Spatial attention is necessary for object-based attention: Evidence from temporal-order judgments

Attentional selection is a dynamic process that relies on multiple types of representations. That object representations contribute to attentional selection has been known for decades; however, most evidence for this contribution has been gleaned from studies that have relied on various forms of spatial cueing (some endogenous and some exogenous). It has thus remained unclear whether object-based attentional selection is a direct result of spatial cuing, or whether it still emerges without any spatial marker. Here we used a novel method—the temporal-order judgment (TOJ)—to examine whether object-based guidance emerges in the absence of spatial cuing. Participants were presented with two rectangles oriented either horizontally or vertically. Following a 150-ms preview time, two target stimuli were presented on the same or on different objects, and participants were asked to report which of the two stimuli had appeared first. The targets consisted of stimuli that formed a percept of a “hole” or a “hill.” First, we demonstrated that the “hill” target was indeed processed faster, as evidenced by a positive perceived simultaneity (PSS) measure. We then demonstrated that if two targets appeared with equal probabilities on the same and on different objects, the PSS values, although positive, were not modulated by the objects. In a subsequent set of experiments, we showed that objects can modulate attentional allocation—however, only when they are biased by a spatial (endogenous) cue. In other words, in the absence of a spatial cue or bias, object representations do not guide attentional selection. In addition to providing new constraints for theories of object-based attentional guidance, these experiments introduce a novel paradigm for measuring object-based attentional effects.     

The neural, evolutionary, developmental, and bodily basis of metaphor

We propose that there are four fundamental kinds of metaphor that are uniquely mapped onto specific brain “networks” and present preliterate (i.e., evolutionary, including before the appearance of written language in the historical record), prelinguistic (i.e., developmental, before the appearance of speech in human development), and extralinguistic (i.e., neuropsychological, cognitive) evidence supportive of this view. We contend that these basic metaphors are largely nonconceptual and entail (a) perceptual-perceptual, (b) cross-modal, (c) movement-movement, and (d) perceptual-affective mappings that, at least, in the initial stages of processing may operate largely outside of conscious awareness. In opposition to our basic metaphor theory (B_mT), the standard theory (S_mT) maintains that metaphor is a conceptual mapping from some base domain to some target domain and/or represents class-inclusion (categorical) assertions. The S_mT captures aspects of secondary or conceptual metaphoric relations but not primary or basic metaphoric relations in our view. We believe our theory (B_mT) explains more about how people actually recognize or create metaphoric associations across disparate domains of experience partly because they are “pre-wired” to make these links.     

Examining task difficulty and the time course of inhibition of return: detecting perceptually degraded targets.

The ability to efficiently direct visual attention to salient features in the environment is a critical function of the visual system. The finding that people are slower to detect a target that appears at a previously cued location is thought to reflect a mechanism known as inhibition of return (IOR). Past research has shown that difficult target discriminations result in a greater amount of time needed to inhibit previously attended locations (i.e., a delayed onset of inhibition), suggesting that task difficulty plays a critical role in the allocation of attention. In this study, IOR was measured at a wide range of SOAs while participants detected either a perceptually degraded target or a standard, high luminance target. When responses were made to a perceptually degraded target, the time course of IOR was delayed by approximately 250 ms (relative to the control group), suggesting that the difficulty in detecting targets also influences the allocation of attention. The results are consistent with the notion that IOR is not simply a reflexive subcortical mechanism but rather involves top-down attentional control settings.     

Hypnosis versus relaxation: accuracy and confidence in dating international news events

This study compared participants who were administered either a hypnosis (n=50) or a relaxation (n=44) recall priming procedure in terms of the ability to estimate the dates of 20 relatively memorable (‘easy’) vs. less memorable (‘difficult’) international news events. The hypnosis and relaxation groups performed comparably in terms of the accuracy of estimates of when the events occurred, self‐reported confidence in estimates, and the memorability and emotionality of the events that were reported during hypnosis and relaxation. After these initial ratings, participants were informed that ‘at least one’ of their estimates was incorrect, and they were given the opportunity to change their estimates of the date of when one or more of the events occurred. Participants who generated their initial estimates during hypnosis were less likely to change their previous estimates of both easy and difficult events, than were participants in the relaxation condition. The measure of self‐reported confidence and a behavioural measure of willingness to change initial reports were largely dissociated from one another. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Integrative problem-centered metaframeworks therapy I: core concepts and hypothesizing

Over the last 20 years psychotherapy and family therapy have been inundated with a plethora of empirically validated treatments for particular disorders. That trend will increase. Psychotherapists will increasingly be exhorted and ultimately required to integrate empirical data and multicultural competence into their practice. Additionally, individual psychotherapy's default dominance of psychotherapeutic discourse needs to integrate and come to theoretical and clinical terms with the implications of the growing body of research demonstrating the validity and value of a multisystemic perspective. This article (and its companion article) presents a comprehensive, integrative, multisystemic, and empirically informed psychotherapeutic perspective to help therapists and psychotherapy trainers successfully address these challenges-Integrative Problem Centered Metaframeworks (IPCM) Therapy. This first article presents and illustrates IPCM's theoretical foundation, core concepts, and "case formulating" components. It delineates a Blueprint for the practice and teaching of 21st century psychotherapists who can meld science and art into best practice.     

Surprise-induced blindness: a stimulus-driven attentional limit to conscious perception

The cost of attending to a visual event can be the failure to consciously detect other events. This processing limitation is well illustrated by the attentional blink paradigm, in which searching for and attending to a target presented in a rapid serial visual presentation stream of distractors can impair one's ability to detect a second target presented soon thereafter. The attentional blink critically depends on 'top-down' attentional settings, for it does not occur if participants are asked to ignore the first target. Here we show that 'bottom-up' attention can also lead to a profound but ephemeral deficit in conscious perception: Presentation of a novel, unexpected, and task-irrelevant stimulus virtually abolishes conscious detection of a target presented within half a second after the 'Surprise' stimulus, but only for its earliest occurrences (generally 1 to 2 presentations). This powerful but short-lived deficit contrasts with a milder but more enduring form of attentional capture that accompanies singleton presentations in rapid serial visual presentations. We conclude that the capture of stimulus-driven attention alone can limit explicit perception.