Cognitive Conceptualism—Where Have All the Affects Gone? Additional Corrections for Barrett et al. (2007)

ABSTRACT— Barrett et al. (2007) claim that their approach to emotions covers more of the available evidence than does my affective neuroscience approach ( Panksepp, 2007b ). In fact, the weight of neurological evidence indicates that raw affect, as monitored by many behavioral tasks, is an aspect of the arousal of instinctual-emotional networks. This provides an empirical approach to understanding how primary-process emotional feelings are constituted by neural activities ( Panksepp, 2008 ). There is abundant evidence for the existence of a variety of primal emotions shared across mammalian species that are biologically ingrained tools for living and learning and that may allow higher brain regions to conceptualize what is really important in the world. Barrett et al., misrepresent my views; an accurate depiction of them can be found in this article and in Gallagher (2008) . Abundant cross-species evidence of basic affective systems exists to enrich cognitive-conceptual and attributional theories of human emotions.     

Changes in recovery-stress state and performance in elite rowers during preparation for major competitions

This study investigated changes in the perceived recovery-stress state and performance in 6 highly trained Estonian rowers preparing for major competitions and representing Estonia in double sculls (age: M = 23.0, SD = 1.4 yr.; height: M = 198.0, SD = 0.0 cm; body mass: M = 97.1, SD = 6.4 kg), and quadruple sculls (age: M = 21.5, SD = 2.5 yr.; height: M = 189.5, SD = 5.4 cm; body mass: M = 90.9, SD = 4.8 kg). The subjects were training regularly and had been doing so for the last 10.5 yr. (double scullers, SD = 2.1 yr.) and 7.5 yr. (quadruple scullers, SD = 3.1 yr.), respectively. The Recovery-Stress Questionnaire for Athletes of Kellmann and Kallus was given two days before World Cup competitions. Standardized Stress and Standardized Recovery scores and RESTQ-Index were computed. In addition, resting cortisol in blood was measured at the same time. The performance of both boat classes constantly decreased from World Cup 1 to World Cup 3 as indicated by percent losses for winning boats. Resting cortisol and RESTQ-Index increased and decreased, respectively, at the same time. For double scullers, a decrease in RESTQ-Index mainly reflected the large decrease in the Standardized Recovery score. A decrease in RESTQ-Index was mainly based on a large increase in the Standardized Stress score for rowers performing in a quadruple scull. Present results indicate that the recovery-stress state affects performance of rowers in international competitions. RESTQ-Index could be used as the athletes' resource measure, while the Standardized Stress and Standardized Recovery scores reflect the athletes' extent of stress and recovery separately.     

Ultrasonic vocalizations as indices of affective states in rats

Adult rats spontaneously vocalize in ultrasonic frequencies. Although these ultrasonic vocalizations (USVs) have been described as by-products of locomotor activity or social signals, accumulating evidence suggests that they may also index anticipatory affective states. Converging ethological, pharmacological, and brain stimulation research indicates that whereas long low-frequency (> 0.3-s, approximately 22-kHz) USVs occur during anticipation of punishment or avoidance behavior, short, high-frequency (< 0.3-s, approximately 50-kHz) USVs typically occur during anticipation of reward or approach behavior. Thus, long 22-kHz USVs may index a state of negative activation, whereas short, 50-kHz USVs may instead index a state of positive activation. This hypothesis has theoretical implications for understanding the brain circuitry underlying mammalian affective states and clinical applicability for modeling hedonic properties of different psychotropic compounds.     

Does any aspect of mind survive brain damage that typically leads to a persistent vegetative state? Ethical considerations

Recent neuroscientific evidence brings into question the conclusion that all aspects of consciousness are gone in patients who have descended into a persistent vegetative state (PVS). Here we summarize the evidence from human brain imaging as well as neurological damage in animals and humans suggesting that some form of consciousness can survive brain damage that commonly causes PVS. We also raise the issue that neuroscientific evidence indicates that raw emotional feelings (primary-process affects) can exist without any cognitive awareness of those feelings. Likewise, the basic brain mechanisms for thirst and hunger exist in brain regions typically not damaged by PVS. If affective feelings can exist without cognitive awareness of those feelings, then it is possible that the instinctual emotional actions and pain "reflexes" often exhibited by PVS patients may indicate some level of mentality remaining in PVS patients. Indeed, it is possible such raw affective feelings are intensified when PVS patients are removed from life-supports. They may still experience a variety of primary-process affective states that could constitute forms of suffering. If so, withdrawal of life-support may violate the principle of nonmaleficence and be tantamount to inflicting inadvertent "cruel and unusual punishment" on patients whose potential distress, during the process of dying, needs to be considered in ethical decision-making about how such individuals should be treated, especially when their lives are ended by termination of life-supports. Medical wisdom may dictate the use of more rapid pharmacological forms of euthanasia that minimize distress than the de facto euthanasia of life-support termination that may lead to excruciating feelings of pure thirst and other negative affective feelings in the absence of any reflective awareness.