A Psychometric Investigation of the Suicide Status Form II with a Psychiatric Inpatient Sample

We investigated the psychometric validity and reliability of the Suicide Status Form‐II (SSF‐II) developed by Jobes, Jacoby, Cimbolic, and Hustead (1997) . Participants were 149 psychiatric inpatients (108 suicidal; 41 nonsuicidal) at the Mayo Clinic. Each participant completed assessment measures within 24 hours of admission and 48–72 hours later. Factor analyses of the SSF core assessment produced a robust two‐factor solution reflecting chronic and acute response styles. The SSF core assessment had good to excellent convergent and criterion validity; pre‐post SSF ratings also demonstrated moderate test‐retest reliability. The results replicated previous research and show that the SSF‐II is psychometrically sound with a high‐risk suicidal inpatient sample.     

The role of detection and recollection of change in list discrimination

In two experiments, we examined the importance of the detection and recollection of change for list discrimination. Two lists of pairs were presented, with the right-hand member being changed between lists for some pairs. Participants in Experiment 1 were instructed to explicitly indicate when they detected a change between pairs during the presentation of List 2, whereas participants in Experiment 2 were not instructed to do so. At the time of test, participants in both experiments were presented with a pair and asked whether it had been presented in List 2. Next, recollection of change was measured by asking whether the right-hand member of the pair was changed between the lists. The results from Experiment 1 revealed high correspondence between the detection of change during the presentation of List 2 and the recollection of change at the time of test. Consequently, change recollection at test can serve as a measure of earlier change detection, in combination with access to memory for change at the time of test. In both experiments, as compared to control conditions, proactive facilitation in list discrimination was observed when change was recollected, whereas proactive interference was observed when change was not recollected. These results were interpreted as showing that recursive reminding—bringing a List 1 pair to mind during the presentation of its changed List 2 pair—embeds memory for the earlier event into memory for the later event, and doing so preserves information about list membership.     

Metacognitive judgments of repetition and variability effects in natural concept learning: evidence for variability neglect

In four experiments, we examined the effects of repetitions and variability on the learning of bird families and metacognitive awareness of such effects. Of particular interest was the accuracy of, and bases for, predictions regarding classification of novel bird species, referred to as category learning judgments (CLJs). Participants studied birds in high repetitions and high variability conditions. These conditions differed in the number of presentations of each bird (repetitions) and the number of unique species from each family (variability). After study, participants made CLJs for each family and were then tested. Results from a classification test revealed repetition benefits for studied species and variability benefits for novel species. In contrast with performance, CLJs did not reflect the benefits of variability. Results showed that CLJs were susceptible to accessibility-based metacognitive illusions produced by additional repetitions of studied items.     

Mistaking the recent past for the present: false seeing by older adults

Results of three experiments revealed that older, as compared to young, adults are more reliant on context when "seeing" a briefly flashed word that was preceded by a prime. In a congruent condition, the prime was the same word as flashed (e.g., DIRT dirt) whereas in an incongruent condition, the prime differed in a single letter from the word that was flashed (DART dirt). Following their attempt to identify the flashed word, participants were asked to report whether they had "seen" the flashed word or, instead, had responded on some other basis (knowing or guessing). Older adults showed dramatically higher false seeing by reporting the prime on incongruent trials and claiming to have seen it flashed. This was true even though a titration procedure was used to equate the performance of young and older adults on baseline trials which did not provide a biasing context. Results of Experiment 3 related age differences in false seeing to willingness to respond when given the option to withhold responses. Convergence of results with those showing higher false memory and false hearing are interpreted as evidence that older adults are less able to avoid misleading effects of context. That lessened ability may be associated with decline in frontal lobe functioning.     

False Remembering in the Aged

ABSTRACT— Researchers studying human memory have increasingly focused on memory accuracy in aging populations. In this article we briefly review the literature on memory accuracy in healthy older adults. The prevailing evidence indicates that, compared to younger adults, older adults exhibit both diminished memory accuracy and greater susceptibility to misinformation. In addition, older adults demonstrate high levels of confidence in their false memories. We suggest an explanatory framework for the high level of false memories observed in older adults, a framework based on the theory that consciously controlled uses of memory decline with age, making older adults more susceptible to false memories that rely on automatic processes. We also point to future research that may remedy such deficits in accuracy.     

