PUTTING PARTICULARISM IN ITS PLACE

Abstract: The point of this paper is to undermine the support that particularism in the domain of epistemic reasons might seem to give to particularism in the domain of practical reasons. In the epistemic domain, there are two related notions: truth and the rationality of belief. Epistemic reasons are related to the rationality of belief, and not directly to truth. In the domain of practical reasons, however, the role of truth is taken by the notion of objective rationality. Practical reasons are directly relevant to this objective notion, and therefore the reasons to expect holism and particularism in the epistemic domain do not transfer to the domain of practical rationality.     

Family-of-Origin Experiences and Conflict Resolution Behaviors of Young Adult Dating Couples

This study was conducted to explore the relationship among retrospective reports of family-of-origin functioning, reported perceptions of a laboratory-based conflict resolution discussion, and outsiders' ratings of communication behaviors between young adult dating couples, with a special focus on predicted gender differences. Sixty-three couples aged 18 to 24 participated in this study. A Revealed Differences task was used to elicit discussion about an issue identified as discordant for the couple on a Relationship Issue Questionnaire. Family-of-origin variables were related to both men's and women's perceptions of the conflict, as well as outsiders' ratings of their conflict resolution behaviors. However, the conflict resolution behaviors and perceptions of men and women were associated with distinctly different aspects of functioning in their families of origin. Further, women's families-of-origin factors were more prominent for the couples' communication behaviors because they indicated a greater number of significant correlations between the women's families of origin and: 1) perceptions of the conflict resolution discussion by both the men and women, and 2) the observed conflict resolution behaviors of both men and women. These findings are discussed in the context of both the relevant research and important social-political influences.     

Bad Luck Once Again

In a recent article in this journal, Storrs McCall and E.J. Lowe sketch an account of indeterminist free will designed to avoid the luck objection that has been wielded to such effect against event‐causal libertarianism. They argue that if decision‐making is an indeterministic process and not an event or series of events, the luck objection will fail. I argue that they are wrong: the luck objection is equally successful against their account as against existing event‐causal libertarianisms. Like the event‐causal libertarianism their account is meant to supplant, the process view cannot offer a reasons explanation of the agent’s choice itself; that choice is explained by nothing except chance. The agent therefore fails to exercise freedom‐level control over it.     

How Are Basic Belief‐Forming Methods Justified?

In this paper, we present an account of in virtue of what thinkers are justified in employing certain basic belief-forming methods. The guiding idea is inspired by Reichenbach's work on induction. There are certain projects in which thinkers are rationally required to engage. Thinkers are epistemically justified in employing a belief-forming method that is indispensable for successfully engaging in such a project. We present a detailed account based on this intuitive thought, and address objections to it. We conclude by commenting on the implications that our account may have for other important epistemological debates.     

TOWARD AN EPISTEMOLOGY OF CERTAIN SUBSTANTIVE A PRIORI TRUTHS

Abstract: This article explains and motivates an account of one way in which we might have substantive a priori knowledge in one important class of domains: domains in which the central concepts are response-dependent. The central example will be our knowledge of the connection between something's being harmful and the fact that it is irrational for us to fail to be averse to that thing. The idea is that although the relevant responses (basic aversion in the case of harm, and a kind of interpretive failure in the case of irrationality) are produced by independent psychological mechanisms, they have distal causes that turn out to be related in ways that—once language enters the picture—yield epistemically accessible necessary connections between the referents of their corresponding terms.