Knowing when to move on: cognitive and perceptual decisions in time

We investigated people's ability to decide how much time to spend on the task at hand. To make such decisions well, one must take into account, among other things, the cost of failing and how one's task performance changes as a function of time. We first investigated timing decisions when the underlying task was perceptual. Decisions were highly efficient and suggested that people can make good use of perceptual knowledge and abstract reward information. Previous studies have found that perceptual decisions are generally optimal, but that cognitive decisions are generally suboptimal--a perception-cognition gap. Does a similar gap exist for timing decisions? We compared timing decisions for a perceptual task with timing decisions for more cognitive tasks. Performance was highly similar across the tasks, which suggests that knowledge can be acquired, and used to make timing decisions, in an equally efficient way regardless of whether that knowledge is derived through perceptual or cognitive experience.     

Adaptation to sensory-motor temporal misalignment: instrumental or perceptual learning?

Sensory-motor delays vary over the course of development and under different environmental conditions. Previous research has shown that humans can compensate for the resulting temporal misalignment while performing sensory-motor tasks (e.g., Cunningham, Billock, & Tsou, 2001a), but remains silent on the question of whether perceptual learning-similar to that involved in adaptation to spatial misalignment (e.g., Redding & Wallace, 1993) and in adaptation to purely intersensory misalignment (e.g., Fujisaki, Shimojo, Kashino, & Nishida, 2004)-is also involved in this adaptive response. Following an attempted replication of Cunningham et al.'s (2001a) study in a preliminary experiment, we present in this paper two experiments that demonstrate that after-effects of adaptation to temporal misalignment do not spontaneously decay. The literature on adaptation to spatial misalignment suggests that, while instrumental learning spontaneously decays in the absence of reinforcement, perceptual learning persists. Therefore our results are consistent with adaptation being effected through perceptual learning.     

A General Factor of Personality in the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory-III, the Dimensional Assessment of Personality Pathology, and the Personality Assessment Inventory

A General Factor of Personality (GFP) occupies the apex of the hierarchy in three prominent personality disorder inventories. On the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory-III, a GFP accounted for 41% of the variance in two second-order factors, 31% of the variance in five first-order factors, and 26% of the variance in all 24 scales. On the Dimensional Assessment of Personality Pathology, a GFP accounted for 61% of the variance in six first-order factors and 36% of the variance in all 18 scales. In a cross-validation study of the Personality Assessment Inventory, a GFP accounted for 65% of the variance in two second-order factors, 47% of the variance in five first-order factors, and 27% of the variance in all 18 scales.     

Relation between aging and research productivity of academic psychologists

Using a cross-sequential design involving four birth cohorts and five measurement periods, a curvilinear relation between aging and research productivity was found for more than 1,000 academic psychologists. Productivity typically began at a low rate in the 20s, increased to a peak around age 40, then decreased in the later years. Substantial individual differences were also observed. Those who began as high publishers remained more productive than the low or medium groups at each age level examined, and even at ages 55-64 they were more productive than the medium or low publishers were at their highest rate. Altogether, across cohorts and publishing levels, age accounted for 6.5% of the variance in publication rate from ages 25-34 to 55-64.     

When a child dies: the sociobiology of bereavement

According to modern evolutionary theory, the fitness of individuals consists of both their personal reproductive success and the reproductive success of those with whom they share genes in common. It follows that one of the most biologically costly events possible is the death of a child. This study investigated the grief intensity of bereaved parents and their immediate families using ratings made by 263 bereaved parents. Predictions were derived from sociobiological tenets relating to parental investment, paternal uncertainty, and the propagation potential of both parents and children. Consequently, it was found that mothers grieved more than fathers, healthy children were grieved for more than unhealthy children; male children were grieved for more than female children; health of child and sex of child interacted such that the pattern of grief intensity obtained was healthy male greater than healthy female = unhealthy female = unhealthy male; similar children were grieved for more than dissimilar children; maternal grandmothers grieved more than either maternal grandfathers or paternal grandmothers, who in turn grieved more than paternal grandfathers; and mothers' siblings grieved more than fathers' siblings.     

Experimenter bias and subliminal perception.

It has been suggested that subliminal perception phenomena may be in part due to experimenter bias effects. Two studies that obtained positive evidence of subliminal perception were therefore replicated with experimenters tested under blind and not blind conditions. There was only marginal support for the subliminal perception hypothesis and, although there were fairly clear indications of diffuse experimenter effects, the evidence for the experimenter bias explanation of subliminal perception was not strong. The need for more extensive replications of subliminal perception researches is noted. It is argued that the experimenter bias hypothesis lacks detail and generality; it is essential for it to be examined in the context of theoretically substantial issues.     

The pop out of scene-relative object movement against retinal motion due to self-movement

An object that moves is spotted almost effortlessly; it "pops out". When the observer is stationary, a moving object is uniquely identified by retinal motion. This is not so when the observer is also moving; as the eye travels through space all scene objects change position relative to the eye producing a complicated field of retinal motion. Without the unique identifier of retinal motion an object moving relative to the scene should be difficult to locate. Using a search task, we investigated this proposition. Computer-rendered objects were moved and transformed in a manner consistent with movement of the observer. Despite the complex pattern of retinal motion, objects moving relative to the scene were found to pop out. We suggest the brain uses its sensitivity to optic flow to "stabilise" the scene, allowing the scene-relative movement of an object to be identified.     

How to Assess a Model's Testability and Identifiability

Formal definitions are given of the following intuitive concepts: (a) A model is quantitatively testable if its predictions are highly precise and narrow. (b) A model is identifiable if the values of its parameters can be ascertained from empirical observations. (c) A model is redundant if the values of some parameters can be deduced from others or if the values of some observables can be deduced from others. Various rules of thumb for nonredundant models are examined. The Counting Rule states that a model is quantitatively testable if and only if it has fewer parameters than observables. This rule can be safely applied only to identifiable models. If a model is unidentifiable, one must apply a generalization of the Counting Rule known as the Jacobian Rule. This rule states that a model is quantitatively testable if and only if the maximum rank (i.e., the number of linearly independent columns) of its Jacobian matrix (i.e., the matrix of partial derivatives of the function that maps parameter values to the predicted values of observables) is smaller than the number of observables. The Identifiability Rule states that a model is identifiable if and only if the maximum rank of its Jacobian matrix equals the number of parameters. The conclusions provided by these rules are only presumptive. To reach definitive conclusions, additional analyses must be performed. To illustrate the foregoing, the quantitative testability and identifiability of linear models and of discrete-state models are analyzed. Copyright 2000 Academic Press.