Developing a Brief Sensation Seeking Scale for Children: Establishing Concurrent Validity With Video Game Use and Rule-Breaking Behavior

Despite the importance of life-cycle models to sensation seeking research, past studies have typically focused on adolescents and adults. This is especially problematic for researchers studying the role of media use in the development of risky behaviors (e.g., violent video game consumption and aggressive behavior). To facilitate research with child populations, a brief sensation seeking scale for children (BSSS-C) is developed and validated with a sample of fourth, fifth, and sixth graders (N = 136). The BSSS-C is found to be internally reliable (α = .82) as well as a strong predictor of several risky child behaviors. Higher sensation seeking children were more likely to play video games, including violent subgenres (e.g., shooters), and to enjoy playing video games that contained specific acts of violence (e.g., weapon use). Higher sensation seekers were also more likely to engage in rule-breaking behavior, such as bringing prohibited cell phones to school. The results suggest that sensation seeking may be related to risky behavior at a very young age.     

Adoption of near-coincident-site lattice orientations by contacting monolayer rafts of metallic nanoparticles with different superlattice periodicities

A hexagonal raft of monodisperse alkane-thiol-stabilized Au nanoparticles has been self-assembled from solution on to an amorphous C substrate and then subsequently a second layer of monodisperse but differently sized gold nanoparticles deposited on top of the first. Detailed analysis of electron micrographs obtained from various regions of this bilayer revealed the presence of several distinct epitaxial interface structures. A simple near-coincident-site lattice model is used to rationalize the existence of the observed characteristic nanoparticle interface structures.     

Dialogue on the hypothetical character of logical analysis

Reconstructing Popper's research programme for the Human Sciences, Noretta Koertge (Inquiry, Vol. 18 [1975]) has given a deductive‐nomological account of explanations of actions by means of a Rationality Principle. It is argued here that such a Rationality Principle is fundamentally redundant. Neither is it logically necessary in order to deduce a cognitive action‐explanandum, nor can it be given a semantic non‐empty interpretation, at least not within Koertge's own syllogism. Any attempt to save the Rationality Principle as unfalsifiablc but nevertheless indispensable for action explanations is rejected in the light of possible alternative action explanations by empirical and therefore in principle falsifiable psychological laws.     

L-Dopa repairs deficits in locomotor and investigatory exploration produced by denervation of catecholamine terminal fields in the forebrain of rats.

In a previous study rats were shown to have decreased locomotor and investigatory exploration after bilateral microinjections of 6-hydroxydopamine into the anterolateral hypothalamus. These deficits correlate with the loss of catecholamine terminals in neocortical, limbic, and anteromedioventral striatal brain sites. To test whether this correlation was causal, central catecholamines were increased by the intraperitoneal administration of L-3,4-dihydroxyphenylalanine (L-dopa), 10--40 mg/kg) after inhibition of extracerebral L-amino acid decarboxylase. Such treatment repaired the deficits in locomotor exploration and investigation in 6-hydroxydopamine rats. Pretreatment with the catecholamine antagonist chlorpromazine (1--2 mg/kg) blocked the increase in locomotor exploration and investigation produced by L-dopa in 6-hydroxydopamine rats. The results suggest, but do not prove, that L-dopa produced these behavioral effects by increasing central catecholamines at the denervated catecholamine receptor sites in the forebrain. These data and the data from the previous study are complementary evidence for the hypothesis that forebrain catecholamine synaptic action is necessary for normal exploratory behavior.     

Measuring Obsessions Without Worry: Convergent and Discriminant Validity of the Revised Padua Inventory in an Icelandic Student Population

The revised Padua Inventory (Padua Inventory-Washington State University Revision or PI-WSUR) was investigated in an Icelandic student population ( n = 431). The inventory was explicitly constructed to minimize the overlap between the measurement of obsessionality and worry. Its relationships with the Maudsley-Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory (MOCI) and the Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ) were investigated. The factor structure of the PI-WSUR was studied as well as the relations of PI-WSUR subscales with corresponding scales on the MOCI (checking, contamination). It was further investigated whether a factor analysis of the PI-WSUR together with PSWQ would indicate that the PI-WSUR and its different components were relatively uncontaminated by variance shared with worry. The results generally supported the psychometric properties of the Icelandic version of the PI-WSUR as well as its relative independence of PSWQ specifically.     

Choosing an Endorser for a Women’s Sporting Event: The Interaction of Attractiveness and Expertise

An experimental study was conducted to determine the impact of expertise and attractiveness on perceived appropriateness of the endorser with a women’s tennis event and, subsequently, attitudes towards the event and intentions to purchase tickets. The sample was comprised of 184 undergraduate students at three U.S. universities. Hypotheses were tested through observed path analysis and results indicated both attractiveness and expertise were significantly related to the endorser’s appropriateness and explained 24% of the variance. However, there was a significant interaction; in the lower expertise condition, the more attractive athlete was rated as a more appropriate endorser. Further, endorser appropriateness led to more positive attitudes and intentions to purchase tickets, and the model explained 13 and 48% of the variance in these variables respectively.     

Mind–brain identity and evidential insulation

Is it rational to believe that the mind is identical to the brain? Identity theorists say it is (or looks like it will be, once all the neuroscientific evidence is in), and they base this claim on a general epistemic route to belief in identity. I re-develop this general route and defend it against some objections. Then I discuss how rational belief in mind–brain identity, obtained via this route, can be threatened by an appropriately adjusted version of the anti-physicalist knowledge argument. Responses to this threat usually appeal either to different modes of presentation or to phenomenal concepts. But neither type of response is satisfactory. I provide a novel response, which appeals to an innocuous epistemic peculiarity of phenomenal states, namely their, as I shall call it, evidential insulation.     

Capacities,explanation and the possibility of disunity

Nancy Cartwright argues that so-called capacities, not universal laws of nature, best explain the often complex way events actually unfold. On this view, science would represent a world that is fundamentally "dappled", or disunified, and not, as orthodoxy would perhaps have it, a world unified by universal laws of nature. I argue, first, that the problem Cartwright raises for laws of nature seems to arise for capacities too, so why reject laws of nature? Second, that in so far as there is a problem, it concerns the role of counterfactuals in explanation; I then briefly propose a simple model of counterfactual explanation. Finally, I investigate how a sophisticated version of the regularity theory of laws of nature (that of Ramsey-Lewis) can be neutral between the empirical hypotheses that the world is unified, and that the world is disunified.