Arithmetic based on the Church numerals in illative combinatory logic

In the early thirties, Church developed predicate calculus within a system based on lambda calculus. Rosser and Kleene developed Arithmetic within this system, but using a Godelization technique showed the system to be inconsistent.Alternative systems to that of Church have been developed, but so far more complex definitions of the natural numbers have had to be used. The present paper based on a system of illative combinatory logic developed previously by the author, does allow the use of the Church numerals. Given a new definition of equality all the Peano-type axioms of Mendelson except one can be derived. A rather weak extra axiom allows the proof of the remaining Peano axiom. Note. The illative combinatory logic used in this paper is similar to the logic employed in computer languages such as ML.The author wishes to thank Dr. Roger Hindley for proofreading this paper and for making some useful suggestions. This paper was presented at the 1986 Annual Conference of the Australasian Association of Logic in Auckland, 9–12 July, 1986.     

A representation theorem for languages with generalized quantifiers through back-and-forth methods

We obtain in this paper a representation of the formulae of extensions ofL by generalized quantifiers through functors between categories of first-order structures and partial isomorphisms. The main tool in the proofs is the back-and-forth technique. As a corollary we obtain the Caicedo's version of Fraïssés theorem characterizing elementary equivalence for such languages. We also discuss informally some geometrical interpretations of our results.     

Fuzziness of concepts and concepts of fuzziness

It has been a vexing question in recent years whether concepts are fuzzy. In this paper several views on the fuzziness of concepts are pointed out to have stemmed from dubious concepts of fuzziness. The underlying notions of the roles feasibly played byprototype, set, andprobability in modeling concepts strongly suggest that the controversy originates from a vague relation between intuitive and mathematical ideas in the cognitive sciences. It is argued that the application of fuzzy sets cannot resolve this vagueness since they are one sided,viz., defined on sets. An alternative definition based on classes (in the sense of axiomatic set theory) is proposed.     

Closed-class words as first syllables do interfere with lexical decisions for nonwords: implications for theories of agrammatism

It has been proposed that a principal cause of the agrammatism of some Broca's aphasics is that such patients, unlike normal subjects, are unable to make use of a special retrieval mechanism for closed-class ("function") words (D. C. Bradley, 1978, Computational distinctions of vocabulary type, Unpublished Ph.D. thesis; D. C. Bradley, M. F. Garrett, & E. B. Zurif, 1980. In D. Caplan (Ed.), Biological studies of mental processes). The main evidence for the existence of such a mechanism consisted of two observations: (1) the recognition of open-class words was observed to be frequency-sensitive, but that of closed-class words was not; and (2) lexical decisions for nonwords which began with open-class words were delayed, whereas there was no such interference for nonwords which began with closed-class words. However, the first of these observations has proved nonreplicable (e.g., B. Gordon & A. Caramazza, 1982, Brain and Language, 15, 143-160, 1983, Brain and Language, 19, 335-345; J. Segui, J. Mehler, W. Frauenfelder, & J. Morton, 1982, Neuropsychologia, 20, 615-627), and in the present paper, three lexical decision experiments are reported in which it is found that, when certain confounding variables are controlled, nonwords which begin with closed-class words are subject to interference. Moreover, contrary to a suggestion of Kolk and Blomert (1985, Brain and Language, 26, 94-105) the interference is independent of the presence of closed-class items in the lexical decision word list. It seems, then, that closed-class words are not qualitatively different from open-class words with respect either to frequency sensitivity or to nonword interference, and in consequence, the above proposed explanation of agrammatism is left without major empirical support.     

Perceptions of speakers with minimal eye contact: Implications for stutterers

One hundred and thirty-three college students responded to percentage definitions of “good,” “minimal,” and “no” eye contact. They also judged their perceptions of a speaker with “little or no eye contact” on a semantic differential scale containing 60 polarized adjective pairs regarding personality traits. The majority of the student respondents defined an individual with “good” eye contact as looking at his/her audience/listener 90–100% of the time. This is a more stringent definition than other literature has indicated. Furthermore, speakers with little or no eye contact were judged less favorably on 70% of the items, which indicates that low eye contact adversely affects perceptions of a speaker's personality. Therefore, stutterers need to be made aware of the importance of and determinants of effective eye contact in communication. Also, the development of effective eye contact needs to be incorporated as a major goal in stuttering therapy.     

Problem structure and the use of base-rate information from experience

This article is concerned with the use of base-rate information that is derived from experience in classifying examples of a category. The basic task involved simulated medical decision making in which participants learned to diagnose hypothetical diseases on the basis of symptom information. Alternative diseases differed in their relative frequency or base rates of occurrence. In five experiments initial learning was followed by a series of transfer tests designed to index the use of base-rate information. On these tests, patterns of symptoms were presented that suggested more than one disease and were therefore ambiguous. The alternative or candidate diseases on such tests could differ in their relative frequency of occurrence during learning. For example, a symptom might be presented that had appeared with both a relatively common and a relatively rare disease. If participants are using base-rate information appropriately (according to Bayes' theorem), then they should be more likely to predict that the common disease is present than that the rare disease is present on such ambiguous tests. Current classification models differ in their predictions concerning the use of base-rate information. For example, most prototype models imply an insensitivity to base-rate information, whereas many exemplar-based classification models predict appropriate use of base-rate information. The results reveal a consistent but complex pattern. Depending on the category structure and the nature of the ambiguous tests, participants use base-rate information appropriately, ignore base-rate information, or use base-rate information inappropriately (predict that the rare disease is more likely to be present). To our knowledge, no current categorization model predicts this pattern of results. To account for these results, a new model is described incorporating the ideas of property or symptom competition and context-sensitive retrieval.     

Is it smart to play the horses? Comment on "A day at the races: a study of IQ, expertise, and cognitive complexity" (Ceci & Liker, 1986)

Ceci and Liker (1986b) presented data that they contended shows two things: (a) Handicapping harness races is a cognitively complex undertaking that can be captured by a multiple regression model, and (b) neither overall skill at handicapping nor the complexity of the mental model used is related to standard measures of intelligence. The first contention is not at issue. But the second contention, that handicapping performance is unrelated to IQ, is not supported by the data presented; in fact, the opposite conclusion seems more likely. The purpose of this comment is to point out errors frequently made in individual-differences research concerning population definition, sample selection, dependent and independent variable reliability and validity and interpretation of results.     

Chronic sweet intake lowers pain thresholds without changing brain mu- or delta-opiate receptors

Sprague-Dawley rats drank sweetened (3% dextrose + 0.144% saccharin, w/v) or unflavored water for 18 days and subsequent pain reactivity was assessed using a hot plate. Compared to the rats that consumed unflavored water, the rats that consumed sweet water responded more quickly on the hot plate indicating that their threshold for pain was lowered. Another group of rats given identical exposure to the fluids had their brains prepared for measuring opiate receptor binding using the delta-receptor ligand [3H]D-Ala-D-Leu-enkephalin ([3H]DADLE) and the mu-receptor selective ligand [3H]Tyr-D-Ala-Gly-MePhe-Gly-ol ([ 3H]DAGO). Binding of these opiates to mu- and delta-receptors in the cerebral cortex, striatum, hippocampus, hypothalamus, brain stem, and remaining brain regions was the same for the rats that drank sweet fluids and those that drank unflavored water. These findings suggest that drinking sweet fluids lowers pain thresholds but does not alter mu- and delta-receptors.