The entertainment value of conspiracy theories

Many citizens around the globe believe conspiracy theories. Why are conspiracy theories so appealing? Here, we propose that conspiracy theories elicit intense emotions independent of emotional valence. People therefore find conspiracy theories entertaining – that is, narratives that people perceive as interesting, exciting, and attention-grabbing – and such entertainment appraisals are positively associated with belief in them. Five studies supported these ideas. Participants were exposed to either a conspiratorial or a non-conspiratorial text about the Notre Dame fire (Study 1) or the death of Jeffrey Epstein (preregistered Study 2). The conspiratorial text elicited stronger entertainment appraisals and intense emotions (independent of emotional valence) than the non-conspiratorial text; moreover, entertainment appraisals mediated the effects of the manipulation on conspiracy beliefs. Study 3 indicated that participants endorsed stronger conspiracy beliefs when an election event was described in an entertaining rather than a boring manner. Subsequent findings revealed that both organisational (Study 4) and societal conspiracy beliefs (Study 5) are positively associated with sensation seeking – a trait characterised by a preference for exciting and intense experiences. We conclude that one reason why people believe conspiracy theories is because they find them entertaining.     

Injustice for All or Just for Me? Social Value Orientation Predicts Responses to Own Versus Other's Procedures

In two experiments, the authors investigated how differences in social value orientation predict evaluations of procedures that were accorded to self and others. Proselfs versus prosocials were either granted or denied an opportunity to voice an opinion in a decision-making process and witnessed how someone else was either granted or denied such an opportunity. Consistent with the hypothesis, procedural evaluations of both proselfs and prosocials were influenced by own procedure when other was granted voice, but only proselfs were influenced by own procedure when other was denied voice. These findings were particularly attributable to prosocials' tendency to evaluate a situation where no-voice procedures are applied consistently between persons more positively than proselfs. It is concluded that proselfs are focused on procedural justice and injustice for self more than prosocials, whereas prosocials value equality in procedures more than proselfs-even when equality implies injustice for all.     

Self-construal level and voice procedures: The individual self as psychological basis for procedural fairness effects

In the current article, we investigate the influence of self-construal level on procedural fairness effects, that is, the finding that fair versus unfair procedures influence people’s evaluations of their relation with decision-making authorities. In two experiments, we manipulated self-construal level by activating the individual self (“I”) or the social self (“We”), and we induced a control condition. Furthermore, we manipulated procedural fairness by granting versus denying participants an opportunity to voice their opinion in a decision-making process. Results consistently revealed stronger procedural fairness effects if the individual self is activated than if the social self is activated. It is concluded that sometimes the individual self, rather than the social self, constitutes the psychological basis for procedural fairness effects.     

Abducted by Bayesians?

This paper discusses the role of theoretical notions in making predictions and evaluating statistical models. The core idea of the paper is that such theoretical notions can be spelt out in terms of priors over statistical models, and that such priors can themselves be assigned probabilities. The discussion substantiates the claim that the use of theoretical notions may offer specific empirical advantages. Moreover, I argue that this use of theoretical notions explicates a particular kind of abductive inference. The paper thus contributes to the discussion over Bayesian models of abductive inference.     

Measurement invariance versus selection invariance: is fair selection possible?

This article shows that measurement invariance (defined in terms of an invariant measurement model in different groups) is generally inconsistent with selection invariance (defined in terms of equal sensitivity and specificity across groups). In particular, when a unidimensional measurement instrument is used and group differences are present in the location but not in the variance of the latent distribution, sensitivity and positive predictive value will be higher in the group at the higher end of the latent dimension, whereas specificity and negative predictive value will be higher in the group at the lower end of the latent dimension. When latent variances are unequal, the differences in these quantities depend on the size of group differences in variances relative to the size of group differences in means. The effect originates as a special case of Simpson's paradox, which arises because the observed score distribution is collapsed into an accept-reject dichotomy. Simulations show the effect can be substantial in realistic situations. It is suggested that the effect may be partly responsible for overprediction in minority groups as typically found in empirical studies on differential academic performance. A methodological solution to the problem is suggested, and social policy implications are discussed.     

Group belongingness and procedural justice: social inclusion and exclusion by peers affects the psychology of voice

The authors focus on the relation between group membership and procedural justice. They argue that whether people are socially included or excluded by their peers influences their reactions to unrelated experiences of procedural justice. Findings from 2 experiments corroborate the prediction that reactions to voice as opposed to no-voice procedures are affected more strongly when people are included in a group than when they are excluded from a group. These findings are extended with a 3rd experiment that shows that people who generally experience higher levels of inclusion in their lives respond more strongly to voice as opposed to no-voice procedures. It is concluded that people's reactions to procedural justice are moderated by people's level of inclusion in social groups.     

A prior predictive loss function for the evaluation of inequality constrained hypotheses

In many types of statistical modeling, inequality constraints are imposed between the parameters of interest. As we will show in this paper, the DIC (i.e., posterior Deviance Information Criterium as proposed as a Bayesian model selection tool by Spiegelhalter, Best, Carlin, & Van Der Linde, 2002) fails when comparing inequality constrained hypotheses. In this paper, we will derive the prior DIC and show that it also fails when comparing inequality constrained hypotheses. However, it will be shown that a modification of the prior predictive loss function that is minimized by the prior DIC renders a criterion that does have the properties needed in order to be able to compare inequality constrained hypotheses. This new criterion will be called the Prior Information Criterion (PIC) and will be illustrated and evaluated using simulated data and examples. The PIC has a close connection with the marginal likelihood in combination with the encompassing prior approach and both methods will be compared. All in all, the main message of the current paper is: (1) do not use the classical DIC when evaluating inequality constrained hypotheses, better use the PIC; and (2) the PIC is considered a proper model selection tool in the context of evaluating inequality constrained hypotheses.     

Modeling Mind and Matter: Reductionism and Psychological Measurement in Cognitive Neuroscience

Psychological resilience has become a popular concept. Owing to that popularity, the word resilience has taken on myriad and often overlapping meanings. To be a useful framework for psychological research and theory, the authors argue, the study of resilience must explicitly reference each of four constituent temporal elements: (a) baseline or preadversity functioning, (b) the actual aversive circumstances, (c) postadversity resilient outcomes, and (d) predictors of resilient outcomes. Using this framework to review the existing literature, the most complete body of evidence is available on individual psychological resilience in children and adults. By contrast, the research on psychological resilience in families and communities is far more limited and lags well behind the rich theoretical perspective available from those literatures. The vast majority of research on resilience in families and communities has focused primarily on only one temporal element, possible predictors of resilient outcomes. Surprisingly, however, almost no scientific evidence is actually available for community or family resilient outcomes. We close by suggesting that there is room for optimism and that existing methods and measures could be relatively easily adapted to help fill these gaps. To that end, we propose a series of steps to guide future research.