Equality in Law and Philosophy

This article discusses various arguments for and against treating equality as a fundamental norm in law and political philosophy, combining prior arguments to the effect that equality is essentially an empty idea with arguments that treat it as a non‐empty but mistaken value that should be rejected. After concluding that most of the arguments for treating equality as a fundamental value fall victim to one or both of these arguments, it considers more closely arguments made by philosophers such as Ronald Dworkin and Thomas Nagel that base a duty of promoting equality on the fact that governments impose a legal order on persons without their consent. It concludes that these arguments are mistaken: if the legal order imposed by government is justified then imposing it is not wrongful and generates no duty of equal treatment, while if that order is not justified no requirement of equality of treatment would cure the lack of justification. It concludes that equality should not be a value in law or political theory, but in some cases other considerations (such as alleviating poverty and distress, promoting accuracy and substantive justice, avoiding arbitrariness, and other values) may justify particular rules that are sometimes mistakenly thought to be based on equality.     

Test-Retest Properties of the Least Preferred Co-worker (LPC) Score

The test-retest properties of the Least Preferred Co-Worker (LPC) scale and two subscales were examined under two conditions: (a) a naive condition, in which respondents were uninformed as to the meaning of the scale and (b) an informed condition, in which the scale was explained to respondents between administrations. The results support the hypothesis that the test-retest stability of the total LPC score would decrease significantly when respondents understood the scale. The stability of the interpersonal subscale exhibited a decrease similar to that of the total scale score, whereas the stability of the task subscale remained constant even when the scale was explained.     

THE DIVERSITY–VALIDITY DILEMMA: OVERVIEW AND LEGAL CONTEXT

Due to racioethnic and sex subgroup differences on predictor scores in many selection procedures, it is difficult for organizations to simultaneously maximize the validity of their selection procedures and hire a diverse workforce. One response to this diversity–validity dilemma is to revise the selection procedures, an approach developed by Ployhart and Holtz (this issue, 2008) . A second possible response is to use affirmative action to increase workforce diversity, an approach developed by Kravitz (this issue, 2008) . This paper briefly presents the legal context that motivates and constrains these approaches. We begin by defining key terms, describing adverse impact, and outlining the burden of proof in adverse impact cases. We then turn to the use of racioethnic minority and female preferences, summarizing some key court decisions and the conditions under which private and public employers may use preferences.     

Missing a romantic partner: A prototype analysis

In this study, a prototype analysis of romantic missing was conducted. College‐age participants in the United States generated features of missing a partner (Study 1) and rated their centrality (Study 2). In a reaction time task, participants made category judgments for central features more quickly than for noncentral features (Study 3). In recognition and recall tasks, central features were more salient in participants’ memory, and participants evaluated individuals experiencing central features in vignettes as missing their partners more (Study 4). A prototype‐based measure of missing administered to individuals in long‐distance relationships (Study 5) correlated with commitment and attachment dimensions but only weakly with loneliness. Finally, level of missing differed based on whether individuals were in a geographically distant (vs. proximal) relationships (Study 6).     

WATCHING THE DETECTIVES: SEASONAL STUDENT EMPLOYEE REACTIONS TO ELECTRONIC MONITORING WITH AND WITHOUT ADVANCE NOTIFICATION

The present paper tested procedural justice hypotheses about seasonal high school and college student employees' reactions to electronic monitoring with video cameras. Study 1, a field study, explored (a) whether employees receiving advance notification of monitoring offered more favorable justice judgments than employees who did not, and (b) whether employees who saw monitoring procedures and/or consequences as fair returned to the organization the following summer. Results supported the hypotheses: employees viewed monitoring procedures as fairer if they received advance notice. Fairness judgments predicted reemployment Study 2, a scenario-based laboratory experiment, also found that advance notice elicited greater justice beliefs. In addition, Study 2 examined how variations in justification for the monitoring affected justice beliefs. Either strong or weak justifications produced greater procedural justice beliefs than no justification.