Labeling: A study of an “autistic” child

Abstract

In this issue we are able to present reports from two very different meetings which, nevertheless, have particular significance for the developing field of family therapy, particularly as it relates to theory and practice. The first is a report by Professors Jeanne L. Thomas and Cecil J. Simons of West Virginia University on the eighth biennial conference on Life-Span Developmental Psychology, held in May 1982, in Mor-gantown, West Virginia. This conference was one of a series sponsored by West Virginia University since 1970 dealing with theoretical and empirical issues in the study of life-span human development. This particular conference highlighted two themes involving the impact of specific historical context on family development as well as the influence of the family on the individual's own experience of these historical events. This kind of broad and in-depth exploration of the multiple factors involved in the historical as well as the personal context of an individual's development promises to provide exciting new opportunities for clinicians and teachers in our field.

The second report from James E. Durkin, Ph.D., of Lincoln University deals with a recent conference on Epistemology, Psychotherapy, and Psychopathology in Houston, September 1982, sponsored by the Houston Galveston Family Institute. Outstanding theoreticans and clinicans in the field of family therapy and systems theory were present, and their exciting discussions have been put into an interesting framework by Dr. Durkin, who has his own way of integrating these issues based on his long work in the application of general systems theory to the field of group psychotherapy. —I. A.     

Triggering Conservation of the Self's Regulatory Resources

Three experiments investigated people's motivation to conserve the self's limited regulatory resource after it is depleted by initial self-control exertion. Across the experiments, the results supported the idea of a conservation process. In Experiment 1, depleted participants' subsequent performance decreased when expecting to engage in a future self-regulation task compared to engaging in no task at all. In Experiments 2 and 3 we employed the “end-effect” pattern found in past vigilance research to further examine conservation. In Experiment 2, depleted and nondepleted participants who knew the study ran for 30 min performed similarly following 20 min of self-regulation, whereas 3 min or 10 min of self-regulation produced typical depletion effects. Likewise, the findings from Experiment 3 revealed this same conservation pattern using a shortened 6-min initial task. Specifically, when depleted participants believed the study was finished their task performance was better compared to those who believed the study would run for another 20 min. In short, the current findings support the idea of conservation—decrements in self-regulatory performance may represent an adaptive inclination to conserve the self's diminished resources rather than an inability to wield further self-control.     

Human dignity and technology: A study and commentary∗

Several contradictory definitions were provided for evolution. It was viewed as progress or as local adaptation, as widening or as exploiting of transformation perspectives, as emergence of non‐historical patterns or as history of Life.

The conflicting views of evolution can be reconciled by taking the rival terms as different moments, or phases, of a single process. The first phase is form creation, the second is form selection. Progress and adaptation, widening and reduction of perspectives, emergence and history orderly mark the two successive phases.

Dynamic Structuralism and Darwinism differ in the preferential emphasis they put, respectively, in the first or in the second phase. According to structuralists, mere history does not depict a process: nothing can happen outside a frame, without a grid of meanings. A chance event, a non‐intelligible event is not a fact. A set of generative principles, of rules of form, is required both to produce evolution and to make it understandable.

By entrusting innovation to chance the Darwinian historical view is essentially pessimistic. Any small step forward can only be achieved at a price of innumerable sacrifices, and only the very few survive. In the dynamic structuralist view, forms (e.g. the mild “splash” by D'Arcy Thompson) emerge spontaneously and immediately, with no need of countless failures. They express concealed potentialities, explore the varied inventory of Nature, and do not result from the meaningless trouble of history.     

Overgeneral autobiographical memory and chronic interpersonal stress as predictors of the course of depression in adolescents

This study investigated whether overgeneral autobiographical memory (OGM) predicts the course of depression in adolescents. As part of a larger longitudinal study of risk for emotional disorders, 55 adolescents with a past history of major depressive disorder or minor depressive disorder completed the Autobiographical Memory Test. Fewer specific memories predicted the subsequent onset of a major depressive episode (MDE) over a 16-month follow-up period, even when covarying baseline depressive symptoms. This main effect was qualified by an interaction between specific memories and chronic interpersonal stress: Fewer specific memories predicted greater risk of MDE onset over follow-up at high (but not low) levels of chronic interpersonal stress. Thus, our findings suggest that OGM, in interaction with chronic interpersonal stress, predicts the course of depression among adolescents, and highlight the importance of measuring interpersonal stress in OGM research.     

Emotion,core affect,and psychological construction

As an alternative to using the concepts of emotion, fear, anger, and the like as scientific tools, this article advocates an approach based on the concepts of core affect and psychological construction, expanding the domain of inquiry beyond “emotion”. Core affect is a neurophysiological state that underlies simply feeling good or bad, drowsy or energised. Psychological construction is not one process but an umbrella term for the various processes that produce: (a) a particular emotional episode's “components” (such as facial movement, vocal tone, peripheral nervous system change, appraisal, attribution, behaviour, subjective experience, and emotion regulation); (b) associations among the components; and (c) the categorisation of the pattern of components as a specific emotion.     

Language use of depressed and depression-vulnerable college students

Essays written by currently-depressed, formerly-depressed, and never-depressed college students were examined for differences in language that might shed light on the cognitive operations associated with depression and depression-vulnerability. A text analysis program computed the incidence of words in predesignated categories. Consistent with Beck's cognitive model and with Pyczsinski and Greenberg's self-focus model of depression, depressed participants used more negatively valenced words and used the word, "I" more than did never-depressed participants. Formerly-depressed (presumably depression-vulnerable) participants did not differ from never-depressed participants on these indices of depressive processing. However, consistent with prediction, formerly-depressed participants' use of the word "I" increased across the essays and was significantly greater than that of never-depressed writers in the final portion of the essays.     

The deliberate control of emotional experience through control of expressions

Recent research suggests that deliberate manipulation of expressive behaviours might self-regulate emotional experiences. Eighty people were first induced to adopt emotional expressions in a successfully disguised procedure that identified whether their feelings were affected by their expressive behaviour when they were unaware of the nature and purpose of that behaviour. They then deliberately attempted to change emotional feelings by adopting or inhibiting emotional behaviours, or by focusing on or being distracted from situational cues for emotion. Participants more responsive to their own behaviour in the disguised procedure felt more intensely when they adopted emotional behaviours, and less intensely when they inhibited those behaviours. In contrast, people identified as unresponsive to their own emotional behaviour were most affected by deliberate focus on or distraction from emotional thoughts. The effectiveness of techniques for emotional self-regulation depends on a match with characteristics of the person.     

Children's and adults’ understanding of the “disgust face”

By the age of 4 years, children (N=120) know the meaning of the word disgust as well as they know the meaning of anger and fear; for example, when asked, they are equally able to generate a plausible cause for each of these emotions. Yet, in tasks involving facial expressions (free labelling of faces, deciding whether or not a face expresses disgust, or finding a “disgust face” in an array of faces), a majority of 3- to 7-year-old children (N=144) associated the prototypical “disgust face” with anger and denied its association with disgust (25% of adults on the same tasks did so as well). These results challenge the assumption that all humans easily recognise disgust from its facial expression and that this recognition is a precursor to children's understanding of the emotion of disgust.