Dynamic operations of thought systems

Our research program focuses on thought systems consisting of a core event that might befall a person and other topics evoked in free associating on this event, mostly its salient antecedents and consequences. We theorize that the pattern of salient antecedents and consequences evoked by the core event are related to its judged desirability and likelihood by several adaptive principles, such that when a change is directly induced in one part of the belief system it produces predictable remote adjustments in other parts. In a first experiment we manipulated the core event's judged desirability or likelihood and tested for predicted remote effects on the salience of antecedents and consequences. A second experiment conversely manipulated the salience of antecedents or consequences and tested for predicted remote effects on the core event's judged desirability and likelihood.     

Processing distinctions between stems and affixes: evidence from a non-fluent aphasic patient

In this paper, we study the ability of a non-fluent aphasic patient, BN, to comprehend morphologically complex words when they appear in utterance contexts. We first establish that he is insensitive to the contextual appropriateness of both derived and inflected words. In a further experiment we show that he has no difficulty processing the stems of complex words and conclude that his problem is with the bound morphemes themselves. We then ask whether this problem is due to his inability to access either the phonological form of a morphologically complex word or its semantic and/or syntactic content. We find that only the access of semantic and syntactic content is impaired. We conclude from these six studies that: (a) BN presents a counter-example to the claim that non-fluent patients have particular difficulty with those aspects of morphology which have a syntactic function; (b) BN processes both derived and inflected words by mapping the sensory input onto the entire full-form of a complex word, but the semantic and syntactic content of the stem alone is accessed and integrated into the context. The semantic and syntactic implications of the suffix are never evaluated. This implies separate representation of the stems and suffixes of some types of morphologically complex words.     

Idioms and mental imagery: the metaphorical motivation for idiomatic meaning

We conducted three experiments to investigate the mental images associated with idiomatic phrases in English. Our hypothesis was that people should have strong conventional images for many idioms and that the regularity in people's knowledge of their images for idioms is due to the conceptual metaphors motivating the figurative meanings of idioms. In the first study, subjects were asked to form and describe their mental images for different idiomatic expressions. Subjects were then asked a series of detailed questions about their images regarding the causes and effects of different events within their images. We found high consistency in subjects' images of idioms with similar figurative meanings despite differences in their surface forms (e.g., spill the beans and let the cat out of the bag). Subjects' responses to detailed questions about their images also showed a high degree of similarity in their answers. Further examination of subjects' imagery protocols supports the idea that the conventional images and knowledge associated with idioms are constrained by the conceptual metaphors (e.g., the MIND IS A CONTAINER and IDEAS ARE ENTITIES) which motivate the figurative meanings of idioms. The results of two control studies showed that the conventional images associated with idioms are not solely based on their figurative meanings (Experiment 2) and that the images associated with literal phrases (e.g., spill the peas) were quite varied and unlikely to be constrained by conceptual metaphor (Experiment 3). These findings support the view that idioms are not "dead" metaphors with their meanings being arbitrarily determined. Rather, the meanings of many idioms are motivated by speakers' tacit knowledge of the conceptual metaphors underlying the meanings of these figurative phrases.     

Further thoughts on second-order family therapy--this time it's personal

A series of articles has recently appeared in which implications of second-order cybernetics for the practice of family therapy have been discussed. In this article, we attempt to advance the discussion by addressing ideas that we think have not been adequately emphasized thus far. Specifically proposed are ideas about conditions that might facilitate the emergence of consciously pragmatic strategy informed by the kind of systemic wisdom that delicately balances natural systems without the benefit of human planning. It is argued that a shift in the personal habits of knowing and acting that typically organize individual human experience is required. After attempting to specify what this shift might involve, implications of these ideas for the practice of family therapy and for human action in general are discussed.     

Peer-group association and adolescent tobacco use

Mosbach & Leventhal (1988) examined the relation of cigarette smoking to peer-group identification in rural Wisconsin adolescents. They found that among dirts (problem-prone youth), regulars (average youth), hot-shots (good social or academic performers), and jocks (athletes), youth most likely to smoke were dirts and hot-shots. We performed a replication with a Southern California cohort and also for use of smokeless tobacco. We hypothesized that jocks would be the main users of smokeless tobacco. We identified the same groups and an additional one, skaters (skateboarders or surfers). As Mosbach & Leventhal found, cigarettes were used most by dirts. Contrary to their results, but consistent with other research, we found that hot-shots were least likely to smoke. Contrary to our prediction, we found that skaters and dirts were more likely to use smokeless tobacco than were jocks. Our data show that both tobacco forms are used by problem-prone youth.     

Literalism as a marker of hypnotic "trance": disconfirming evidence

The responses given by highly hypnotizable, hypnotic subjects and those of unhypnotizable subjects who simulated hypnosis to questions of the type, "Do you mind telling me your name?" and "Do you mind standing up?" were contrasted. The purpose was to examine Erickson's (1980) assertion that literalism (answering "yes" or "no" verbally or nonverbally without any cognitive elaboration) is a marker of hypnotic "trance." Simulators exhibited a greater rate of literalism than hypnotic "virtuosos" (i.e., extreme scorers on both group and individual hypnotizability measures). Hypnotized subjects and nonhypnotized subjects approached in the campus library responded comparably. Because less than a third of hypnotic virtuosos responded literally, our results strongly refuted Erickson's assertion that literalism is a cognitive feature of hypnosis.