Religion and the Human Rights Idea

Three recent books focus, in different ways, on the idea of human rights and its relation to religion and religious ethics. All three books discussed here address criticisms of the human rights idea and seek to establish the relationship of religion and human rights with regard to the field of policy. The present discussion begins with an overview that places these three books in the larger context of the development of the human rights idea and its historical relationship with religion. It then turns to Little's book, next to the collection of essays edited by Twiss, Simion, and Petersen, which is described internally as a Festschrift for Little, and then to Hogan's book, and in the final section it explores comparisons among the books.     

Somatic response to stress, physical symptoms and health service use: The role of current stress

The study examined physical symptoms and health service utilization of subjects high or low on a measure of the tendency to experience stress somatically and high or low on a measure of current stress. High somatic responders reported greater numbers of symptoms than low somatic responders regardless of stress level. However, high somatic responders who were experiencing high levels of current stress reported significantly more symptoms than high somatic responders who were experiencing low levels of stress. These findings indicate that somatic response to stress reflects both a general tendency to focus on physical symptoms, and a specific tendency to focus more on physical symptoms when under stress. Analysis of health service records indicated that high somatic responders had more visits prompted by symptoms than low somatic responders, but did not differ in frequency of health service visits designed to maintain health. The findings further clarify the relationship between somatic response to stress, physical symptoms and health service use.     

Self-Discrepancies as Predictors of Vulnerability to Distinct Syndromes of Chronic Emotional Distress

Two types of self-discrepancy differing in both domain and standpoint of self-guide were examined as predictors of vulnerability to chronic emotional syndromes. Study 1 assessed discrepancy between the actual/own self-state and the ideal/own self-guide and between the actual/own self-state and the ought/other self-guide in predicting syndromes of dejection and agitation as well as different types of anger. Actual/own: ideal/own discrepancy (AI) was uniquely related to dejection, frustration, and anger at self as measured 2 months later; actual/own:ought/other discrepancy (AOO) was uniquely related to agitation and to anger at others and resentment. Study 2 used structural equation modeling of the relations between AI and AOO discrepancy and social anxiety versus depression as measured weeks later. A model in which AOO was more strongly associated with social anxiety and AI was more strongly associated with depressive symptoms provided the best fit. The results support the convergent and discriminant validity of a self-discrepancy model of vulnerability to chronic emotional syndromes.     

Conceptions of states and traits: dimensional attributes with ideals as prototypes

Traits and states are concepts that people use to both describe and understand themselves and others. We show that people view these concepts as prototype-based categories that have a graded internal structure and fuzzy boundaries and identify a set of attributes that define the prototypical cores of two categories: traits and states. Prototypical traits are stable, long-lasting, and internally caused. Prototypical states are temporary, brief, and caused by external circumstances. These prototypes are not defined by averages, as the family-resemblance principle would suggest, but by ideal (or extreme) attribute values. Like other ideal-based categories, traits and states serve particular goals. Trait concepts permit people to predict the present from the past; state concepts identify those behaviors that can be controlled by manipulating the situation. These two complementary schemas are part of the extensive theory of psychological causality that is implicit in language. Abstract social concepts differ from object categories in their category standards, the nature of their attributes, and the interrelations among those attributes.