On the Methodology of the Race Debate: Conceptual Analysis and Racial Discourse

The traditional debate about whether race should be eliminated from public discourse is often conducted in significant part by examining whether race is real. Whether race is real, in turn, often comes down to whether racial discourse purports to refer to social or natural kinds, which means that analysis of racial concepts is crucial to the question of racial eliminativism. The dominate theory of conceptual analysis in the race debate is that racial concepts should be analyzed according to how those terms have been used by historical experts. It is argued here that this dominant theory is misguided, and that we should therefore analyze racial concepts according to how they are used in contemporary, folk discourse. In addition, and in contrast to the main rival to the dominant theory, I argue that we should analyze folk racial discourse not from the armchair, but instead through empirical research.     

Conformity to Experimenter‐Provided Examples: Will People use an Unusual Feature?

Undergraduates studied nonword exemplars and then created their own novel nonwords. In Experiment 1, people studied legal or illegal nonwords. In Experiment 2, people studied illegal nonwords, but to increase awareness of the features, half of the participants assessed the features of the nonwords. Despite instructions to avoid copying any aspect of the examples, people incorporated features from the examples into their own novel creations. Although people do not spontaneously create illegal nonwords, those people that studied illegal nonwords were more likely to create illegal nonwords. Assessing the features of the examples did not reduce the likelihood that people would copy features of the examples. We discuss these results in the context of Ward's (1994) structured imagination account.     

Taking People as They Are?

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Downtown Metropolitan Churches: Ecological Situation and Response

Based on three principles from theories of human ecology, this study examines the response of downtown churches in metropolitan Columbus, Ohio to a changing environment. Over 150 years, churches grew in number, stabilized, contracted sharply, and restabilized, changing increasingly from neighborhood to niche churches. Better-funded larger and older churches survived by developing heterogeneous religious and other ties with diverse weekday populations of downtown residents, employees, shoppers, and transients. Churches closer to the city center had more opportunities to develop these relationships. Sociological factors such as theology, leadership, and external resources from the metropolis, state, and nation also played a role. The interaction of sociological and ecological frameworks on both macro and micro levels explains the response of religious organizations to specific urban environments.     

The Instability of Philosophical Intuitions: Running Hot and Cold on Truetemp

A growing body of empirical literature challenges philosophers' reliance on intuitions as evidence based on the fact that intuitions vary according to factors such as cultural and educational background, and socio-economic status. Our research extends this challenge, investigating Lehrer's appeal to the Truetemp Case as evidence against reliabilism. We found that intuitions in response to this case vary according to whether, and which, other thought-experiments are considered first. Our results show that compared to subjects who receive the Truetemp Case first, subjects first presented with a clear case of knowledge are less willing to attribute knowledge in the Truetemp Case, and subjects first presented with a clear case of non-knowledge are more willing to attribute knowledge in the Truetemp Case. We contend that this instability undermines the supposed evidential status of these intuitions, such that philosophers who deal in intuitions can no longer rest comfortably in their armchairs.     

PUTTING PARTICULARISM IN ITS PLACE

Abstract: The point of this paper is to undermine the support that particularism in the domain of epistemic reasons might seem to give to particularism in the domain of practical reasons. In the epistemic domain, there are two related notions: truth and the rationality of belief. Epistemic reasons are related to the rationality of belief, and not directly to truth. In the domain of practical reasons, however, the role of truth is taken by the notion of objective rationality. Practical reasons are directly relevant to this objective notion, and therefore the reasons to expect holism and particularism in the epistemic domain do not transfer to the domain of practical rationality.     

How Are Basic Belief‐Forming Methods Justified?

In this paper, we present an account of in virtue of what thinkers are justified in employing certain basic belief-forming methods. The guiding idea is inspired by Reichenbach's work on induction. There are certain projects in which thinkers are rationally required to engage. Thinkers are epistemically justified in employing a belief-forming method that is indispensable for successfully engaging in such a project. We present a detailed account based on this intuitive thought, and address objections to it. We conclude by commenting on the implications that our account may have for other important epistemological debates.     

TOWARD AN EPISTEMOLOGY OF CERTAIN SUBSTANTIVE A PRIORI TRUTHS

Abstract: This article explains and motivates an account of one way in which we might have substantive a priori knowledge in one important class of domains: domains in which the central concepts are response-dependent. The central example will be our knowledge of the connection between something's being harmful and the fact that it is irrational for us to fail to be averse to that thing. The idea is that although the relevant responses (basic aversion in the case of harm, and a kind of interpretive failure in the case of irrationality) are produced by independent psychological mechanisms, they have distal causes that turn out to be related in ways that—once language enters the picture—yield epistemically accessible necessary connections between the referents of their corresponding terms.     

The desire for sexual variety as a key to understanding basic human mating strategies

Different authors have proposed competing evolutionary theories of human mating. Some argue that both sexes are designed to pursue a singular long‐term mating strategy. Others contend that both sexes are designed to function as essentially multiple maters. Sexual Strategies Theory (SST; D.M. Buss & D.P. Schmitt, 1993), in contrast, proposes that men and women have evolved short‐term and long‐term mating strategies that are pursued differently by each sex depending on theoretically derived dimensions of context. According to SST, the sexes tend to differ in the nature and prominence of the short‐term component of human mating–particularly the short‐term desire for sexual variety. The current research was designed to test competing empirical predictions from these contrasting theories by focusing on sex differences in the desire for sexual variety. Study 1 (N= 1,049), consisting of five separate samples, found large and consistent sex differences in the desire for short‐term sexual variety, even after employing statistical methods to control for skewed distributions and statistical outliers. Study 2 (N= 192) confirmed the results of Study 1 using an older, more mature sample. Study 3 (N= 50) again replicated these sex differences using an observer‐based method of inquiry. Study 4 (N= 167) found evidence that short‐term mating was unrelated generally to psychological dysfunction and may be related to mentally healthy personality characteristics in men. Discussion focuses on the viability of pluralistic compared with monomorphic evolutionary theories of human mating strategies.