ON NATURALIZING THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF MATHEMATICS

In this paper, I consider an argument for the claim that any satisfactory epistemology of mathematics will violate core tenets of naturalism, i.e. that mathematics cannot be naturalized. I find little reason for optimism that the argument can be effectively answered.     

BREACH AND FULFILLMENT OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTRACT: A COMPARISON OF TRADITIONAL AND EXPANDED VIEWS

Breach and fulfillment in a psychological contract has traditionally been studied with approaches that are conceptually and methodologically limited. We compared predictions derived from the traditional view to predictions from an expanded view that maintains the distinction between promised and delivered inducements and examines their joint relationship with employee satisfaction. The traditional and expanded views were compared using longitudinal data and polynomial regression analysis. Results provided little support for the traditional view. In contrast, results supported the expanded view and revealed that relationships for breach and fulfillment are more complex than previously suggested. Specifically, satisfaction depended on whether breach represented deficient or excess inducements and the particular inducement under consideration. Moreover, satisfaction was more strongly related to delivered inducements than promised inducements. These results question basic tenets of psychological contract research and indicate new avenues for research that build on the expanded view developed in this article.     

TRINITARIAN THEOLOGY AFTER AND WITH—BUT NOT AGAINST—AQUINAS?

Gilles Emery, Trinity in Aquinas , O.P. (Ypsilanti, Michigan: Sapientia Press, 2003), ix +361 pp.
Matthew Levering, Scripture and Metaphysics: Aquinas and the Renewal of Trinitarian Theology (Malden, Massa-chusetts: Blackwell, 2004), x +254 pp
Timothy L. Smith, Thomas Aquinas' Trinitarian Theology: A Study in Theological Method (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2003), xiii +258 pp.     

ROSS ON DESERT AND PUNISHMENT

Abstract:  W. D. Ross thinks it is good, other things equal, that people get what they deserve. But he denies that "the principle of punishing the vicious, for the sake of doing so, is that on which the state should proceed in its bestowal of punishments." Ross offers two main arguments for this denial: what I call the "scope argument" and the "state's purpose argument." I argue that both fail. In doing so, I illuminate Ross's distinctive views about desert and the state.