On the function of weak phantasmata in perception: Phenomenological,psychological and neurological clues for the transcendental function of imagination in perception

Weak phantasmata have a decisive and specifically transcendental function in our everyday perception. This paper provides several different arguments for this claim based on evidence from both empirical psychology and phenomenology.I would like to express my gratitude to Bill McKenna for his help with the English text and his critical remarks. This paper was presented in the Cork Roundtable for Philosophy in March 2003, at University College, Cork, and I would like to thank Julia Jansen, Tony O’Connor and the other participants for their constructive critique.     

Coming to terms with risk factors for eating disorders: application of risk terminology and suggestions for a general taxonomy

The aims of the present review are to apply a recent risk factor approach (H. C. Kraemer et al., 1997) to putative risk factors for eating disorders, to order these along a timeline, and to deduce general taxonomic questions. Putative risk factors were classified according to risk factor type, outcome (anorexia nervosa, bulimia nervosa, binge-eating disorder, full vs. partial syndromes), and additional factor characteristics (specificity, potency, need for replication). Few of the putative risk factors were reported to precede the onset of the disorder. Many factors were general risk factors; only few differentiated between the 3 eating disorder syndromes. Common risk factors from longitudinal and cross-sectional studies were gender, ethnicity, early childhood eating and gastrointestinal problems, elevated weight and shape concerns, negative self-evaluation, sexual abuse and other adverse experiences, and general psychiatric morbidity. Suggestions are made for the conceptualization of future risk factor studies.     

Effects of binding in the identification of objects

The binding problem requires a solution at the level of individual neurons, but no definite mechanism has yet be given. Therefore, the neuronal level is as yet inadequate for modeling cognitive processes in which binding plays a crucial role. Moreover, the neuronal level involves too many details that are unlikely to be essential for understanding cognition. A general model of cognitive brain functioning is described in which cognitive tasks are represented in a network of cell assemblies. In the network, binding is functionally defined in a way that is compatible with the neuronal level. A computer simulation of the model clarifies how the binding of location and identity of a set of simultaneously presented letters takes place and how questions about the location and identity of the letters are answered. From the simulation of the task three predictions on the logistics of neural processes are derived: 1. When the cell assembly representing a letter participates in more than one temporary excitation loop, it will reach its critical threshold faster. At the behavioral level this means that as the number of identical letters in the display increases, responses will be faster. 2. In order to answer questions about the location and identity of presented letters cell assemblies representing the target location and the target identity have to become bound to their appropriate values. As a consequence the facilitatory effect of identical letters will be stronger if they involve the target location or the target identity than when identical non-targets are involved. 3. Negative identifications are more dependent on the presentation time of the letters than positive identifications because the excitation loops involved take more time to reach the critical threshold. Therefore, the facilitatory effect of identical letters is stronger when the external activation is relatively strong, i.e., when presentation time of the letters is sufficiently long. The reaction times obtained in three behavioral experiments support these hypotheses. Effects of binding can therefore be predicted on the basis of the general logistics of neural processes, without assumptions about a specific binding mechanism at the neuronal level.     

Actions blind to conceptually overlapping stimuli

Participants are worse at identifying spatial symbols (arrowheads) while performing spatially compatible manual key presses. The present experiments investigated the generality of this blindness effect to response-compatible stimuli. In Experiment 1 a left key press deteriorated the identification of left-pointing arrows, and a right key press deteriorated the perception of right-pointing arrows, independent of the hands used to press the key. Thus the blindness effect is based on codes of the distal response location rather than on the body-intrinsic anatomical connection of the hands. Experiment 2 extended the blindness effect to verbal responses and written position words (left, right, up, down). Vocalizing a position word blinded to directly compatible position words (e.g., left-left), but not to orthogonally compatible position words (e.g., left-down). This result suggests that the use of identical stimulus-response codes, and not the use of saliency-matching but distinct codes, suffices to produce blindness effects. Finally, Experiment 3 extended the blindness phenomenon beyond the spatial domain by demonstrating blindness between saying color words and perceiving color patches. Altogether, the experiments revealed action-induced blindness to be a phenomenon of broad empirical validity occurring whenever action and perception afford simultaneous access to the same conceptual codes.     

Perceiving while acting: action affects perception

In two experiments we studied how motor responses affect stimulus encoding when stimuli and responses are functionally unrelated and merely overlap in time. Such R-S effects across S-R assignments have been reported by Schubö, Aschersleben, and Prinz (2001), who found that stimulus encoding was affected by concurrent response execution in the sense of a contrast (i.e., emphasizing differences). The present study aimed at elucidating the mechanisms underlying this effect. Experiment 1 studied the time course of the R-S effect. Contrast was only obtained for short intertrial intervals (ITIs). With long ITIs contrast turned into assimilation (i.e., emphasizing similarities). Experiment 2 excluded an interpretation of the assimilation effect in terms of motor repetition. Our findings support the notion of a shared representational domain for perception and action control, and suggest that contrast between stimulus and response codes emerges when two S-R assignments compete with each other in perception. When perceptual competition is over, assimilation emerges in memory.     

Bottom-up and top-down control in visual search

Previous research suggests that the allocation of attention is largely controlled either in a stimulus-driven or in a goal-driven manner. To date, few studies have systematically manipulated variables affecting stimulus-driven and goal-driven selection independently in order to investigate how both manners of control interrelate and affect performance in visual search. In the present study observers were presented with search displays consisting of an array of line segments rotated at various orientations. The task of observers was to indicate the presence or absence of a vertical line segment (the target) presented amongst a series of nontargets and possibly one distractor. By varying the absolute differences in orientation between the target, nontargets, and distractors, relative target-distractor salience and target-distractor similarity were independently manipulated to investigate the contribution of stimulus-driven and goal-driven control. The major result was that relative target-distractor salience and target-distractor similarity affected search performance independently. Performance was better in cases where the irrelevant distractor was not a salient item in the search display and did not look similar to the target. The results are discussed in terms of models of attentional control.