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181.
182.
The structural view of rational acceptance is a commitment to developing a logical calculus to express rationally accepted
propositions sufficient to represent valid argument forms constructed from rationally accepted formulas. This essay argues
for this project by observing that a satisfactory solution to the lottery paradox and the paradox of the preface calls for
a theory that both (i) offers the facilities to represent accepting less than certain propositions within an interpreted artificial
language and (ii) provides a logical calculus of rationally accepted formulas that preserves rational acceptance under consequence.
The essay explores the merit and scope of the structural view by observing that some limitations to a recent framework advanced
James Hawthorne and Luc Bovens are traced to their framework satisfying the first of these two conditions but not the second. 相似文献
183.
184.
The reason why, since Descartes, nobody has found a solution to the mind–body problem seems to be that the problem itself
is a false or pseudo-problem. The discussion has proceeded within a pre-Cartesian conceptual framework which itself is a source
of the difficulty. Dualism and all its alternatives have preserved the same pre-Cartesian conceptual framework even while
denying Descartes’ dualism. In order to avoid this pseudo-problem, I introduce a new perspective with three elements: the
subject, the observed object, and the conditions of observation (given by the internal and external tools of observation).
On this new perspective, because of the conditions of observation, the mind and the brain belong to epistemologically different
worlds.
An erratum to this article is available at . 相似文献
185.
Knowing one’s past thoughts and attitudes is a vital sort of self-knowledge. In the absence of memorial impressions to serve as evidence, we face a pressing question of how such self-knowledge is possible. Recently, philosophers of mind have argued that self-knowledge of past attitudes supervenes on rationality. I examine two kinds of argument for this supervenience claim, one from cognitive dynamics, and one from practical rationality, and reject both. I present an alternative account, on which knowledge of past attitudes is inferential knowledge, and depends upon contingent facts of one’s rationality and consistency. Failures of self-knowledge are better explained by the inferential account. 相似文献
186.
Omitting experimental data is often considered a violation of scientific integrity. If we consider experimental inquiry as
a questioning process, omitting data is seen to be merely an example of tentatively rejecting (‘bracketing’) some of nature’s
answers. Such bracketing is not only occasionally permissible; sometimes it is mandated by optimal interrogative strategies.
When to omit data is therefore a strategic rather than ethical question. These points are illustrated by reference to Millikan’s
oil drop experiment. 相似文献
187.
A Contextual Approach to Scientific Understanding 总被引:4,自引:0,他引:4
Achieving understanding of nature is one of the aims of science. In this paper we offer an analysis of the nature of scientific understanding that accords with actual scientific practice and accommodates the historical diversity of conceptions of understanding. Its core idea is a general criterion for the intelligibility of scientific theories that is essentially contextual: which theories conform to this criterion depends on contextual factors, and can change in the course of time. Our analysis provides a general account of how understanding is provided by scientific explanations of diverse types. In this way, it reconciles conflicting views of explanatory understanding, such as the causal-mechanical and the unificationist conceptions. 相似文献
188.
David Chalmerss version of two-dimensional semantics is an attempt at setting up a unified semantic framework that would vindicate both the Fregean and the Kripkean semantic intuitions. I claim that there are three acceptable ways of carrying out such a project, and that Chalmerss theory does not coherently fit any of the three patterns. I suggest that the theory may be seen as pointing to the possibility of a double reading for many linguistic expressions (a double reading which, however, is not easily identified with straightforward semantic ambiguity). 相似文献
189.
190.