Privacy Rights,and Why Negative Control is Not a Dead End: A Reply to Munch and Lundgren

Lauritz Munch and Björn Lundgren have recently replied to a paper published by us in this journal. In our original paper, we defended a novel version of the so-called ‘control theory’ of the moral right to privacy. We argued that control theorists should define ‘control’ as what we coined ‘Negative Control’. Munch and Lundgren have recently provided a range of interesting and challenging objections to our view. Independently of each other, they give almost identical counterexamples to our definition of Negative Control. In this comment, we show that while the counterexamples are genuine counterexamples, they do not force us to abandon the idea of Negative Control. Furthermore, we reply to two additional objections raised by Lundgren. One of these replies involves giving a new account of what the relation is between the concept of privacy and the right to privacy.

     

The Achievement of Therapeutic Objectives Scale: interrater reliability and sensitivity to change in short-term dynamic psychotherapy and cognitive therapy

This study examined interrater reliability and sensitivity to change of the Achievement of Therapeutic Objectives Scale (ATOS; McCullough, Larsen, et al., 2003) in short-term dynamic psychotherapy (STDP) and cognitive therapy (CT). The ATOS is a process scale originally developed to assess patients' achievements of treatment objectives in STDP, but further operational definitions have led to a theoretically neutral assessment device, making it applicable to other treatment modalities as well. Videotapes from a randomized controlled trial comparing the effectiveness of STDP and CT for patients with Cluster C personality disorders were rated by independent raters, typically at Sessions 6 and 36. The results indicated good to excellent interrater reliability, as well as adequate sensitivity to change in theoretically expected ways, in both STDP and CT. The results lend further support to the psychometric soundness of the ATOS and show promise for its use when comparing STDP and CT.     

My face through the looking-glass: the effect of mirror reversal on reflection size estimation

People tend to grossly overestimate the size of their mirror-reflected face. Although this overestimation bias is robust, not much is known about its relationships to self-face perception. In two experiments, we investigated the overestimation bias as a function of the presentation of the own face (left–right reversed – as in a mirror – or nonreversed – as in a photograph), the identity of the seen face, and prior exposure to a real mirror. For this we developed a computerized task requiring size estimations of displayed faces. We replicated the observation that people overestimate the size of their mirror-reflected face and showed that the overestimation can be reduced following a brief mirror exposure. We also found that left–right reversal modulates the overestimation bias, depending on the perceived face’s identity. These data underline the enhanced familiarity of left–right reversed self-faces and the importance of size perception for understanding mirror reflection processing.     

Neural correlates and causal mechanisms

What Joseph Neisser calls for is exactly right: more philosophy of science will help us better understand and refine the idea of neural correlates of consciousness (NCC). But (i) the key bit of philosophy of science Neisser appeals to is itself in need of clarification; (ii) the orthodox NCC definition is more resourceful than Neisser allows, and (iii) it is possible to resist the phenomenological conception of conscious experience that fuels some of Neisser's argument.     

Nathan Söderblom and Our Own Time1

In 1914 Professor Nathan Söderblom was elected archbishop of the Church of Sweden. His consecration took place in Uppsala Cathedral just months after the beginning of World War I. In 1925, he convened an ecumenical meeting in Stockholm that came to shape the ecumenical movement for decades to come. The peace question remained at the heart of his episcopate as long as it lasted. In this article, Antje Jackelén and Jakob Wirén explore some of the additional challenges that lay before Nathan Söderblom. Even today, there are lessons to be learned from the way Söderblom responded to issues such as questioning the relevance of the church, the need for dialogue between science and theology, the urgency of ecumenical cooperation, and the risks of nationalism.     

Religious freedom and cultural asymmetry: Some pitfalls of secularism

ABSTRACT

Disputes concerning state interference in the religious practices and traditions of citizens have created uproar in public debate in India and Europe during the past decades. The contributors to this colloquium on Europe, India, and the Limits of Secularism point to the importance of two domains in addressing these disputes: the comparative study of court decisions and the budding domain of comparative political theory. In this response, I discuss several issues that emerge from these domains and argue that the problem of cultural asymmetry continues to create major pitfalls in the debates on secularism and religious freedom.     

Scientific Uncertainty in News Coverage of Cancer Research: Effects of Hedging on Scientists’ and Journalists’ Credibility

News reports of scientific research are rarely hedged; in other words, the reports do not contain caveats, limitations, or other indicators of scientific uncertainty. Some have suggested that hedging may influence news consumers’ perceptions of scientists’ and journalists’ credibility (perceptions that may be related to support for scientific research and/or adoption of scientific recommendations). But whether hedging does affect audience perceptions is unknown. A multiple‐message experiment (N= 601) found that across five messages, both scientists and journalists were viewed as more trustworthy (a) when news coverage of cancer research was hedged (e.g., study limitations were reported) and (b) when the hedging was attributed to the scientists responsible for the research (as opposed to scientists unaffiliated with the research).     

Intervention or Involvement: A Video Observational Analysis of Bouncers in Aggressive Encounters

ABSTRACT

Little is known about how bouncer–patron interactions may influence a bouncer’s use of physical aggression. To address this gap, we offer a micro-interactional analysis examining real-life aggressive bouncer behavior captured by venue surveillance cameras. Quantitative results show that bouncer physical aggression is associated with interactions in which bouncers are directly involved as a conflict party, but not with interactions where they solely intervene as a third-party. Further, a qualitative analysis of emotional cues identifies anger as a plausible mechanism underpinning bouncer aggression. We consider the implications of these findings for night-time economy violence prevention strategies and discuss the relevance of video data for barroom research.     

The Self‐Evidencing Brain

An exciting theory in neuroscience is that the brain is an organ for prediction error minimization (PEM). This theory is rapidly gaining influence and is set to dominate the science of mind and brain in the years to come. PEM has extreme explanatory ambition, and profound philosophical implications. Here, I assume the theory, briefly explain it, and then I argue that PEM implies that the brain is essentially self‐evidencing. This means it is imperative to identify an evidentiary boundary between the brain and its environment. This boundary defines the mind‐world relation, opens the door to skepticism, and makes the mind transpire as more inferentially secluded and neurocentrically skull‐bound than many would nowadays think. Therefore, PEM somewhat deflates contemporary hypotheses that cognition is extended, embodied and enactive; however, it can nevertheless accommodate the kinds of cases that fuel these hypotheses.