On the relationship between autobiographical memory and perceptual learning

Although the majority of research on human memory has concentrated on a person's ability to recall or recognize items as having been presented in a particular situation, the effects of memory are also revealed in a person's performance of a perceptual task. Prior experience with material can make that material more easily identified or comprehended in perceptually difficult situations. Unlike with standard retention tests, effects of prior experience on a perceptual task do not logically require that a person be aware that he or she is remembering. Indeed, amnesic patients purportedly show effects of practice in their subsequent performance of a perceptual or motor task even though they profess that they do not remember having engaged in that prior experience. The experiments that are reported were designed to explore the relationship between the more aware autobiographical form of memory that is measured by a recognition memory test and the less aware form of memory that is expressed in perceptual learning. Comparisons of effects on perceptual learning and recognition memory reveal two classes of variables. Variables such as the level of processing of words during study influenced recognition memory, although they had no effect on subsequent perceptual recognition. A study presentation of a word had as large an effect on its later perceptual recognition when recognition memory performance was very poor as it did when recognition memory performance was near perfect. In contrast, variables such as the number and the spacing of repetitions produced parallel effects on perceptual recognition and recognition memory. Following Mandler and others, it is suggested that there are two bases for recognition memory. If an item is readily perceived so that it seems to "jump out" from the page, a person is likely to judge that he or she has previously seen the item in the experimental situation. Variables that influence ease of perceptual recognition, then, can also have an effect on recognition memory, so parallel effects are found. The second basis for recognition memory involves elaboration of a word's study context and depends on such factors as level of processing during study--factors that are not important for perceptual recognition of isolated words. Comparisons of perceptual recognition and recognition memory are shown to be useful for determining how a variable has its effect. Effects of study on perceptual recognition appear to be totally due to memory for physical or graphemic information. Results reported are also relevant to theories of perceptual learning. A single presentation of an item is shown to have large and long-lasting effects on its later perceptual recognition. At least partially, effects of study on perceptual recognition depend on the same variables as do effects on more standard memory tests.     

Dissociating automatic and controlled processes in a memory-search task: Beyond implicit memory

Our goal in this paper was to examine the processes that give rise to action slips. Procedures used to examine implicit memory and automatic processes were found to be unsatisfactory. However, the process-dissociation procedure proved useful for examining the contribution of the automatic and controlled processes underlying performance. The procedure was used in conjunction with a Sternberg memory-search task to examine the effects of set size, response speed, and stimulus-response mapping on controlled and automatic processes. The formulation allowed us to predict accurately how subjects would perform in a varied mapping condition. Moreover, set size and response speed were found to influence the controlled search process, but to leave the automatic influences unaffected. Stimulus-response mapping, on the other hand, was found to lead to probability matching in the automatic processes; this pattern was found to remain constant across changes in set size and response speed.     

Describing our “humanness”: Can genetic science alter what it means to be “human”?

Over the past several decades, geneticists have succeeded in identifying the genetic mutations associated with disease. New strategies for treatment, including gene transfer and gene therapy, are under development. Although genetic science has been welcomed for its potential to predict and treat disease, interventions may become ethically objectionable if they threaten to alter characteristics that are distinctively human. Before we can determine whether or not a genetic technique carries this risk, we must clarify what it means to be “human”. This paper inquires how “humanness” has been defined within various academic fields. The views of several legal theoreists, scientists, bioethicists, psychologists, philosophers and anthropologists whose works seem to best reflect how “humanness” is understood in their respective fields of study are considered. Our survey attempts to chart a path for a more detailed study on the meaning of “humanness” in the future. We assess four traits commonly identified in the literature as defining what it means to be human: cognition, biological or physiological composition, social interaction with other “human” beings, and spirituality. The nature of the relationship between these characteristics, in our view, is symbiotic: genetic intervention which alters one of them could have repercussions on one or more of the others. In conclusion, we offer guidance to those participating in genetic research and treatment regarding the parameters within which they may proceed without threatening the preservation of what is distinctively human.     

Separating habit and recollection in young and older adults: effects of elaborative processing and distinctiveness

An extension of L. L. Jacoby's (1991) process-dissociation procedure was used to examine the effects of aging on recollection and automatic influences of memory (habit). Experiment 1 showed that older adults were impaired in their ability to engage in recollection but did not differ from young adults in their reliance on habit. Elderly adults were also less able to exploit distinctive contextual information to enhance recollection. Experiments 2 and 3 showed that with more supportive conditions, older adults were able to benefit from distinctive contextual information. Quantitative and qualitative deficits in recollective abilities are interpreted within a dual-process model of memory. The problem of distinguishing between a deficit in recollection and a deficit in inhibitory processes in older adults (e.g., L. Hasher & R. T. Zacks, 1988) and the importance of this distinction for purposes of repairing memory performance are discussed.