The illusion of control: Sequential dependencies underlie contingent attentional capture

The degree to which humans have top-down control over which information they process remains a central debate within the attention literature. Most of the evidence supporting the top-down control of visuospatial attention has come from cueing paradigms in which target stimuli are preceded by cues that are similar or dissimilar from the target. These studies find that the cues similar to targets capture attention, but dissimilar cues do not, suggesting the top-down control of attention. Here, we used a modified cueing paradigm to investigate an alternative possibility that the cue type differences are due to sequential dependency effects occurring between cue and target processing rather than the top-down control of attention. When individuals searched for color targets, we replicated contingent capture effects in RTs, which are susceptible to sequential dependencies, but memory performance was always best at the cued locations, regardless of the cue’s identity. When individuals searched for onset targets, we observed contingent capture in both tasks. These results demonstrate the utility of the memory probe paradigm and suggest an asymmetry between how strongly onsets and color defined cues capture attention.     

Testing the role of response repetition in spatial priming in visual search

In common “attention” tasks, which require stimulus-identity processing prior to the formation of a speeded key-press response, spatial priming effects depend on response repetition. Typically, the repetition of a stimulus location is advantageous when the prior response repeats, but disadvantageous or inconsequential when the prior response changes. This link between responding and space makes it difficult to draw inferences about attentional bias from two-choice key-press tasks. Instead, the findings are accounted for by episodic retrieval theories, which argue that the response associated with a prior stimulus location is retrieved when a later stimulus occupies its space. This retrieval operation is advantageous if the prior response is needed but not otherwise, which explains typical patterns. This perspective motivated us to evaluate whether spatial priming effects in the visual-search literature depend critically on response repetition. To assess this, we reevaluated a series of experiments recently published by Tower-Richardi, Leber, and Golomb (Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics, 78(1), 114–132, 2016). Their goal was to determine the reference frame of spatial priming across visual search displays. Reassessment reveals that spatial priming was strongly dependent on response repetition when spatiotopic, retinotopic, and object-centered reference frames were perfectly confounded. However, when eye movements were made to dissociate the spatiotopic and object-centered reference frame from the retinotopic reference frame, spatial priming was positive and unaffected by response repetition. The findings demonstrate that at least two distinct processes factor into spatial priming across visual searches, which occur at different levels of representation.     

Impulsive choice and pre‐exposure to delays: iv. effects of delay‐ and immediacy‐exposure training relative to maturational changes in impulsivity

Impulsive choice describes preference for smaller, sooner rewards over larger, later rewards. Excessive delay discounting (i.e., rapid devaluation of delayed rewards) underlies some impulsive choices, and is observed in many maladaptive behaviors (e.g., substance abuse, gambling). Interventions designed to reduce delay discounting may provide therapeutic gains. One such intervention provides rats with extended training with delayed reinforcers. When compared to a group given extended training with immediate reinforcers, delay‐exposed rats make significantly fewer impulsive choices. To what extent is this difference due to delay‐exposure training shifting preference toward self‐control or immediacy‐exposure training (the putative control group) shifting preference toward impulsivity? The current study compared the effects of delay‐ and immediacy‐exposure training to a no‐training control group and evaluated within‐subject changes in impulsive choice across 51 male Wistar rats. Delay‐exposed rats made significantly fewer impulsive choices than immediacy‐exposed and control rats. Between‐group differences in impulsive choice were not observed in the latter two groups. While delay‐exposed rats showed large, significant pre‐ to posttraining reductions in impulsive choice, immediacy‐exposed and control rats showed small reductions in impulsive choice. These results suggest that extended training with delayed reinforcers reduces impulsive choice, and that extended training with immediate reinforcers does not increase impulsive choice.     

A Single Counterexample Leads to Moral Belief Revision

What kind of evidence will lead people to revise their moral beliefs? Moral beliefs are often strongly held convictions, and existing research has shown that morality is rooted in emotion and socialization rather than deliberative reasoning. In addition, more general issues—such as confirmation bias—further impede coherent belief revision. Here, we explored a unique means for inducing belief revision. In two experiments, participants considered a moral dilemma in which an overwhelming majority of people judged that it was inappropriate to take action to maximize utility. Their judgments contradicted a utilitarian principle they otherwise strongly endorsed. Exposure to this scenario led participants to revise their belief in the utilitarian principle, and this revision persisted over several hours. This method provides a new avenue for inducing belief revision.