II—Jason Stanley

ABSTRACT The central claim is that Hornsby's argument that semantic knowledge is practical knowledge is based upon a false premise. I argue, contra Hornsby, that speakers do not voice their thoughts directly. Rather, our actions of voicing our thoughts are justified by decisions we make (albeit rapidly) about what words to use. Along the way, I raise doubts about other aspects of the thesis that semantic knowledge is practical knowledge.     

A perceptual phenomenon and its neurophysiological correlate.

A square-wave grating from which the fundamental harmonic has been subtracted (missing fundamental grating) when viewed from a suitable distance appears similar to another grating of periodicity three times higher. The neurons of the visual cortex of the cat, in a given range of spatial frequencies characteristic of each cell, give similar responses to the two gratings.     

THE GOLEM LEGEND AND THE ENIGMA OF FACEBOOK

We are easily misguided as to the true nature of Facebook, and tend to treat it simply as a powerful technological instrument in the service of human intentions. We can, however, gain a better picture of it through recourse to the Jewish tradition of the golem, an image of human beings, created by them in a re-enactment of their own creation by God. It turns into a magic servant in modernity with an inherent dynamic running between its human and its subhuman characteristics. This dynamic is the main cause behind its becoming uncontrollable. In like manner, what is subhuman in Facebook serves its masters and functions under their total control, but also empowers Facebook's increasingly human operation, an algorithm-based capability which raises growing doubts about what counts as human. Facebook implies the crisis of humanity which coincides with the “death of God,” that is, the obsolescence of the idea of a divine creator.     

“To hope was to expect”: The impact of perspective taking and forecast type on wishful thinking

When forecasting future outcomes, people tend to believe that the outcomes they want to happen are also likely to happen. Despite numerous attempts, few systematic factors have been identified that consistently and robustly reduce wishful thinking (WT) effects. Using elections and sporting event outcomes as contexts, three experiments examined whether taking the perspective of a political rival or opposing fan reduced WT effects. We also examined whether making deliberative (vs. intuitive-based) forecasts was associated with lower WT effects. Online adult samples of U.S. citizens from Mechanical Turk and U.S. college students provided their preferences and forecasts for the U.S. presidential election (Experiments 1 and 2) and a sports competition outcome (Experiment 3). Critically, some participants received perspective taking prompts immediately before providing forecasts. First, results revealed reductions in WT effects when participants engaged in perspective taking. Interestingly, this effect only emerged when intuitive-based forecasts were made first (Experiment 3). Second, intuitive-based forecasts revealed stronger evidence of WT effects. Finally, we found that perspective taking and forming forecasts deliberately promoted a shift in focus away from preferences and toward a consideration of the relative strengths and weaknesses of the entities (i.e., candidates and teams). Theoretical implications for understanding WT effects and applied implications for developing interventions are discussed.