EXPLICATION AND TEST OF A COGNITIVE MODEL OF COMMUNICATION APPREHENSION: A NEW LOOK AT AN OLD CONSTRUCT

A cognitive model of the processes underlying the arousal of a state of communication apprehension is proposed. This model draws upon current work in cognitive science to specify the nature of the relevant structures and the nature of the processes that operate over those structures. An empirical test of the model indicates strong support in that the interaction of long-term memory contents and perceived evaluative ness of the situation was a significant predictor of anxiety. Additionally, the model allowed the prediction of changes in physiological arousal (heart rate) over time that closely paralleled observed heart rate.     

THE DISCLOSURE-LIKING RELATIONSHIP

Two experiments were conducted to investigate the effects of a perceiver's own disclosure on attraction for self-disclosing others. In Experiment 1, female undergraduates selected two topics and disclosed information on them to a confederate partner. This disclosure occurred either before or after the confederate disclosed information on three different topics that were either high or low in intimacy. Based on self-perception theory, it was predicted and found that intimacy of the subject's self-disclosure would be positively correlated with attraction for the confederate when the subject disclosed before her partner but not when she disclosed after her partner. A second prediction that subjects would be attracted toward a highly intimate partner only if they had previously disclosed was not confirmed. Instead, attraction for the confederate was greater when she had disclosed before the subject and when she had disclosed intimately. Experiment 2 varied the intimacy of the response of a partner to the subject's initial self-disclosure and whether this response dealt with the same topics or different topics. It was found that attraction was greater for an intimate than a nonintimate partner when topics for disclosure were the same. When disclosure topics were different, there was no significant difference in attraction for the intimate and nonintimate partner. Results are discussed in terms of their implications for the disclosure-liking hypothesis.     

Agnosticism About Other Worlds: A New Antirealist Programme in Modality

The modal antirealist, as presented here, aims to secure at least some of the benefits associated with talking in genuine modal realist terms while avoiding commitment to a plurality of Lewisian (or ersatz) worlds. The antirealist stance of agnosticism about other worlds combines acceptance of Lewis's account of what world-talk means with refusal to assert, or believe in, the existence of other worlds. Agnosticism about other worlds does not entail a comprehensive agnosticism about modality, but where such agnosticism about modality is enforced, the aim of the agnostic programme is to show that it is not detrimental to our modal practices. The agnostic programme consists in an attempt to demonstrate the rational dispensability of that disputed class of modal beliefs which the agnostic eschews, but which are held by the realist and the folk. Here I attempt to motivate, describe, and illustrate such an agnostic antirealist programme in modal philosophy.     

EMBRYONIC PERSONHOOD,HUMAN NATURE,AND RATIONAL ENSOULMENT

This essay briefly describes a few of the problems associated with using personhood language to defend the right to life of the pre‐implantation embryo. Arguing that an immaterial soul explains the personal identity of an embryo is problematic for many people because there is no apparent spiritual activity in the unborn. While some scholars argue that the embryo has the potential to act as an adult person and thus should be protected from harm, others contend that potentiality alone is insufficient reason to ascribe special moral worth to the embryo in utero. For Thomas Aquinas, the soul is not only the life‐principle that organizes the human body, but it is also that by which the human being thinks and wills. By making suitable corrections to Aristotle's hylomorphic depiction of the soul–body relation, I suggest that a rational soul must be present from the moment of conception and that it is at the service of the (embryonic) person. What is of critical importance here is to accept that a human being is present from the moment of conception, something the vast majority of embryologists maintain, notwithstanding the inveiglement of those who state that the pre‐implantation blastocyst is simply a disorganized clump of cells.