Journalists: a moral law unto themselves?

ABSTRACT Journalists often take themselves as having a moral duty to protect their sources. If the sources in question leak information from government departments, government ministers will consider themselves as having the moral right to demand that the journalists disclose the identity of those sources. This creates conflicts of value between what journalists and ministers consider to be right. It is argued not only that traditional moral theories cannot resolve such moral conflicts, but that they are in a sense a good thing. A world in which the conflicts occur may be considered to be better than one in which they are prevented from occurring, for one can expect to have both effective journalism and effective government only in the former. The most important consequence of this view is that it makes the professional ethics of journalism (and, by implication, those of other professions) into something more than the mere application of universal moral rules to the various situations in which those who work in the profession are liable to find themselves.     

KNOWING WHEN TO “SECOND-GUESS”

Studies on social information gathering typically investigate how an interactant actively elicits needed information from another source. An alternative approach would focus on how a hearer gathers selected bits of information from the message(s) at hand. The process of second-guessing is proposed as one such interpretive approach to information gathering. Previous research confirmed that social actors do use this strategy and use it reasonably effectively. This article extends our knowledge of second-guessing by looking at the conditions or “cues” that provoke the process, and by showing that participants in an experimental study second-guess when confronted with those cues.     

Michael Tooley and the Jolly Nasty Conclusion

Abstract Some recent powerful and persuasive arguments seem to imply that a world of people with lives that are barely worth living is preferable to a world which contains fewer people all of whom have extremely satisfying lives. This ‘repugnant conclusion’ is clearly to be rejected if possible—but is it possible? Many attempts to reject or avoid it have failed. One of the latest, by Michael Tooley, looked promising but the present essay argues that this attempt has also failed.