Flexibilidad y demandas de capacidad de la atención

RESUMEN

El artículo presenta una teoría multimodal de la atención. Se supone que la atención es flexible, pudiendo hacer un análisis perceptual de la información de distinta profundidad. La información objetivo es seleccionada al nivel del análisis sensorial por los modos tempranos de la atención pero no lo es por los modos tardíos hasta después del análisis semántico. Mientras el sistema de análisis perceptual cambia de los modos tempranos a los tardíos, se recoge más información de las vías no-objetivo, pero requiere más capacidad para atender a la vía objetivo. El estudio comprueba con cinco experimentos los dos supuestos principales, a saber: que la atención requiere capacidad y que la cantidad de capacidad requerida se incrementa de los modos tempranos a los tardíos. En la discusión general los autores afirman que los datos apoyan estos dos supuestos de la teoría multimodal.     

Ockham and Buridan on the Ampliation of Modal Propositions

This paper explores a currently unnoticed argument used by John Buridan to defend his analysis of modal propositions and to reject the analysis of modal propositions of necessity put forward by William of Ockham. First, I explore this argument and, by considering possible responses of Ockham to Buridan, show some of the ways in which Ockham seems to be keeping closer to Aristotle's remarks about modal propositions in Prior Analytics, 18.     

A Formal Reconstruction of Buridan's Modal Syllogism

In this paper, we provide a historical exposition of John Buridan's theory of divided modal propositions. We then develop a semantic interpretation of Buridan's theory which pays particular attention to Buridan's ampliation of modal terms. We show that these semantics correctly capture his syllogistic reasoning.     

Learning the Relevance of Relevance and the Trouble with Truth: Evaluating Explanatory Relevance across Childhood

ABSTRACT

In four experiments, we investigate how the ability to detect irrelevant explanations develops. In Experiments 1 and 2, 4- to 8-year-olds and adults rated different types of explanations about “what makes cars go” individually, in the absence of a direct contrast. Each explanation was true and relevant (e.g., “Cars have engines that turn gasoline into power”), true and irrelevant (e.g., “Cars have radios that play music”), or a false statement that would be relevant if it were true (e.g., “Cars have rockets that speed them up”). Participants of all ages spontaneously indicated that false explanations were less helpful than relevant explanations. However, there was a developmental shift for irrelevant explanations: 4-year-olds only detected irrelevant explanations that did not involve internal features of cars (e.g., “Cars have parking lots that they park in”). Crucially, this shift between age 4 and 5 cannot be explained by 4-year-olds’ lack of knowledge since 4-year-olds correctly indicated that relevant explanations were more helpful than irrelevant feature explanations when given a direct contrast in Experiment 3. These results are further clarified in Experiment 4, in which we provided a different explanatory goal (“where to find cars”) and found that even young children have a nuanced understanding of explanatory relevance that is sensitive to differing explanatory goals. Together, these four experiments suggest an early-emerging ability to understand relevance, but a shift between age 4 and 5 in the ability to spontaneously use this understanding when evaluating individual explanations in isolation.     

Little Bayesians or little Einsteins? Probability and explanatory virtue in children's inferences

Like scientists, children seek ways to explain causal systems in the world. But are children scientists in the strict Bayesian tradition of maximizing posterior probability? Or do they attend to other explanatory considerations, as laypeople and scientists – such as Einstein – do? Four experiments support the latter possibility. In particular, we demonstrate in four experiments that 4‐ to 8‐year‐old children, like adults, have a robust latent scope bias that leads to inferences that do not maximize posterior probability. When faced with two explanations equally consistent with observed data, where one explanation makes an unverified prediction, children consistently preferred the explanation that does not make this prediction (Experiment 1), even if the prior probabilities are identical (Experiment 3). Additional evidence suggests that this latent scope bias may result from the same explanatory strategies used by adults (Experiments 1 and 2), and can be attenuated by strong prior odds (Experiment 4). We argue that children, like adults, rely on ‘explanatory virtues’ in inference – a strategy that often leads to normative responses, but can also lead to systematic error.     

Socioanalytic theory and work behavior: Roles of work values and political skill in job performance and promotability assessment

Socioanalytic theory postulates that job performance ratings are predicted by basic social motives moderated by social competency. The two motives are the motive to get along with others and the motive to achieve status and power. The present two-study investigation assessed these motives as work values and collected supervisors' job performance and promotability assessments. Social competency was assessed as political skill at work. The results provided strong and consistent support for the hypotheses, thus providing a more direct test of socioanalytic theory and extending it to demonstrate effects beyond overall job performance ratings on contextual performance and promotability assessments. Contributions and implications of these results, strengths and limitations, directions for future research, and practical implications are discussed.     

Positive Illusions of Social Competence in Girls with and Without ADHD

We compared social self-competence ratings in 9–12 year old girls with (n = 42) versus without (n = 40) ADHD, relative to ratings of the girls’ social competence made by mothers, teachers, and blind raters during a social laboratory task. Relative to scores from mothers, teachers, and the lab-task, girls with ADHD over-estimated their competence significantly more than control girls. Over-estimates were greater for girls with ADHD who also had heightened oppositional-defiant symptoms, or lower depressive symptoms. Over-estimates were positively related to a socially desirable reporting bias for girls with ADHD, but not for control girls, suggesting that girls with ADHD attempt to present themselves in an unduly positive, self-protective light. For girls with ADHD, over-estimates also were positively related to maladjustment and negatively related to adjustment. However, for girls without ADHD, over-estimates were positively related to adjustment. Overall, over-estimates of competence function differently in girls with and without ADHD.