ANXIETY SENSITIVITY AND TRAIT-SYMPTOM MEASURES OF ANXIETY AND DEPRESSION

The Icelandic version of the Anxiety Sensitivity Index was investigated in two studies of college students. A principal components analysis of ASI scores from both studies (N=718) yielded three components similar to what has been found previously: Psychological Concerns, Physical Concerns and Social Concerns. In the first study the relationship between the ASI and trait anxiety was investigated. It was analysed at the level of the total scales but also at the level of subscales of both instruments. Two subscales of the STAI, measuring respectively Anxiety-trait and Depression-trait, were used as well as the Psychological Concerns and Physical Concerns subscales of the ASI. In a second study the relationships between ASI and its subscales and two symptom measures of anxiety and depression were addressed. ASI was in both studies more strongly related to the anxiety than the depression scales. Also, in both studies the Physical Concerns subscale of the ASI was more strongly related to anxiety than to depression, whereas the Psychological Concerns subscale was equally related to anxiety and depression. Taken together the studies support the notion of different relationships between different aspects of anxiety sensitivity, and anxiety and depression as traits, cognitive symptoms and mood related symptoms.     

Blame it on patriarchy: More sexist attitudes are associated with stronger consideration of cosmetic surgery for oneself and one's partner

In the present work, we examined associations between oppressive, sexist beliefs and consideration of cosmetic surgery for oneself and also endorsement of cosmetic surgery for one's romantic partner. A total of 554 German‐speaking volunteers from the community, mainly in Austria, completed measures of consideration of cosmetic surgery and three measures of sexist attitudes, while a subset of participants in romantic relationships completed a measure of endorsement of cosmetic surgery for their partners along with the measures of sexism. Preliminary analyses showed that women and single respondents were more likely to consider having cosmetic surgery than men and committed respondents, respectively. Further analyses showed that consideration of cosmetic surgery for oneself was significantly associated with sexist attitudes, particularly hostile attitudes to women. In addition, among participants in a relationship, sexist attitudes were associated with endorsement of cosmetic surgery for one's partner. These results indicate that attitudes to cosmetic surgery for oneself and one's partner are shaped by gender‐ideological belief systems in patriarchal societies. Possible implications for understanding the motivations for having cosmetic surgery, among both single respondents and couples, are discussed.     

Measuring Obsessions Without Worry: Convergent and Discriminant Validity of the Revised Padua Inventory in an Icelandic Student Population

The revised Padua Inventory (Padua Inventory-Washington State University Revision or PI-WSUR) was investigated in an Icelandic student population ( n = 431). The inventory was explicitly constructed to minimize the overlap between the measurement of obsessionality and worry. Its relationships with the Maudsley-Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory (MOCI) and the Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ) were investigated. The factor structure of the PI-WSUR was studied as well as the relations of PI-WSUR subscales with corresponding scales on the MOCI (checking, contamination). It was further investigated whether a factor analysis of the PI-WSUR together with PSWQ would indicate that the PI-WSUR and its different components were relatively uncontaminated by variance shared with worry. The results generally supported the psychometric properties of the Icelandic version of the PI-WSUR as well as its relative independence of PSWQ specifically.     

Mind–brain identity and evidential insulation

Is it rational to believe that the mind is identical to the brain? Identity theorists say it is (or looks like it will be, once all the neuroscientific evidence is in), and they base this claim on a general epistemic route to belief in identity. I re-develop this general route and defend it against some objections. Then I discuss how rational belief in mind–brain identity, obtained via this route, can be threatened by an appropriately adjusted version of the anti-physicalist knowledge argument. Responses to this threat usually appeal either to different modes of presentation or to phenomenal concepts. But neither type of response is satisfactory. I provide a novel response, which appeals to an innocuous epistemic peculiarity of phenomenal states, namely their, as I shall call it, evidential insulation.     

Alien psychology: Associations between extraterrestrial beliefs and paranormal ideation,superstitious beliefs,schizotypy, and the Big Five personality factors

This study examined the associations between the belief that intelligent extraterrestrial life has visited Earth and that governmental agencies have knowledge of this fact and various individual psychological difference factors. A total of 433 participants completed measures of extraterrestrial beliefs, paranormal beliefs, superstitious ideation, schizotypy, the Big Five personality factors, and demographic variables. Results showed that extraterrestrial beliefs were significantly predicted by paranormal beliefs, the unusual experience factor of schizotypy, Openness to Experience, and education. These results are discussed in relation to work suggesting that an individual differences approach may be useful to clarifying the underlying processes that give rise to extraterrestrial beliefs. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Conspiracist ideation in Britain and Austria: evidence of a monological belief system and associations between individual psychological differences and real-world and fictitious conspiracy theories

