Simple games as dynamic, coupled systems: randomness and other emergent properties

From a game theory perspective the ability to generate random behaviors is critical. However, psychological studies have consistently found that individuals are poor at behaving randomly. In this paper we investigated the possibility that the randomness mechanism lies not within the individual players but in the interaction between the players. Provided that players are influenced by their opponent’s past behavior, their relationship may constitute a state of reciprocal causation [Cognitive Science 21 (1998) 461], in which each player simultaneously affects and is affected by the other player. The result of this would be a dynamic, coupled system. Using neural networks to represent the individual players in a game of paper, rock, and scissors, a model of this process was developed and shown to be capable of generating chaos-like behaviors as an emergent property. In addition, it was found that by manipulating the control parameters of the model, corresponding to the amount of working memory and the perceived values of different outcomes, that the game could be biased in favor of one player over the other, an outcome not predicted by game theory. Human data was collected and the results show that the model accurately describes human behavior. The results and the model are discussed in light of recent theoretical advances in dynamic systems theory and cognition.     

Quantitative abilities of invertebrates: a methodological review

Animal Cognition - Quantitative abilities are widely recognized to play important roles in several ecological contexts, such as foraging, mate choice, and social interaction. Indeed, such abilities...     

A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis of Decision-Making in Offender Populations with Mental Disorder

Neuropsychology Review - Decision-making has many different definitions and is measured in varied ways using neuropsychological tasks. Offenders with mental disorder habitually make disadvantageous...     

How Polysemy Affects Concreteness Ratings: The Case of Metaphor

Concreteness ratings are frequently used in a variety of disciplines to operationalize differences between concrete and abstract words and concepts. However, most ratings studies present items in isolation, thereby overlooking the potential polysemy of words. Consequently, ratings for polysemous words may be conflated, causing a threat to the validity of concreteness‐ratings studies. This is particularly relevant to metaphorical words, which typically describe something abstract in terms of something more concrete. To investigate whether perceived concreteness ratings differ for metaphorical versus non‐metaphorical word meanings, we obtained concreteness ratings for 96 English nouns from 230 participants. Results show that nouns are perceived as less concrete when a metaphorical (versus non‐metaphorical) meaning is triggered. We thus recommend taking metaphoricity into account in future concreteness‐ratings studies to further improve the quality and reliability of such studies, as well as the consistency of the empirical studies that rely on these ratings.     

Emergent Goal-Anticipatory Gaze in Infants via Event-Predictive Learning and Inference

From about 7 months of age onward, infants start to reliably fixate the goal of an observed action, such as a grasp, before the action is complete. The available research has identified a variety of factors that influence such goal-anticipatory gaze shifts, including the experience with the shown action events and familiarity with the observed agents. However, the underlying cognitive processes are still heavily debated. We propose that our minds (i) tend to structure sensorimotor dynamics into probabilistic, generative event-predictive, and event boundary predictive models, and, meanwhile, (ii) choose actions with the objective to minimize predicted uncertainty. We implement this proposition by means of event-predictive learning and active inference. The implemented learning mechanism induces an inductive, event-predictive bias, thus developing schematic encodings of experienced events and event boundaries. The implemented active inference principle chooses actions by aiming at minimizing expected future uncertainty. We train our system on multiple object-manipulation events. As a result, the generation of goal-anticipatory gaze shifts emerges while learning about object manipulations: the model starts fixating the inferred goal already at the start of an observed event after having sampled some experience with possible events and when a familiar agent (i.e., a hand) is involved. Meanwhile, the model keeps reactively tracking an unfamiliar agent (i.e., a mechanical claw) that is performing the same movement. We qualitatively compare these modeling results to behavioral data of infants and conclude that event-predictive learning combined with active inference may be critical for eliciting goal-anticipatory gaze behavior in infants.     

Management of Test Anxiety Among Pupils in Basic Science Using Music-Based Cognitive Behavior Therapy Intervention: Implication for Community Development

Journal of Rational-Emotive & Cognitive-Behavior Therapy - Effectiveness of music-based cognitive behavior therapy (CBT) intervention has been established on various participants such as...     

Negative priming with masked distractor-only prime trials: awareness moderates negative priming

The literature yields inconsistent evidence for negative priming (NP) following masked distractor-only prime trials. We contrast two different hypotheses on the inconsistent findings: one - which is most compatible with the temporal discrimination theory - that relates the sign of priming effects to the absence vs. presence of prime awareness and one -which is most compatible with the inhibition and episodic retrieval accounts - that relates the sign of priming effects to the prime event being categorized as a to-be-attended vs. to-be-ignored event. In two experiments, it turned out that participants' awareness of the masked stimuli caused the different results (with participants being not aware of the primes showing NP), whereas the factor prime color = probe target color vs. prime color = probe distractor color (i.e., the prime contains the to-be-attended vs. the to-be-ignored signal) did not moderate NP. These findings are discussed with regard to theories of negative priming and the debate on conscious vs. unconscious perception.