What Am I? Virtual Machines and the Mind/Body Problem

When your word processor or email program is running on your computer, this creates a “virtual machine” that manipulates windows, files, text, etc. What is this virtual machine, and what are the virtual objects it manipulates? Many standard arguments in the philosophy of mind have exact analogues for virtual machines and virtual objects, but we do not want to draw the wild metaphysical conclusions that have sometimes tempted philosophers in the philosophy of mind. A computer file is not made of epiphenomenal ectoplasm. I argue instead that virtual objects are “supervenient objects.” The stereotypical example of supervenient objects is the statue and the lump of clay. To this end I propose a theory of supervenient objects. Then I turn to persons and mental states. I argue that my mental states are virtual states of a cognitive virtual machine implemented on my body, and a person is a supervenient object supervening on this cognitive virtual machine.     

In the Name of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit: A Critical Reflection on the Trinitarian Theologies of Religion of S. Mark Heim and Gavin D'Costa

Abstract:  S. Mark Heim and Gavin D'Costa are two significant contemporary authors grounding a theology of religions in the doctrine of the Trinity. This article critically examines their respective interpretations of the doctrine of the Trinity, and their deployment of this doctrine in appreciation of religious difference. Heim, in his attempt to provide a theological validation for the world religions, departs from more traditional formulations of the Trinity. Ironically, this departure means that he fails to describe the world religions in their own particularity, that is, as they would describe themselves. D'Costa, by contrast, maintains a sound trinitarian position, and raises the question of Christian responsibility toward the world religions from precisely this theological grounding. He does not conceptualize the religions within a theological framework, but does demonstrate that engagement with the religions constitutes an obedient ecclesial response to the Trinity.     

EMBRYONIC PERSONHOOD,HUMAN NATURE,AND RATIONAL ENSOULMENT

This essay briefly describes a few of the problems associated with using personhood language to defend the right to life of the pre‐implantation embryo. Arguing that an immaterial soul explains the personal identity of an embryo is problematic for many people because there is no apparent spiritual activity in the unborn. While some scholars argue that the embryo has the potential to act as an adult person and thus should be protected from harm, others contend that potentiality alone is insufficient reason to ascribe special moral worth to the embryo in utero. For Thomas Aquinas, the soul is not only the life‐principle that organizes the human body, but it is also that by which the human being thinks and wills. By making suitable corrections to Aristotle's hylomorphic depiction of the soul–body relation, I suggest that a rational soul must be present from the moment of conception and that it is at the service of the (embryonic) person. What is of critical importance here is to accept that a human being is present from the moment of conception, something the vast majority of embryologists maintain, notwithstanding the inveiglement of those who state that the pre‐implantation blastocyst is simply a disorganized clump of cells.     

ARE WE GETTING FOOLED AGAIN? COMING TO TERMS WITH LIMITATIONS IN THE USE OF PERSONALITY TESTS FOR PERSONNEL SELECTION

We recently published an article in which we highlighted a number of issues associated with the use of self-report personality tests in personnel selection contexts ( Morgeson et al., 2007 ). Both Ones, Dilchert, Viswesvaran, and Judge (2007) and Tett and Christiansen (2007) have written responses to this article. In our response to these articles we address many of the issues raised by Ones et al. and Tett and Christiansen. In addition to a detailed response, we make the following 4 key points: (1) Our criticisms of personality testing apply only to the selection context, not to all research on personality; (2) the observed validities of personality tests predicting job performance criteria are low and have not changed much over time; (3) when evaluating the usefulness of using personality tests to select applicants, one must not ignore the observed, uncorrected validity; and (4) when discussing the value of personality tests for selection contexts, the most important criteria are those that reflect job performance. Implications for personality testing research and practice are discussed.     

Personal Responsibility for Tornado Preparedness: Commitment or Choice?1

A review of the literature reveals that personal responsibility assumed for one's behavior clearly affects behavioral outcomes for a variety of situations, and that personal responsibility is in turn affected by a wide variety of variables. However, limited research has been conducted to determine exactly what personal responsibility fundamentally entails. While duty, moral obligation, choice, and commitment have been suggested as being integral to the concept of responsibility, few investigations have systematically varied more than one of these variables in a single experiment. The present study was conducted to investigate the effects of both choice and commitment on personal responsibility assumed for and behavioral intentions to engage in tornado preparedness. Results indicate that both choice and commitment were required to generate personal responsibility for and subsequent intentions to engage in tornado preparedness. Implications of these results are discussed.