COHERENTISM AND JUSTIFIED INCONSISTENT BELIEFS: A SOLUTION

The most pressing difficulty coherentism faces is, I believe, the problem of justified inconsistent beliefs. In a nutshell, there are cases in which our beliefs appear to be both fully rational and justified, and yet the contents of the beliefs are inconsistent, often knowingly so. This fact contradicts the seemingly obvious idea that a minimal requirement for coherence is logical consistency. Here, I present a solution to one version of this problem.     

Generalization of Creativity Across Domains: Examination of the Method Effect Hypothesis

The question of whether creativity is content general or content specific is one of the most controversial issues in contemporary creativity research. Recent studies provide support for both positions, but the results of these investigations may be influenced by several factors, including the presence of a method effect (i.e., psychometric vs. alternative assessment). This study investigates the method effect by analyzing quantity (psychometric) and quality (alternative assessment) of creative achievement simultaneously using structural equation modeling. Results provide evidence for the method effect hypothesis.     

The Instability of Philosophical Intuitions: Running Hot and Cold on Truetemp

A growing body of empirical literature challenges philosophers' reliance on intuitions as evidence based on the fact that intuitions vary according to factors such as cultural and educational background, and socio-economic status. Our research extends this challenge, investigating Lehrer's appeal to the Truetemp Case as evidence against reliabilism. We found that intuitions in response to this case vary according to whether, and which, other thought-experiments are considered first. Our results show that compared to subjects who receive the Truetemp Case first, subjects first presented with a clear case of knowledge are less willing to attribute knowledge in the Truetemp Case, and subjects first presented with a clear case of non-knowledge are more willing to attribute knowledge in the Truetemp Case. We contend that this instability undermines the supposed evidential status of these intuitions, such that philosophers who deal in intuitions can no longer rest comfortably in their armchairs.