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141.
JOHN DIVERS 《Philosophy and phenomenological research》2004,69(3):660-685
The modal antirealist, as presented here, aims to secure at least some of the benefits associated with talking in genuine modal realist terms while avoiding commitment to a plurality of Lewisian (or ersatz) worlds. The antirealist stance of agnosticism about other worlds combines acceptance of Lewis's account of what world-talk means with refusal to assert, or believe in, the existence of other worlds. Agnosticism about other worlds does not entail a comprehensive agnosticism about modality, but where such agnosticism about modality is enforced, the aim of the agnostic programme is to show that it is not detrimental to our modal practices. The agnostic programme consists in an attempt to demonstrate the rational dispensability of that disputed class of modal beliefs which the agnostic eschews, but which are held by the realist and the folk. Here I attempt to motivate, describe, and illustrate such an agnostic antirealist programme in modal philosophy. 相似文献
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Nussbaum's Account of Compassion 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
JOHN DEIGH 《Philosophy and phenomenological research》2004,68(2):465-472
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JOHN L. POLLOCK 《Philosophy and phenomenological research》2008,76(2):237-309
When your word processor or email program is running on your computer, this creates a “virtual machine” that manipulates windows, files, text, etc. What is this virtual machine, and what are the virtual objects it manipulates? Many standard arguments in the philosophy of mind have exact analogues for virtual machines and virtual objects, but we do not want to draw the wild metaphysical conclusions that have sometimes tempted philosophers in the philosophy of mind. A computer file is not made of epiphenomenal ectoplasm. I argue instead that virtual objects are “supervenient objects.” The stereotypical example of supervenient objects is the statue and the lump of clay. To this end I propose a theory of supervenient objects. Then I turn to persons and mental states. I argue that my mental states are virtual states of a cognitive virtual machine implemented on my body, and a person is a supervenient object supervening on this cognitive virtual machine. 相似文献
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JOHN G. FLETT 《International Journal of Systematic Theology》2008,10(1):73-90
Abstract: S. Mark Heim and Gavin D'Costa are two significant contemporary authors grounding a theology of religions in the doctrine of the Trinity. This article critically examines their respective interpretations of the doctrine of the Trinity, and their deployment of this doctrine in appreciation of religious difference. Heim, in his attempt to provide a theological validation for the world religions, departs from more traditional formulations of the Trinity. Ironically, this departure means that he fails to describe the world religions in their own particularity, that is, as they would describe themselves. D'Costa, by contrast, maintains a sound trinitarian position, and raises the question of Christian responsibility toward the world religions from precisely this theological grounding. He does not conceptualize the religions within a theological framework, but does demonstrate that engagement with the religions constitutes an obedient ecclesial response to the Trinity. 相似文献
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JOHN R. MEYER 《Heythrop Journal》2006,47(2):206-225
This essay briefly describes a few of the problems associated with using personhood language to defend the right to life of the pre‐implantation embryo. Arguing that an immaterial soul explains the personal identity of an embryo is problematic for many people because there is no apparent spiritual activity in the unborn. While some scholars argue that the embryo has the potential to act as an adult person and thus should be protected from harm, others contend that potentiality alone is insufficient reason to ascribe special moral worth to the embryo in utero. For Thomas Aquinas, the soul is not only the life‐principle that organizes the human body, but it is also that by which the human being thinks and wills. By making suitable corrections to Aristotle's hylomorphic depiction of the soul–body relation, I suggest that a rational soul must be present from the moment of conception and that it is at the service of the (embryonic) person. What is of critical importance here is to accept that a human being is present from the moment of conception, something the vast majority of embryologists maintain, notwithstanding the inveiglement of those who state that the pre‐implantation blastocyst is simply a disorganized clump of cells. 相似文献
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