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71.
A new approach to computer programs used to administer and/or analyze repertory grids is described. The system outlined here, OMNIGRID-PC, is a variation of OMNIGRID, which was designed to have broad practical and theoretical applications. The general features of OMNIGRID are discussed; then the unique features of the OMNIGRID-PC system, Versions 1.0 and 1.5, are explained in detail along with their underlying theoretical rationale. The Appendix more fully explicates the interpretive significance of the most substantive new feature of Version 3.5–Cromwell Format data collection.  相似文献   
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Anti-intellectualists in epistemology argue for the thesis that knowing-how is not a species of knowing-that, and most of them tend to avoid any use of the notion “knowing-that” in their explanation of intelligent action on pain of inconsistency. Intellectualists tend to disprove anti-intellectualism by showing that the residues of knowing-that remain in the anti-intellectualist explanation of intelligent action. Outside the field of epistemology, some philosophers who try to highlight the nature of their explanation of intelligent action in certain fields, such as ethics, tend to classify themselves as intellectualist simply because they appeal to the notion of knowing-that in their explanation. In a word, the idea of knowing-that is harmful to the anti-intellectualist explanation of intelligent action, whether from an insider or outsider perspective. In this paper, I argue that these tendencies are unjustified because they are based on an unclear conception of anti-intellectualism. I shall use Gilbert Ryle’s anti-intellectualism as a paradigm with which to describe anti-intellectualism and to illustrate why the notion of knowing-that is not harmful to but is, on the contrary, beneficial to the anti-intellectualist explanation of intelligent action. If my explication of Ryle’s anti-intellectualism is correct, then most anti-intellectualists in the literature blindly worry about the notion of knowing-that, most intellectualists fire into the wrong flock, and some philosophers outside epistemology mischaracterize their own position.  相似文献   
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The authors examined whether three indicators of Schizotypy, the Revised Social Anhedonia Scale (RSAS), Magical Ideation Scale (MIS), and Perceptual Aberration Scale (PAS), identify a common latent class or taxon as conceptualized by P. E. Meehl (1962, 1990). The separate and joint latent structures of these scales were evaluated using taxometric methods in two large, independent samples. Replicating prior findings, the RSAS and PAS each identified latent taxa with base rates approximating.10. Results for the taxonicity of the MIS were less consistent. Analyses of joint latent structure indicated that the RSAS-identified taxon was essentially independent of constructs measured by the PAS or MIS. Measures commonly thought to tap the same latent class, conjectured to be schizotypy, do not share this property.  相似文献   
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Emergent persons     
Recent psychological theorizing about the emergence of persons makes a number of ontological claims that are not always explicit. A critical consideration of such claims reveals both considerable convergence and some points of disagreement across different psychological theories of emergent personhood. What is clear is that all such theories resist the reduction of persons to biophysical or sociocultural properties, conditions, and processes. In various ways, they each call for a nonreductionistic recognition of the sociocultural constitution of important aspects of personhood, without denying the necessity of biophysical requirements of personhood. Because standard emergentist positions in physical science and the philosophy of physical science mostly ignore the sociocultural level of reality, psychological theorizing about the emergence of persons requires an alternative ontological framework. It is proposed that an ontology of levels of reality that includes the physical, chemical, biological, sociocultural, and personal/psychological is appropriate for understanding how persons are both substantively and relationally emergent within the biophysical, sociocultural world. With such an ontological framework in place, it is possible to understand human activity in the world as the primary vehicle for both the phylogenetic evolution and ontogenetic development of persons.  相似文献   
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