Visuospatial cueing by self-caused features: Orienting of attention and action–outcome associative learning

The effect of a salient visual feature in orienting spatial attention was examined as a function of the learned association between the visual feature and the observer’s action. During an initial acquisition phase, participants learned that two keypress actions consistently produced red and green visual cues. Next, in a test phase, participants’ actions continued to result in singletons, but their color could be either congruent or incongruent with the learned action–color associations. Furthermore, the color singletons now functioned as valid or invalid spatial cues in a visual search, in which participants looked for a tilted line (“/” or “\”) among distractors (“X”s). The results showed that an action-congruent color was more effective as a valid cue in the search task (increased benefit), but less effective as an invalid cue (reduced cost). We discuss our findings in terms of both an inhibition account and a preactivation account of action-driven sensory bias, and argue in favor of the preactivation account.     

Pop-out and pop-in: Visual working memory advantages for unique items

Attentional control is thought to play a critical role in determining the amount of information that can be stored and retrieved from visual working memory (VWM). We tested whether and how task-irrelevant feature-based salience, known to affect the control of visual attention, affects VWM performance. Our results show that features of a task-irrelevant color singleton are more likely to be recalled from VWM than non-singleton items and that this increased memorability comes at a cost to the other items in the display. Furthermore, the singleton effect in VWM was negatively correlated with an individual’s baseline VWM capacity. Taken together, these results suggest that individual differences in VWM storage capacity may be partially attributable to the ability to ignore differences in task-irrelevant physical salience.     

Resilient Response to Battering

Spouse abuse remains an important social problem. Recent research has begun to explore resiliency in a variety of areas: Why, despite harsh life circumstances, do some people survive and later thrive after experiencing trauma? What are the processes associated with a successful departure from abuse? The authors worked with a local shelter to identify three groups of women: (a) those currently at the shelter; (b) those who had been away from an abusive relationship for at least one year; and (c) those who were identified by shelter staff as having demonstrated a resilient response to battering, and compared experiences and recommendations between groups and discuss clinical and service implications.     

Prior experience and patterning in a prisoner's dilemma game

Female college students first played a pseudo-prisoner's dilemma (PPD) game with the experimenter, who followed a fixed strategy. In the first experiment the experimenter's strategies for different groups of subjects were: (a) play tit-for-tat; (b) play randomly; (c) always cooperate; (d) always defect (‘cooperation’ and ‘defection’, defined as in an actual prisoner's dilemma game). Only the tit-for-tat group increased cooperation over trials; other groups decreased cooperation. After playing the PPD with the experimenter, subjects played an actual prisoner's dilemma (PD) game with each other. In the PD game, subjects began cooperating moderately but cooperation deteriorated regardless of what the experimenter's strategy had been in the earlier (PPD) game. In a second experiment, subjects again played a PPD game with the experimenter and then played a PD game with each other. Half played one trial at a time as in the first experiment while half played in patterns of four trials at a time. In the PD game, patterning of trials retarded the development of mutual defection regardless of previous experience. The cooperation-preserving effect of patterning of trials in this social task is compared with similar effects on individual tasks involving self-control and risk-aversion. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Trust,anger, resentment,forgiveness: On blame and its reasons

A discussion of the scope that exists for the normative assessment of blame. The paper starts from the assumption that blame is to be understood in terms of the reactive attitudes. A particular crux is the question of whether blame can be assessed critically if conditions are in place that render the reactive attitudes apt or warranted. The paper argues that even warranted blame can be managed critically and that this is something we often have reason to do, given the oppositional nature of reactive blame. The point is illustrated through a discussion of forgiveness and hypocrisy. A further claim is that, once reasons for reactive blame are distinguished from distinct reasons for managing it in different ways, space opens up for interesting global challenges to reactive blame, even when it is internally apt or warranted.     

