True-to-Hume laws and the open-future (or Hypertemporal Humeanism)

Take open-future Humeanism to comprise the following four tenets: (T1) that truth supervenes on a mosaic of local particular matters of fact; (T2) that there are no necessary connections between distinct existences; (T3) that there is a dynamic present moment; and (T4) that there are no future facts; that is, contingent propositions about the future obtain truth values only when their referents are actualised. Prima facie this is a deeply problematic metaphysic for the Humean, since given that the widely accepted Humean conception takes all truths (inclusive of nomological truths) to supervene on an omnitemporal mosaic of local particular matters of fact, if there are no future facts, then the Humean can neither provide laws of nature, nor justify many everyday inductive inferences. However, I argue that this eternalist metaphysic is in tension with at least one of Hume’s central metaphysical claims concerning causation, e.g. that causal regularities may cease to hold at any time. In this paper I propose and defend one possible open-future Humean metaphysic which admits of “true-to-Hume” causal and nomological facts. Furthermore, although I am happy to concede that induction is problematic for the open-future Humean, I demonstrate that it poses no greater threat to the open-future conception than it does to the popular Lewisian conception of natural law.     

Neuropsychological Impact of Trauma-Related Mental Illnesses: A Systematic Review of Clinically Meaningful Results

Neuropsychology Review - A trauma history is present in approximately 90% of adults in the United States. Comparatively, lifetime post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) prevalence...     

Do generation and regulation of emotions interact? Examination of their relationships in young adults

Emotions can be generated in response to inherently emotional perceptual properties of a stimulus (‘bottom up’) and in response to cognitive interpretations of an event (‘top down’). Similarly, emotion regulation (ER) strategies may deploy bottom-up or top-down processes, however the specific nature of these processes remains unclear. In this study we sought to replicate and extend previous studies that have investigated the interaction between ER and emotion generation. Specifically, we examined the relationship between both methods of emotion generation and ER in a sample of 75 undergraduate students who completed self-report questionnaires and a behavioral task of ER. We attempted to extend previous research by testing whether the positive effect of cognitive reappraisal on top-down generated emotions was specific to reappraisal or true of multiple ER strategies. Overall there was a main effect of generation such that top-down generated emotion was better regulated by cognitive reappraisal, expressive suppression, and appraisal strategies. We also found a main effect of ER such that cognitive reappraisal was perceived as the most successful ER strategy. We argue that ER is a state-dependent process that includes dynamic cycles between emotion generation and regulation processes. We further discuss expressive suppression as a top-down emotion regulation strategy in the context of our study despite debated literature.     

Determinism and sporting prowess: A response to Mumford and Anjum

In Getting Causes from Powers, Stephen Mumford and Rani Anjum published a novel approach to the metaphysics of dispositional properties, according to which causal powers are to be viewed as vectors. Recently (at the time of writing) they have employed a similar system to represent prowess in sport. In this paper, I discuss the Mumford/Anjum tendential theory of sporting prowess. I question their motivation for the tendencies account, concluding that (contra Mumford and Anjum) determinism would not take away from the enjoyment of spectator sports, so long as epistemic uncertainty is preserved. Nonetheless, I deem the tendencies theory of prowess a good one, so in addition, here I develop the Mumford/Anjum thesis, applying the multi-dimensional aspect they themselves apply to “complex causal situations” in their 2011 work on properties, to the philosophy of sport.