perspectives (e.g., intergroup emotions theory, social appraisal theory and emotions as social information theory) and recent empirical findings regarding the role of emotions in groups. We organise our review according to two overarching themes: how groups shape emotions and how emotions shape groups. We show how novel empirical approaches break important new ground in uncovering the role of emotions in groups. Research on emotional collectives is thriving and constitutes a key to understanding the social nature of emotions.