Affectivity in Its Relation to Memory

It seems obvious that various feelings (various kinds of affectivity) are memorized, forgotten, and recollected to various degrees. Some of them are forgotten. Some of those forgotten can be recollected, while others are lost forever. For example, short and long-lasting feelings and shallow and deep feelings are memorized and remembered in different ways. In this paper I analyse from a conceptual point of view several categories of memory-of-feelings and offer a comprehensive map of them. In the end, the richness of categories in the realm of memory is interpreted as a proof of the intricacy of affectivity.     

Theory development should begin (but not end) with good empirical fits: a comment on Roberts and Pashler (2000)

S. Roberts and H. Pashler (2000) argued against using goodness of fit as evidence to support theories. The authors agree with their suggestions for how to go beyond good fits but disagree with their starting point. In this comment, the authors argue that good fits are part and parcel of theory development, that they are part and parcel of the processes suggested by S. Roberts and H. Pashler, and that they must be the starting point (though far from the ending point) in theoretical development. The authors discuss historical examples of scientific theory development, recent examples of psychological theory development, and development of a particular theory (social contagion theory; J. L. Rodgers & D. C. Rowe, 1993) that S. Roberts and H. Pashler criticized.     

Action-based and vision-based selection of input: Two sources of control

In the first part of this paper we review evidence suggesting that there exists a mechanism that selects input on the basis of its similarity to the required action. This response-based input selection differs from the more established space- and object-based input selection in that it is not constrained by the structure of the input. Our evidence suggests that the two-choice Stroop effect is caused by this response-based selection mechanism. By contrast, it is known that the flanker effect is determined by the space- and object- based selection mechanisms. We explore whether the conflict resolution of the Stroop and flanker tasks is different as well by embedding these two tasks in a PRP (Psychological Refractory Period) paradigm. We show that the Stroop and the PRP effects are additive whereas the flanker and the PRP effects are underadditive, suggesting that the processes in charge of the conflict resolution in the Stroop and the flanker tasks are indeed different. We discuss possible reasons for this difference, and discuss possible ways in which the response-based mechanism can be implemented in information processing models.