Individual differences in need for cognition and decision making in the Iowa Gambling Task

Differences in decision making between individuals differing in Need for Cognition (NFC) are examined using the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT). Previous work using normative one time decisions suggests that individual low in NFC process gains and losses differently than those high in NFC and are more susceptible to decision biases. The IGT is a popular laboratory task that involves making risky decisions from experience involving both gains and losses. In the first experiment, low NFC participants performed significantly worse than the high NFC participants. A second experiment designed to examine the nature of these differences provides evidence that low NFC participants place more importance on gains as opposed to losses when performing the IGT. Results are discussed in light of previous work suggesting that low NFC participants place more importance on losses in mixed outcome decisions.     

Justice in Teams: The Context Sensitivity of Justice Rules Across Individual and Team Contexts1

Two empirical studies investigated the context sensitivity of various rules for fostering organizational justice using hypothetical vignettes. Study 1 compared the importance of distributive justice rules (equity, equality, need) and procedural justice rules (process control, decision control, consistency, correctability, accuracy, bias suppression, ethicality) across individual and team contexts. The results showed that team contexts enhanced the importance of equality, consistency, and decision control. Study 2 compared the importance of procedural justice rules across different types of teams. The results showed that the accuracy rule was more important in small teams, while the consistency and bias suppression rules were more important in diverse teams. The importance of other rules, including interpersonal and informational justice, did not vary across the experimental conditions.     

“Meaningful” social inferences: Effects of implicit theories on inferential processes

Perceivers’ shared theories about the social world have long featured prominently in social inference research. Here, we investigate how fundamental differences in such theories influence basic inferential processes. Past work has typically shown that integrating multiple interpretations of behavior during social inference requires cognitive resources. However, three studies that measured or manipulated people’s beliefs about the stable versus dynamic nature of human attributes (i.e., their entity vs. incremental theory, respectively) qualify these past findings. Results revealed that, when interpreting others’ actions, perceivers’ theories selectively facilitate the consideration of interpretations that are especially theory-relevant. While experiencing cognitive load, entity theorists continued to incorporate information about stable dispositions (but not about dynamic social situations) in their social inferences, whereas incremental theorists continued to incorporate information about dynamic social situations (but not about stable traits). Implications of these results for how perceivers find meaning in behavior are discussed.     

Feature mismatch effects in auditory negative

A handful of studies have revealed that withholding a response to a sound causes impaired responding to that sound when subsequently presented (Buchner & Steffens, 2001; Mondor, Leboe, & Leboe, 2005). In the present study, we investigated whether a switch in the location of a repeated sound might represent an additional source of this auditory negative priming effect. In all three of our experiments, participants performed a series of trials in which they withheld a response to a dichotic pair of prime sounds presented to each ear. A dichotic pair ofprobe sounds was then presented to each ear, and the participants were required to categorize one of them. Across these experiments, the participants were slower to categorize only repeated sounds that were presented in opposite locations.     

Applying statistics to the gatekeeping of expert evidence: Introducing the Structured Statistical Judgement (SSJ)

Daubert required judges to base their decisions about the admissibility of expert witness testimony in large part on the reliability and validity of empirical observations. Because judges have a wide array of duties and may not be equipped to understand the complexities of statistical analysis, some jurists have recommended that court‐appointed experts assist judges in their gatekeeping function. To assist such experts in scrutinizing empirical papers, we propose a Structured Statistical Judgement (SSJ) that takes advantage of advances in the various statistical methods – such as effect sizes that adjust for error – which have allowed researchers to report increasingly more reliable and valid observations. We also include supplementary materials that court‐appointed experts can use both as a codebook to operationalize the SSJ and as a quick reference that will aid consultation with judges. An initial application of the SSJ examined all 93 empirical articles published in Psychology, Public Policy, and Law and Law and Human Behavior in 2015 and resulted in excellent interrater reliability (π = 0.83; π = 0.95; π = 0.97), at the same time it indicated that a majority of the articles fail to include the comprehensive and transparent statistical analysis that would be most useful to courts.     

Bonding social capital and collective action: Associations with residents' perceptions of their neighbourhoods

Neighbourhood perceptions have important implications for individual well‐being, yet there is limited research focused on variables that predict these perceptions. This study proposes that previous engagement in collective action mediates the relationship between neighbourhood bonding social capital and neighbourhood perceptions. Structural equation modelling with a large, nationally representative sample (N = 25,370) is used to test the hypotheses. The findings suggest that bonding social capital has a positive, direct effect on both neighbourhood perceptions and collective action. Collective action has a negative, direct association with neighbourhood perceptions and bonding social capital has a negative, indirect effect on neighbourhood perceptions via collective action. Although the full model explains 28% of the variance in neighbourhood perceptions, bonding social capital only explains 5% of the variance in collective action.     

Measuring Prosociality: The Development of a Prosocial Behavioral Intentions Scale

Prosociality is a critical issue in behavioral research. In this investigation, we developed a measure of prosocial behavioral intentions. Qualitative responses from two surveys (n = 465) and items from existing measures were used to generate a list of prosocial behaviors in which people might intend to engage. We factor analyzed responses to these items (n = 319) and retained the most common and representative items. The new measure demonstrated adequate internal consistency (n = 247, 147; α = .81, .83); convergent validity with past prosocial behavior (r = .51, .43), moral identity (r = .50, .55), and materialism (r = –.30, –.20). The instrument also predicted prosocial behavior while controlling for a prior measure of prosocial intentions, Exp(B) = 1.99, Wald = 10.59, p = .001, thereby demonstrating incremental predictive validity. This 4-item scale could be used across contexts to advance the study of prosociality.     

Nonassertive Moral Abolitionism

Proponents of moral abolitionism, like Richard Garner, qualify their view as an “assertive” version of the position. They counsel moral realists and anti‐realists alike to accept moral error theory, abolish morality, and encourage others to abolish morality. In response, this paper argues that moral error theorists should abolish morality, but become quiet about such abolition. It offers a quietist or nonassertive version of moral abolitionism. It does so by first clarifying and addressing the arguments for and against assertive moral abolitionism. Second, it develops novel criticisms of assertive moral abolitionism and offers nonassertive moral abolitionism in response. Third, it discusses how various metaethical views might respond to nonassertive moral abolitionism. Its basic claim is that nonassertive moral abolitionism provides superior therapeutic benefits over assertive moral abolitionism and other conserving and reforming approaches to moral discourse.