Spatial attention is necessary for object-based attention: Evidence from temporal-order judgments

Attentional selection is a dynamic process that relies on multiple types of representations. That object representations contribute to attentional selection has been known for decades; however, most evidence for this contribution has been gleaned from studies that have relied on various forms of spatial cueing (some endogenous and some exogenous). It has thus remained unclear whether object-based attentional selection is a direct result of spatial cuing, or whether it still emerges without any spatial marker. Here we used a novel method—the temporal-order judgment (TOJ)—to examine whether object-based guidance emerges in the absence of spatial cuing. Participants were presented with two rectangles oriented either horizontally or vertically. Following a 150-ms preview time, two target stimuli were presented on the same or on different objects, and participants were asked to report which of the two stimuli had appeared first. The targets consisted of stimuli that formed a percept of a “hole” or a “hill.” First, we demonstrated that the “hill” target was indeed processed faster, as evidenced by a positive perceived simultaneity (PSS) measure. We then demonstrated that if two targets appeared with equal probabilities on the same and on different objects, the PSS values, although positive, were not modulated by the objects. In a subsequent set of experiments, we showed that objects can modulate attentional allocation—however, only when they are biased by a spatial (endogenous) cue. In other words, in the absence of a spatial cue or bias, object representations do not guide attentional selection. In addition to providing new constraints for theories of object-based attentional guidance, these experiments introduce a novel paradigm for measuring object-based attentional effects.     

The neural, evolutionary, developmental, and bodily basis of metaphor

We propose that there are four fundamental kinds of metaphor that are uniquely mapped onto specific brain “networks” and present preliterate (i.e., evolutionary, including before the appearance of written language in the historical record), prelinguistic (i.e., developmental, before the appearance of speech in human development), and extralinguistic (i.e., neuropsychological, cognitive) evidence supportive of this view. We contend that these basic metaphors are largely nonconceptual and entail (a) perceptual-perceptual, (b) cross-modal, (c) movement-movement, and (d) perceptual-affective mappings that, at least, in the initial stages of processing may operate largely outside of conscious awareness. In opposition to our basic metaphor theory (B_mT), the standard theory (S_mT) maintains that metaphor is a conceptual mapping from some base domain to some target domain and/or represents class-inclusion (categorical) assertions. The S_mT captures aspects of secondary or conceptual metaphoric relations but not primary or basic metaphoric relations in our view. We believe our theory (B_mT) explains more about how people actually recognize or create metaphoric associations across disparate domains of experience partly because they are “pre-wired” to make these links.     

Examining task difficulty and the time course of inhibition of return: detecting perceptually degraded targets.

The ability to efficiently direct visual attention to salient features in the environment is a critical function of the visual system. The finding that people are slower to detect a target that appears at a previously cued location is thought to reflect a mechanism known as inhibition of return (IOR). Past research has shown that difficult target discriminations result in a greater amount of time needed to inhibit previously attended locations (i.e., a delayed onset of inhibition), suggesting that task difficulty plays a critical role in the allocation of attention. In this study, IOR was measured at a wide range of SOAs while participants detected either a perceptually degraded target or a standard, high luminance target. When responses were made to a perceptually degraded target, the time course of IOR was delayed by approximately 250 ms (relative to the control group), suggesting that the difficulty in detecting targets also influences the allocation of attention. The results are consistent with the notion that IOR is not simply a reflexive subcortical mechanism but rather involves top-down attentional control settings.     

Hypnosis versus relaxation: accuracy and confidence in dating international news events

This study compared participants who were administered either a hypnosis (n=50) or a relaxation (n=44) recall priming procedure in terms of the ability to estimate the dates of 20 relatively memorable (‘easy’) vs. less memorable (‘difficult’) international news events. The hypnosis and relaxation groups performed comparably in terms of the accuracy of estimates of when the events occurred, self‐reported confidence in estimates, and the memorability and emotionality of the events that were reported during hypnosis and relaxation. After these initial ratings, participants were informed that ‘at least one’ of their estimates was incorrect, and they were given the opportunity to change their estimates of the date of when one or more of the events occurred. Participants who generated their initial estimates during hypnosis were less likely to change their previous estimates of both easy and difficult events, than were participants in the relaxation condition. The measure of self‐reported confidence and a behavioural measure of willingness to change initial reports were largely dissociated from one another. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.