Despite evidence of widespread belief in conspiracy theories, there remains a dearth of research on the individual difference correlates of conspiracist ideation. In two studies, we sought to overcome this limitation by examining correlations between conspiracist ideation and a range of individual psychological factors. In Study 1, 817 Britons indicated their agreement with conspiracist ideation concerning the July 7, 2005 (7/7), London bombings, and completed a battery of individual difference scales. Results showed that stronger belief in 7/7 conspiracy theories was predicted by stronger belief in other real-world conspiracy theories, greater exposure to conspiracist ideation, higher political cynicism, greater support for democratic principles, more negative attitudes to authority, lower self-esteem, and lower Agreeableness. In Study 2, 281 Austrians indicated their agreement with an entirely fictitious conspiracy theory and completed a battery of individual difference measures not examined in Study 1. Results showed that belief in the entirely fictitious conspiracy theory was significantly associated with stronger belief in other real-world conspiracy theories, stronger paranormal beliefs, and lower crystallized intelligence. These results are discussed in terms of the potential of identifying individual difference constellations among conspiracy theorists.     

Capacities,explanation and the possibility of disunity

Nancy Cartwright argues that so-called capacities, not universal laws of nature, best explain the often complex way events actually unfold. On this view, science would represent a world that is fundamentally "dappled", or disunified, and not, as orthodoxy would perhaps have it, a world unified by universal laws of nature. I argue, first, that the problem Cartwright raises for laws of nature seems to arise for capacities too, so why reject laws of nature? Second, that in so far as there is a problem, it concerns the role of counterfactuals in explanation; I then briefly propose a simple model of counterfactual explanation. Finally, I investigate how a sophisticated version of the regularity theory of laws of nature (that of Ramsey-Lewis) can be neutral between the empirical hypotheses that the world is unified, and that the world is disunified.     

Illness Beliefs,Treatment Beliefs and Information Needs as Starting Points for Patient Information: The Evaluation of an Intervention for Patients with Depression

Patients with depression are often dissatisfied with disease- and therapy-related information. The objective of this study was to evaluate an intervention that applied the Common Sense Model to the provision of information during inpatient rehabilitation for patients with depression. The intervention was evaluated in a sequential control group design. Analyses of covariance were used to assess differences between the control and intervention groups. Changes with respect to illness and treatment beliefs (personal control, treatment control, coherence and concerns about medicines), satisfaction with information about medicines, illness and rehabilitation, and depressive burden were selected as primary outcome measures. We observed significant between-group differences indicating the intervention group’s superiority in terms of satisfaction with information regarding medicines. However, the two groups’ changes during rehabilitation did not differ in terms of the other outcomes. The intervention resulted in patients judging that their medication information needs had been more thoroughly fulfilled than those patients who received care-as-usual information. However, the intervention did not prove to be effective when the other outcome variables are considered. Taken together and bearing in mind the limitations of our study—particularly the non-randomised design—our results should be replicated in a randomised controlled trial.     

Subjectivism and the Framework of Constitutive Grounds

Philosophers have applied the framework of constitutive grounds to make sense of the disagreement between subjectivism and objectivism. The framework understands the two theories as being involved in a disagreement about the extent to which value is determined by attitudes. Although the framework affords us with some useful observations about how this should be interpreted, the question how value can be determined by attitudes in the first place is left largely unanswered. Here we explore the benefits of a positive interpretation which aims to address this oversight and make the framework more informative. This interpretation, which is inspired by the recent work of Schroeder (2007) and Sobel (2016), claims that the relevant sense in which value can be determined by attitudes is discovered by seeing how facts can be endowed with the normative property of being a reason. We argue that this interpretation significantly deepens our understanding of the disagreement between subjectivism and objectivism.     

Assessing False-Belief Understanding in Children with Autism Using a Computer Application: A Pilot Study

We have developed a False-Belief (FB) understanding task for use on a computer tablet, trying to assess FB understanding in a less social way. It is based on classical FB protocols, and additionally includes a manipulation of language in an attempt to explore the facilitating effect of linguistic support during FB processing. Specifically, the FB task was presented in three auditory conditions: narrative, silent, and interference. The task was assumed to shed new light on the FB difficulties often observed in Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD). Sixty-eight children with ASD (M?=?7.5 years) and an age matched comparison group with 98 typically developing (TD) children were assessed with the FB task. The children with ASD did not perform above chance level in any condition, and significant differences in success rates were found between the groups in two conditions (silent and narrative), with TD children performing better. We discuss implications, limitations, and further developments.