Attachment and expectations about future relationships: Moderation by accessibility

This article examined the relationship between internal working models of self and other (Bowlby, 1969) and expectations for satisfaction in a future relationship, and how that relationship is moderated by the accessibility of one's internal models. Study one showed that the model of self was predictive of expected satisfaction, but the model of other was not. In study two, the results of study one were replicated. However, using a reaction time task to measure the chronic accessibility of internal models, it was shown that the relationship between model of self and expected satisfaction existed only for people with highly accessible internal models. The implications of these findings for a more cognitive view of attachment-processes is discussed.     

On Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology

We argue, contrary to epistemological orthodoxy, that knowledge is not purely epistemic—that knowledge is not simply a matter of truth-related factors (evidence, reliability, etc.). We do this by arguing for a pragmatic condition on knowledge, KA: if a subject knows that p, then she is rational to act as if p. KA, together with fallibilism, entails that knowledge is not purely epistemic. We support KA by appealing to the role of knowledge-citations in defending and criticizing actions, and by giving a principled argument for KA, based on the inference rule KB: if a subject knows that A is the best thing she can do, she is rational to do A. In the second half of the paper, we consider and reject the two most promising objections to our case for KA, one based on the Gricean notion of conversational implicature and the other based on a contextualist maneuver.     

What We Owe the Dead

abstract   My aim in this paper is to argue that we have at least some obligations to the dead. After briefly considering some previous (unsuccessful) attempts to establish such obligations, I offer a reductio argument which establishes at least some obligations to the dead. Following this, the surprising extent of these obligations (given a few roughly Kantian assumptions) is considered. I then argue that there are and must be some significant limitations on the duties of the living in relation to the dead. My aim in this paper is not to sort out how we should deal with all of the particular cases in which the question of obligations to the dead emerge — in archaeological digs, research involving the newly dead, the execution of wills, or the fulfilment of last requests — but I will attempt to lay some groundwork for the future assessment of these questions.     

A Cross-Cultural Comparison of Worldviews: American and Fijian Counseling Students

The Scale to Assess World Views was administered to 104 Fijians and to 109 Americans who were all enrolled in counseling programs in their respective countries. Fijians and Americans were compared in order to determine whether the worldviews of counseling students in these two countries were different. Differences were found between the Fijian and American counseling students on the Human Relationships category and the Time Orientation Category. The Fijian Counseling students scored higher than the Americans on the Lineal-Hierarchical and Collateral-Mutual subscales of the Human Relationships Category and higher than the Americans on the Past and Future subscales of the Time Orientation Category.