Abuse and neglect of adults with mental retardation in different residential settings

Eighty-two per cent of all cases of abuse or neglect of an adult with mental retardation substantiated by the Abuse Investigation Division of the Connecticut Office of Protection and Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities over a five-year period occurred in the victim's residence. Chi square analyses revealed that there was significantly more abuse in institutions and group homes and significantly less in the individual's own home. Furthermore, analyses revealed that there was significantly more personal neglect in group homes and community training homes and significantly less in own homes. The results were discussed and recommendations made regarding ways of reducing abuse and neglect.     

Communication in preterm infants: Why is it different?

The present paper selectively reviews the literature which compares full-term and preterm infants' communication with their mothers in the first year of life. The review is focused not only on what differences are found between full-term and preterm infants, but also why such differences exist. Particular emphasis is placed on the importance of interpreting the findings in the light of the developmental phase of the infants, the heterogeneity of the preterm population and the situation in which communication is studied. Most studies were not designed to consider these issues in any detail. Differences with respect to these factors can be found between studies, however, which may have contributed to the often contradictory findings. Consequently, comparisons between these studies provide clues about the effects of these factors on communicative development. The ultimate goal of this review is to point to important directions for future research on early communication in preterm infants.     

Attentional misguidance in visual search

Previous research has shown that a task-irrelevant sudden onset of an object will capture an observer’s visual attention or draw it to that object (e.g., Yantis & Jonides, 1984). However, further research has demonstrated the apparent inability of an object with a task-irrelevant but unique color or luminance to capture attention (Jonides & Yantis, 1988). In the experiments reported here, we reexplore the question of whether task-irrelevant properties other than sudden onset may capture attention. Our results suggest that uniquely colored or luminous objects, as well as salient though irrelevant boundaries, do not appear to capture attention. However, these irrelevant features do appear to serve as landmarks for a top-down search strategy which becomes increasingly likely with larger display set sizes. These findings are described in terms of stimulus-driven and goal-directed aspects of attentional control.     

Taking Frege's name in vain

A widely held view about Fregean Sense has it that the determination of a sign's referent by the sign's sense is achieved viasatisfaction: the sense specifies a condition (or set of conditions) and the referent is that entity, if any, which uniquely satisfies that (set of) condition(s). This is usually held in conjunction with the claim that the sense is existentially and qualitatively independent of the referent: if the referent did not exist, or did not uniquely satisfy the sense, the sense would still exist and would still specify the same condition(s) that it actually does (and might determine a different referent than its actual one). Proponents of this view give several reasons for holding it. I describe these reasons and argue that they are not convincing. More generally, I try to show that the notion of satisfaction has no useful application within Frege's system. I then suggest an alternative account of the determination of a referent by a sense that I think is truer to Frege and more illuminating. Compared to the satisfaction view, my account construes determination as a more naturalistic and epistemically real relation between speakers and things in the world.     

Phenomenology and artificial intelligence: Husserl learns Chinese

For over a decade John Searle's ingenious argument against the possibility of artificial intelligence has held a prominent place in contemporary philosophy. This is not just because of its striking central example and the apparent simplicity of its argument. As its appearance in Scientific American testifies, it is also due to its importance to the wider scientific community. If Searle is right, artificial intelligence in the strict sense, the sense that would claim that mind can be instantiated through a formal program of symbol manipulation, is basically wrong. No set of formal conditions can provide us with the characteristic feature of mind which is the intentionally of its mental contents. Formally regarded, such intentionally is an irreducible primitive. It cannot be analyzed into non-intentional (purely syntactic, symbolic) components. This paper will argue that this objection is based on a misunderstanding. Intentionality is not simply something given which is incapable of further analysis. It only appears so when we mistakenly abstract it from time. When we regard its temporal structure, it shows itself as a rule-governed, synthetic process, one capable of being instantiated both by machines and men.