My Perspective on Psychotherapy Integration: An Outsider Who's Out of It

My rejoinder is a response to two commentaries on my SEPI keynote in 1997: commentaries written by Goldfried and Cullari. Instead of grappling with the ideas I presented, both respondents were distracted by my satirical beginning. In my talk I proposed a method for studying psychotherapy integration. I am not pessimistic about the potential for integration, nor am I pessimistic about psychotherapy. But I am a skeptic, and science is driven—and indeed advance—by skepticism. In fact, psychotherapy integration requires that its advocates be skeptics. I still do not know what psychotherapy integration is, and remain confused. I can only conclude that I am not only an outsider, but out of it.     

Replication of a high-probability request sequence with varied interprompt times in a preschool setting

An intervention for noncompliance consisting of a series of requests promoting a high probability of compliance followed either 5 s or 20 s later by a request with a low probability of compliance was implemented with a preschool child with autism. Results indicated that applications of the request sequence with a shorter interprompt time resulted in higher rates of compliance, and longer interprompt times resulted in near-baseline rates of compliance.     

Evidence of observer reliability for the Fagan Test of Infant Intelligence (FTII)

To obtain estimates of observer reliability, the Fagan Test of Infant Intelligence (FTII) apparatus was modified to allow the infants' performance to be videotaped. Based upon results of 25 infants scored once during time of testing and again 2 years later using the videotape version, interobserver and intraobserver reliabilities obtained for percent novelty preference (test rounds), total number of looks (familiarization and test rounds), and mean fixation (familiarization and test rounds) were mostly very high for each round (M r = .92, SD = .04). The videotaped infants' scores did not differ significantly from those of a comparable sample of infants who were tested using an unmodified apparatus.     

Comparison of Body Mass Index by self-reported versus measured height and weight

This study compared differences between self-reported and measured height and weight and subsequent Body Mass Index. College students (N=62) were asked to complete a health questionnaire as accurately as possible. Height and weight were self-reported without the knowledge that these variables would be subsequently measured. Self-reported and measured heights, weights, and calculated Body Mass Indexes were statistically compared. Analysis indicated that measured height was significantly less than self-reported height for men, but weight was not significantly different. Calculated Body Mass Index for men was not significantly different, however, self-reported Body Mass Index resulted in placement in the Normal range (18.5 to 24.9) category and measured Body Mass Index placement in the Overweight category (25.0 to 29.9). Women's self-reported and measured heights were not significantly different; however, self-reported weight was significantly less than measured. Further, significantly different Body Mass Indexes were found for women. It was concluded that self-reported height and weight might be viewed with caution in Body Mass Index assessment for convenience samples of college-age subjects.     

Chronic and temporarily activated causal uncertainty beliefs and stereotype usage

In 3 studies, we examined the hypothesis that the effects of stereotype usage on target judgments are moderated by causal uncertainty beliefs and related accuracy goal structures. In Study 1, we focused on the role of chronically accessible causal uncertainty beliefs as predictors of a target's level of guilt for an alleged academic misconduct offense. In Study 2, we examined the role of chronic causal uncertainty reduction goals and a manipulated accuracy goal; in Study 3, we investigated the role of primed causal uncertainty beliefs on guilt judgments. In all 3 studies, we found that activation of causal uncertainty beliefs and accuracy concerns was related to a reduced usage of stereotypes. Moreover, this reduction was not associated with participants' levels of perceived control, depression, state affect, need for cognition, or personal need for structure. Results are discussed in terms of their implications for the model of causal uncertainty and, more generally, in terms of the motivational processes underlying stereotype usage.     

Examining the effects of frustration on working memory capacity

The present study attempts to expand our understanding of frustration, clinical symptoms, and working memory by examining the unique contribution of attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder symptoms and frustration to working memory capacity (WMC). A factor-analytic framework was utilized to isolate and examine WMC based on results from three working memory tasks that were administered in counterbalanced order to control for individual differences in baseline WMC. All participants provided subjective ratings of frustration both prior to and after administration of a frustration induction. Results suggest that although we were able to systematically induce subjective frustration for participants in the experimental group relative to the control group, WMC was not associated with induced frustration in the present study. Results also indicated that inattention symptoms predicted baseline frustration levels. This work highlights the need to examine the extent to which storage/rehearsal WMC and additional process-oriented working memory-related performance variables are related to frustration. The data that support the findings of this study are available from the corresponding author upon request.     

Against Perceptual Conceptualism

This paper is concerned with the question of whether mature human experience is thoroughly conceptual, or whether it involves non-conceptual elements or layers. It has two central goals. The first goal is methodological. It aims to establish that that question is, to a large extent, an empirical question. The question cannot be answered by appealing to purely a priori and transcendental considerations. The second goal is to argue, inter alia by relying on empirical findings, that the view known as ‘state-conceptualism’ is false. We will argue that our experiences do involve non-conceptual elements. That is, a subject may enjoy an experience with a particular phenomenal aspect, without possessing the concept needed for the specification of the content of that aspect, and moreover, without being able to acquire that concept upon having that experience.     

Mental state decoding in past major depression: Effect of sad versus happy mood induction

Individuals with mild depression show an enhanced ability to read or “decode” others' mental states. The goal of the present study was to investigate whether this pattern of performance is related specifically to the pathology of depression or whether it is simply a feature of the transient dysphoric state. Forty-one undergraduates with a previous episode of major depression and 52 undergraduates with no depression history participated in a mental state decoding task following a sad versus happy mood induction. Previously depressed participants were significantly more accurate in their mental state judgements than were the never-depressed participants, suggesting that enhanced mental state decoding may be a specific feature of depression in remission. Furthermore, previously depressed participants whose positive mood increased in response to the happy mood induction showed a poorer level of performance on the task, similar to that observed in the never-depressed group. Thus, a happy mood may have induced a somewhat less accurate, but perhaps more adaptive, approach to processing social information. These findings were robust after controlling for current level of depression and anxiety symptoms, intensity of response to the mood induction, response times, and performance on a control task.