The Instability of Philosophical Intuitions: Running Hot and Cold on Truetemp

A growing body of empirical literature challenges philosophers' reliance on intuitions as evidence based on the fact that intuitions vary according to factors such as cultural and educational background, and socio-economic status. Our research extends this challenge, investigating Lehrer's appeal to the Truetemp Case as evidence against reliabilism. We found that intuitions in response to this case vary according to whether, and which, other thought-experiments are considered first. Our results show that compared to subjects who receive the Truetemp Case first, subjects first presented with a clear case of knowledge are less willing to attribute knowledge in the Truetemp Case, and subjects first presented with a clear case of non-knowledge are more willing to attribute knowledge in the Truetemp Case. We contend that this instability undermines the supposed evidential status of these intuitions, such that philosophers who deal in intuitions can no longer rest comfortably in their armchairs.     

Truth as a ‘Living Bond’: A Dialectical Response to Recent Rhetorical Theology

Abstract: In recent years, the Radical Orthodoxy movement (especially John Milbank) has developed an influential theological response to the putative nihilism inherent in modern philosophical tendencies to construe the relation between finite and infinite realities as utterly disjunctive and thus incapable of mediation. This response, which generally implies the championing of a ‘participatory’ ontology, has been very hostile to Protestant or ‘dialectical’ theology, whose insistence upon an ‘indirect’ rather than a ‘rhetorical’ form of truth is taken to implicate such theology in the nihilism of a ‘univocal’ ontology. In this article I offer another reading of the dialectical, via Søren Kierkegaard and René Girard, according to which its anti‐objectivism is due not to the inheritance of modern epistemological dilemmas but to a quite biblical existential rigor. I argue, contrary to Milbank, that this rigor is not finally gnostic, but instead that it alone can preserve the form of truth as a living, spiritual form.     

BLAMEWORTHINESS WITHOUT WRONGDOING

In this article I argue that it is possible to be blameworthy for doing something that was not objectively morally wrong. If I am right, this would have implications for several debates at the intersection of metaphysics and moral philosophy. I also float a view about which actions can serve as legitimate bases for blame that allows for the possibility of blameworthiness without objective wrongdoing and also suggests an explanation for the appeal of the commonly held view that blameworthiness requires objective wrongdoing.