Gender is a dimension of face recognition

In an experiment, the authors investigated the impact of gender categorization on face recognition. Participants were familiarized with composite androgynous faces labeled with either a woman's first name (Mary) or a man's first name (John). The results indicated that participants more quickly eliminated faces of the opposite gender than faces of the same gender than the face they were looking for. This gender effect did not result from greater similarity between faces of the same gender. Rather, early gender categorization of a face during face recognition appears to speed up the comparison process between the perceptual input and the facial representation. Implications for face recognition models are discussed.     

Global visual completion of quasi-regular shapes

The topic of amodal completion has often been investigated by using partly occluded shapes that are regular. In research that has typically been done with displays such as these regular shapes, it has been shown that global aspects of a shape can determine completion. To see how robust these global influences in the completion process are, we investigated quasi-regular shapes, ie shapes with a certain overall regularity but not based on metrical identities. First, in experiment 1 participants had to complete quasi-regular shapes in a drawing task. Then, in experiment 2 the primed-matching paradigm was used. Results from both experiments provided evidence for global completions. In experiment 3 we found that multiple global completions can be primed, which, as a control experiment showed, cannot be explained by some inability of the visual system to see the difference between the different completions. These data support the notion that global influences on visual occlusion are apparent even when the partly occluded stimulus is outside the domain of regular shapes. Implications for a global approach are provided.     

Cultural Identity and Groups of Belonging

Research into the cultural foundations of psychic structure must take place simultaneously at the individual, group, and psychosocial level of analysis. Identity, as both an individual and a collective phenomenon, and the primacy of the group dimension become manifest in the imaginary space created by groups, in Bion's protomental system. Cultural incorporates function like somatic processes and establish the synchrony of all cultural interactions. Individuation would thus emerge from the shared common base, which in turn is related to the individual's internalization of his group of belonging. A distinction is drawn between primary groups of belonging, which are extensions of family structure and supply the group's cultural identity, and secondary belonging groups, which are instituted by the society. The relationship between transcultural experiences, aiming at achieving unity, and intercultural experiences, which recognize limits and differences, is a source of tension for the individual and the group. Examples are given of the function of excitation screens within instituted groups and of the cultural dimension of the analytic setting.     

Menarche,Menstruation, and Gender Identity: Retrospective Accounts from Women Who Have Undergone Premenopausal Hysterectomy

Hysterectomy (the surgical removal of the uterus) precipitates the end of menstrual cycles in premenopausal women. In this article I explore whether that premature termination of menstrual function negatively affects women's subjective gender identities. Using the grounded theory research approach, I conducted in-depth interviews with 40 diverse respondents who had undergone premenopausal hysterectomy. These women generally acknowledged that, since the time of menarche, they had closely associated menstruation with their gender identities. However, despite some regrets, respondents' primary reaction was almost unanimous relief that they had ceased menstruating. This finding must be viewed in the context of overwhelming and uncontrollable menstrual pain and bleeding that many respondents had previously experienced. Contrary to expressing remorse that they no longer identified with normal women, who menstruate, most respondents sought to disassociate themselves from the normalized suffering that they perceived is endured by all menstruating women.     

Physical,neural, and mental timing

The conclusions drawn by Benjamin Libet from his work with colleagues on the timing of somatosensorial conscious experiences has met with a lot of praise and criticism. In this issue we find three examples of the latter. Here I attempt to place the divide between the two opponent camps in a broader perspective by analyzing the question of the relation between physical timing, neural timing, and experiential (mental) timing. The nervous system does a sophisticated job of recombining and recoding messages from the sensorial surfaces and if these processes are slighted in a theory, it might become necessary to postulate weird operations, including subjective back-referral. Neuroscientifically inspired theories are of necessity still based on guesses, extrapolations, and philosophically dubious manners of speech. They often assume some neural correlate of consciousness (NCC) as a part of the nervous system that transforms neural activity in reportable experiences. The majority of neuroscientists appear to assume that the NCC can compare and bind activity patterns only if they arrive simultaneously at the NCC. This leads to a search for synchrony or to theories in terms of the compensation of differences in neural delays (latencies). This is the main dimension of the Libet discussion. Examples from vision research, such as "temporal-binding-by-synchrony" and the "flash-lag" effect, are then used to illustrate these reasoning patterns in more detail. Alternatively one could assume symbolic representations of time and space (symbolic "tags") that are not coded in their own dimension (not time in time and space in space). Unless such tags are multiplexed with the quality message (tickle, color, or motion), one gets a binding problem for tags. One of the hidden aspects of the discussion between Libet and opponents appears to be the following. Is the NCC smarter than the rest of the nervous system, so that it can solve the problems of local sign (e.g., "where is the event"?) and timing (e.g., "when did it occur?" and "how long did it last?") on its own, or are these pieces of information coded symbolically early on in the system? A supersmart NCC appears to be the assumption of Libet's camp (which includes Descartes, but also mystics). The wish to distribute the smartness evenly across all stages of processing in the nervous system (smart recodings) appears to motivate the opponents. I argue that there are reasons to side with the latter group.     

Phonological sensitivity and the acquisition of new words in children

Two studies are reported which aimed to examine the relationship between phonological sensitivity and the acquisition of new words that systematically differed in the familiarity of their sound structures. In the first study measures of phonological sensitivity, phonological short-term memory, vocabulary, and nonverbal ability were administered to forty-one 5-year-old children. Phonological sensitivity was related to the paired-associate learning of phonologically unfamiliar words, but not to the learning of familiar words. In the second study a group of 14 nonreading 5-year-old children received phonological sensitivity training. A control group was trained in semantic categorization. After the training, the phonological sensitivity group did perform better on measures of letter knowledge and phonological sensitivity (rhyme and first-sound categorization) and appeared to learn phonologically unfamiliar words more easily. The findings of both studies suggest that phonological sensitivity can support the acquisition of novel words.     

Substantive unconscious and adjective unconscious: the contribution of Wilfred Bion

The author first provides her readers with a brief summary of some of Freud's ideas, as found throughout his work, on the notion of 'unconscious'. The notion of unconscious as noun is contrasted to the idea of unconscious as adjective, this latter being proposed as a quality, or a state, ever temporary, dynamic, and subject to the constant changes going on in the individual's internal psychic world, as well as to external conditions. After presenting some considerations, the author then contrasts the Kleinian model of the mind to the Freudian, and Wilfred Bion's contribution is discussed at some length. Within Bion's conception of psychic functioning, the model of 'dream' is highlighted and, in this regard, clarifications are sought regarding Bion's view of the unconscious. To conclude, a brief and superficial approximation to the work of Carl Jung is touched upon, although the author admits to knowing little of Jung's positions.