Crossing No Man's Land: Cooperation From the Trenches

This paper represents an attempt to bridge the gap between rational and psychological models of choice, as represented by expected utility theory and prospect theory, and to show how researchers from different traditions can start to work together on problems of interest to both. A central issue for both models concerns the origin of preferences and how they might be predicted. Two questions of interest to all social scientists are related to the formation of preferences: What determines what people want, and what determines what people do once they know what they want? The incorporation of emotion into models of decision‐making may help users of divergent models find common ground for exploration and investigation.     

Resisting easy inferences1

Amie Thomasson has articulated a novel conception of ontological debates, defending an easy approach to ontological questions as part of the articulation of a deflationary metaphysical view (Thomasson, 2015). After raising some concerns to the approach, we sketch a neutralist alternative to her ontological framework, offering an even easier way of conducting ontological debates.