Seeing red? Colour biases of foraging birds are context dependent

Animal Cognition - Colours are commonly used as visual cues when measuring animals’ cognitive abilities. However, animals can have innate biases towards certain colours that depend on...     

Information Processing and Decision-Making in Pathological Worriers and their Potential Role in Mechanisms of Generalized Anxiety Disorder

Systematic information processing and decision-making under uncertainty are key constructs of new conceptions explaining the severity of pathological worry. The current study attempted to analyze their usefulness in subclinical and clinical groups. In the first phase of the study (N = 251) participants were examined with the Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ), a GP consultationrelated survey, and a screening survey for generalized anxiety disorder (GAD). In the second phase (N = 220), the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, the PSWQ, and tasks measuring systematic information processing (SIP) versus heuristic reasoning (HR) were applied. In the third phase (N = 60), GAD (n = 30) and healthy control (n = 30) groups were examined with the above methods and the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT). In the low risk group, a relationship between mood and the representativeness heuristic (ρ = 0.50), as well as anchoring and adjustment heuristic (anxiety-related stimuli) was found (ρ = −0.53). In the GAD group, significant correlations between the PSWQ score, the IGT loss avoidance score (ρ = 0.40), and total IGT score (ρ = 0.48) were found. The results did not confirm a particular usefulness of the systematic/heuristic information processing construct in subclinical and clinical groups. Theory-consistent results were rather found in the nonclinical groups. Nevertheless, the data revealed some interesting findings supporting potential explanatory power of some theoretical models.     

The Knowledge Argument and Objectivity

In this paper I argue that Frank Jackson’s Knowledge Argument is better considered not as an argument against physicalism, but as an argument that objective theories must be incomplete. I argue that despite the apparent diversity of responses to the knowledge argument, they all boil down to a response according to which genuine epistemic gains are made when an individual has an experience. I call this the acquaintance response. I then argue that this response violates an intuitive stricture on the objectivity of theories. Therefore, the knowledge argument does show that objective theories cannot provide a complete understanding of the world. The result, however, is that both objective dualism and objective physicalism are refuted by the argument. In the end it is suggested that the notion of “subjective physicalism” is one that should be pursued.     

How Wittgenstein Defeated Russell’s Multiple Relation Theory of Judgment

In 1913 Wittgenstein raised an objection to Russell’s multiple relation theory of judgment that eventually led Russell to abandon his theory. As he put it in the Tractatus, the objection was that “the correct explanation of the form of the proposition, ‘A makes the judgement p’, must show that it is impossible for a judgement to be a piece of nonsense. (Russell’s theory does not satisfy this requirement,” (5.5422). This objection has been widely interpreted to concern type restrictions on the constituents of judgment. I argue that this interpretation is mistaken and that Wittgenstein’s objection is in fact a form of the problem of the unity of the proposition.     

THE USE OF REBT PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES IN LEADERSHIP TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT

Training, coaching, and consulting with people in leadership roles can be a primary consulting function for clinicians. In this paper, the authors describe their model of leadership, and what they believe to be the central personality or character components of leadership necessary for producing extraordinary results. Throughout they will show where and how REBT skills can make a significant contribution.     

Explication Defended

How can formal methods be applied to philosophical problems that involve informal concepts of ordinary language? Carnap answered this question by describing a methodology that he called “explication." Strawson objected that explication changes the subject and does not address the original philosophical problem; this paper shows that Carnap’s response to that objection was inadequate and offers a better response. More recent criticisms of explication by Boniolo and Eagle are shown to rest on misunderstandings of the nature of explication. It is concluded that explication is an appropriate methodology for formal philosophy.     

Cracking the mirror: on Kierkegaard’s concerns about friendship

In this article, I offer a brief account of some of Kierkegaard’s key concerns about friendship: its “preferential” nature and its being a form of self-love. Kierkegaard’s endorsement of the ancient idea of the friend as “second self” involves a common but misguided assumption: that friendship depends largely upon likeness between friends. This focus obscures a vitally important element, highlighted by the so-called “drawing” view of friendship. Once this is emphasized, we can see a significant aspect - though by no means all - of Kierkegaard’s worry as misplaced. However, the “drawing” view also enables us to begin to see what a “Kierkegaardian” friendship might look like.