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141.
JOHN KULVICKI 《美学与艺术评论杂志》2016,74(4):335-346
Long‐exposure photographs present distinctive philosophical challenges. They do not quite look like things in motion. Experiences of such photos take time, but not in a way that mimics the time of the motion depicted. In fact, it would not be off base to worry that these photos fail, strictly speaking, to depict motion or things‐in‐time. And if they fail to depict motion, then it is an interesting question what, if anything, they succeed in depicting. These timeless traces of temporal patterns are thus a challenge to how we understand pictures. In addition to being representations, however, such photographs are recordings. They witlessly register aspects of scenes in a manner that can be replayed. The following shows that recording is a valuable and neglected tool for investigating representational practices. Aspects of what photos record also figure in their representational contents, and this provides a way of approaching the photography of events in time. This article proceeds by framing, and then answering, three questions. First, what do photos record about temporal patterns? Second, which aspects of such recordings also show up in photos’ representational contents? And third, do these pictures depict, rather than merely represent, such temporal patterns? 相似文献
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JOHN L. SMITH NICKY J. BERRY PAUL WHITELEY 《European journal of social psychology》1997,27(2):237-243
Female high and low self-monitors were interviewed by a female experimenter who adopted either an androgynous or a feminine guise. An analysis of responses scored for femininity yielded a significant interaction between self-monitoring and interviewer guise which, when subjected to further analysis, revealed a significant simple effect for high self-monitors but not for low self-monitors. High self-monitors scored significantly higher on femininity when with the feminine guise interviewer, but lower when with the androgynous guise interviewer. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
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JOHN DIVERS 《Philosophy and phenomenological research》2004,69(3):660-685
The modal antirealist, as presented here, aims to secure at least some of the benefits associated with talking in genuine modal realist terms while avoiding commitment to a plurality of Lewisian (or ersatz) worlds. The antirealist stance of agnosticism about other worlds combines acceptance of Lewis's account of what world-talk means with refusal to assert, or believe in, the existence of other worlds. Agnosticism about other worlds does not entail a comprehensive agnosticism about modality, but where such agnosticism about modality is enforced, the aim of the agnostic programme is to show that it is not detrimental to our modal practices. The agnostic programme consists in an attempt to demonstrate the rational dispensability of that disputed class of modal beliefs which the agnostic eschews, but which are held by the realist and the folk. Here I attempt to motivate, describe, and illustrate such an agnostic antirealist programme in modal philosophy. 相似文献
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Nussbaum's Account of Compassion 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
JOHN DEIGH 《Philosophy and phenomenological research》2004,68(2):465-472
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JOHN L. POLLOCK 《Philosophy and phenomenological research》2008,76(2):237-309
When your word processor or email program is running on your computer, this creates a “virtual machine” that manipulates windows, files, text, etc. What is this virtual machine, and what are the virtual objects it manipulates? Many standard arguments in the philosophy of mind have exact analogues for virtual machines and virtual objects, but we do not want to draw the wild metaphysical conclusions that have sometimes tempted philosophers in the philosophy of mind. A computer file is not made of epiphenomenal ectoplasm. I argue instead that virtual objects are “supervenient objects.” The stereotypical example of supervenient objects is the statue and the lump of clay. To this end I propose a theory of supervenient objects. Then I turn to persons and mental states. I argue that my mental states are virtual states of a cognitive virtual machine implemented on my body, and a person is a supervenient object supervening on this cognitive virtual machine. 相似文献